Logan v. Mullis, C-3313

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Citation: 686 S.W.2d 605
• Docket Number: No. C-3313,C-3313
• Parties: J.S. LOGAN, Jr., Petitioner, v. J.A. MULLIS, and Wife, Martha Mullis, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 13 March 1985

Page 605

686 S.W.2d 605 J.S. LOGAN, Jr., Petitioner,
v.
J.A. MULLIS, and Wife, Martha Mullis, Respondents. No. C-3313. Supreme Court of Texas. March 13, 1985.

Page 606

Hubbard, Patton, Peek, Haltom & Roberts, Donald W. Capshaw, Texarkana, for petitioner.

Atchley, Russell, Waldrop & Hlavinka, Norman C. Russell, Texarkana, for respondents.

GONZALEZ, Justice.

This is a suit for damages and an injunction for interference with an easement. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment for defendant, J.S. Logan, Jr. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for plaintiffs, J.A. and Martha Mullis. We affirm.

In 1977, Logan owned a tract of land which was landlocked. He purchased a roadway easement from James and Carolyn Ashford, the owners of adjoining property. The easement crossed the Ashfords' property to a public road. The easement provided that:

Page 607

The right of way, easement, rights and privileges herein granted shall be used only for the purpose of providing pedestrian and vehicular ingress and egress between the paved highway lying West of the Grantors' property mentioned above and the property of Grantee which adjoins the property of Grantors to the East.

It is agreed that the Grantee will build a fence along one side of the said easement as agreed with the Grantors, and further that the Grantors, their heirs and assigns, and the agents, invitees and guests of the Grantors, their heirs or assigns may also use the road way built and to be built by the Grantee.

Logan subsequently constructed a gravel road over the easement. Because a creek intersected the easement, he built a culvert beneath the road at that point. The culvert was constructed by cutting both ends off of a railroad tank car and putting it in the creek bed. When the culvert was completed, the gravel road was extended over it.

Later the same year that Logan obtained his easement, the Mullises purchased 18 1/2 acres of land from the Ashfords, subject to and including the Logan easement. Several years later, Logan acquired another highway access by purchasing the remainder of the Ashford property. Since he no longer needed the easement across the Mullis tract, Logan sent a letter to the Mullises informing them that "[y]ou will not use my road easement again unless you put it in yourself. Please be so advised and no matter what." Logan thereafter removed the metal culvert from the Mullises' property, destroyed part of the fence along the roadway, and piled dirt across the road to make it impassable.

The Mullises sued Logan for damages and injunctive relief. After a hearing, Logan was ordered to, within ninety days, replace the culvert, remove the obstructions placed across the easement and restore approximately 200 feet of fence which he tore down while removing the culvert. When he failed to comply, a motion for contempt of court was filed. Logan died before the motion was heard, and the suit for damages continued against his estate.

At trial, only special issues on damages were submitted to the jury. The jury found that: (1) the reasonable cost necessary to put the roadway in the condition in which it was immediately before Logan removed the culvert was $4,000; (2) the Mullises had suffered damages as a result of the removal of the culvert; and (3) the reasonable value of the loss of use of the property was $900.

The trial court initially rendered judgment for the Mullises in accordance with the jury verdict. Thereafter, Logan filed timely motions for new trial, for judgment N.O.V. and to vacate the judgment. The trial court vacated its original judgment and rendered a take nothing judgment in Logan's favor. At the Mullises' request, the trial court filed findings of fact and a conclusion of law that the culvert was not a fixture and that therefore, Logan had a right to remove it without incurring liability.

The essential liability issue was whether the culvert was permanently attached to the realty. If it retained its character as personalty, Logan was free to remove it when he abandoned the easement. If the culvert was a fixture, Logan had no right to remove it and subjected himself to liability for damages for its removal.

Three factors are relevant in determining whether personalty has become a fixture, that is, a permanent part of the realty to which it is affixed: (1) the mode and sufficiency of annexation, either real or constructive; (2) the adaptation of the article to the use or purpose of the realty; and (3) the intention of the party who annexed the chattel to the realty. O'Neal v. Quilter, 111 Tex. 345, 234 S.W. 528, 529 (1921), Fenlon v. Jaffee, 553 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The third criterion dealing with intention is preeminent, whereas the first and second criteria constitute evidence of intention. Fenlon v. Jaffee, 553 S.W.2d at

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428; Hutchins v. Masterson, 46 Tex. 551, 554 (1887).

Intent is made apparent by objective manifestations. Citizens' National Bank of Abilene v. Elk Mfg. Co., 29 S.W.2d 1062, 1065 (Tex.Comm'n App.1930, judgmt adopted). See also City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.1968). As a general rule, intent is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. However, even testimony of intention that the chattel was not meant to become a fixture will not prevail in the face of undisputed evidence to the contrary. See Ruby v. Cambridge Fire Ins. Co., 358 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1962, no writ). Where reasonable minds cannot differ, the issue is one of law rather than one of fact. See Exchange Savings & Loan Association v. Monocrete Pty. Ltd., 629 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex.1982) when this court in...