Loper v. Street

• Decision Date: 01 February 1980
• Citation: 412 A.2d 316
• Parties: Donald Wayne LOPER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Gerald I. STREET et al., Defendant and Third-Party-Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Third-Party Defendant Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 316

412 A.2d 316

Donald Wayne LOPER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Gerald I. STREET et al., Defendant and Third-Party-Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Third-Party

Defendant Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Nov. 15, 1979.

Decided Feb. 1, 1980.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Robert B. Young, of Young & Schwartz, Dover, for plaintiff below, appellant.

Nicholas H. Rodriguez and Catherine T. Hickey, of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P. A., Dover, for defendants below, appellees.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and QUILLEN, JJ.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

In this appeal, the question is whether the plaintiff was a "guest", as a matter of law, within the meaning of that term as used in the Delaware Automobile Guest Statute, 21 Del.C. § 6101(a). ¹

I.

The plaintiff, Donald Wayne Loper, was a passenger in an automobile which was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. The driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding, Carlton G. Patterson, was killed and the plaintiff and the driver of the other vehicle were injured. The plaintiff brought a negligence action in the Superior Court against Patterson's Estate and the driver of the other vehicle. The motion for summary judgment by Patterson's Estate was granted, and the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment was denied, on the ground that the plaintiff was a "guest without payment" in the Patterson automobile at the time of the accident, as that term is used in the Delaware Automobile Guest Statute and, thus, was prohibited from bringing a negligence action against Patterson or his Estate. The plaintiff appeals.

Viewing the events in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment has been granted, Wagner v. Olmedo, Del.Supr., 365 A.2d 643 (1976), the pertinent facts are as follows:

The plaintiff, age 17, and Patterson, age 18, were cousins and good friends. On the day of the accident, Patterson was home on leave from the Army and the plaintiff was visiting him at the home of Patterson's mother. Patterson's uncle had picked up the plaintiff and Patterson in his car with the intention of transporting them to the uncle's home. On the way there, they stopped to register Patterson for a learner's permit at the Department of Motor Vehicles.

Upon reaching the uncle's house, the threesome agreed that the uncle would lend his car to Patterson on the condition that Patterson and the plaintiff would wash the car. All agreed that Patterson would drive and that the plaintiff alone would accompany him as the statutorily required licensed driver. ²

Patterson and the plaintiff went to the house of the plaintiff's father to wash the car. Having completed this task, they drove to a nearby service station for gasoline since they were planning to drive some distance that evening to visit mutual friends. The plaintiff paid for half the gasoline purchased: $2.50. After stopping enroute to see some friends, Patterson and the plaintiff proceeded toward home with Patterson driving. It was on the way back to Patterson's uncle's house that the accident occurred.

II.

The plaintiff contends that the payment by him of half the cost of the gasoline is, alone, sufficient to remove him from the classification of "guest without payment" and to remove this case from the ambit of the Delaware Automobile Guest Statute. Alternatively, he argues, the totality of the circumstances of this case i. e., paying for the gas, helping Patterson wash the car, and acting as the statutorily required driver require such relief.

The defendant argues, and the Superior Court concluded, that the factual circumstances, upon which the plaintiff relies to release him from the proscriptions of the Guest Statute, were mere expressions of friendship and the exchange of social amenities. Such actions, it is argued, do not constitute sufficient bases to take the case out of the Automobile Guest Statute.

III.

It is axiomatic that, in determining whether a passenger is a "guest without payment" under § 6101(a), courts must look to the benefit gained by the driver. Foster v. Shropshire, Del.Super., 375 A.2d 458 (1977), Justice v. Gatchell, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 97 (1974); Mumford v. Robinson, Del.Supr., 231 A.2d 477 (1967). The plaintiff contends that the burden of persuasion rested on the shoulders of the defendant, and that this burden was not met by the Estate because it could not show that Patterson received no benefit in this case. We cannot agree.

The party asserting the inapplicability of the Guest Statute has the burden of persuasion. DeJoseph v. Faraone, Del.Super., 254 A.2d 257 (1969). The plaintiff relies on Stratford Apartments, Inc. v. Fleming, Del.Supr., 305 A.2d 624 (1973) to support the proposition that the party asserting the applicability of the statute has the burden of proof. There this Court stated:

"The crux of this case is whether Mrs. Fleming was a 'guest without payment'. Like the automobile guest statute, the property guest statute is in derogation of the common law and as such, it must be strictly construed against the party for whose benefit the law was passed, namely, the occupant. In order for Stratford to receive the protection of the guest statute, it must be shown that it received and expected no benefit of value from the guest's presence."

305 A.2d at 626 (emphasis added). This language, however, is not addressed to the burden of persuasion. It states a conclusion regarding the quantum of proof necessary for a showing that a party was a "guest without payment."

However, even if we were to accept the plaintiff's argument that the burden of proof lies with the party seeking the application of the Statute, we would still be unable to conclude that he was anything but a "guest" within the meaning of § 6101(a).

The key to the crucial question of whether a passenger in an automobile is a "guest without payment", within the meaning of § 6101(a), lies not in the absence of any benefit to the driver, as the plaintiff asserts, but in the tangible nature of the benefit conferred. Foster v. Shropshire, 375 A.2d at 460. In order for a benefit to be sufficiently tangible to negate the applicability of § 6101(a), it must impart a significant economic or business benefit to the operator of the vehicle. Mumford v. Robinson, 231 A.2d at 479; Dunn v. Stumbers, Del.Supr., 174 A.2d 567, 569 (1967); Smith v. Tatum, Va.Supr., 199 Va. 85, 97 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1957).

The benefits tendered here, as cause for this Court to render § 6101(a) unavailable in this case, do not meet this standard: The plaintiff's aid in washing Patterson's car is clearly not a sufficiently significant tangible benefit. The $2.50 paid by the plaintiff as contribution to gasoline for a trip to be made later is similarly too insignificant. He stresses the fact that this contribution was made in cash and asserts that such a method of payment is prima facie evidence of his status as a "passenger". The significance of a benefit is not dependent upon the mode in which it is tendered. An insignificant benefit is insignificant whether it is tendered in cash, kind, services, or otherwise. Clearly, payment for a small amount of gasoline falls into that category. The plaintiff's presence as the required licensed driver served no economic or business purpose for Patterson. His presence merely allowed the deceased to take him for a drive around the Delaware countryside while running some incidental errands.

Indeed, the manifest purpose of the trip, the car wash, and the stop at the gas station was entirely social. This Court has held that a benefit which is no more...