Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Melton
| Decision Date | 19 November 1907 |
| Parties | Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Melton |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Hopkins Circuit Court.
Judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals — Affirmed.
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WADDELL & DEMPSEY and BENJAMIN D. WARFIELD for appellant.
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GORDON & GORDON & COX and CLAY & CLAY for appellee.
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Additional authorities by JAS. W. CLAY for appellee.
Spencer Melton was a carpenter in the service of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, and on March 2, 1905, was engaged in building a coal chute on the railroad tracks near Howell, Ind., working under a foreman named Shrode. In building the coal chute it became necessary to set up some bents, weighing about 1,200 pounds each, and 22 feet long. To raise up the bents they used a pulley, block, and tackle. The bent was raised by the hands pulling on the rope. The pulley was fastened to a square beam by an iron chain similar to those used for locking a wagon. The bent was too heavy for the men to carry it up at once. They would surge upon the rope, and thus lift it a little, and then, after catching their breath, would surge again. To prevent the bent from going back when thus lifted up, Melton, by the direction of the foreman, got a piece of timber and propped the bent, to hold it at the height to which it had been raised when the men made a surge. The foreman had a similar piece of timber and propped the bent on the opposite side from Melton. While they were thus engaged in raising the bent, the chain which held the pulley broke, the bent fell, catching Melton under it, and smashing him down upon other timbers, fracturing one leg at the knee, the other at the hip, breaking the ribs on one side, and also breaking his back. By reason of his injuries he was paralized from his waist down. The bowels and bladder have to be moved with an instrument. His virility is destroyed. He has no feeling in the right leg, or use of it, and the left is but little better. He was then a healthy young man, weighing 145 pounds. Now he weighs 116 pounds. His suffering for six or eight weeks was very intense, and since then while he has not suffered so much, he is never free from pain. The pain in his back is continuous. He was treated in sanitariums at Chicago, St. Louis, and Evansville, as well as by local doctors at his home. The testimony of the physicians show that his injuries are permanent. In this suit brought by him to recover for his injuries, the jury found for him and fixed his damages at $22,000. The court entered judgment upon the verdict, and the railroad company appeals.
The action was brought under a statute of Indiana, which, so far as material, is as follows:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Indiana, that every railroad or other corporation except municipal operating in this state, shall be liable in damages for personal injury suffered by any employe while in its service, the employe so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence, in the following cases:
It is insisted for the railroad company that the act is unconstitutional in this: that it applies to corporations and does not apply to individuals whose employes may be injured. The Supreme Court of Indiana has construed the statute only to apply to railroad companies. It is held that it applies to all persons, whether natural or artificial, operating a railroad, and that it does not apply to any other business. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of the statute, basing its judgment upon the construction of the statute given by the Supreme Court of Indiana. Railroad Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 582, 69 L. R. A. 875, 71 Am. St. Rep. 301; Tullis v. Railroad Co., 175 U. S. 348, 20 Sup. Ct. 136, 44 L. Ed. 192; Railroad Co. v. Lightheiser (Ind.) 78 N. E. 1033; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494, 60 N. E. 943, 54 L. R. A. 787; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough (Ind.) 80 N. E. 529.
It is earnestly insisted that, while the act is constitutional under these rulings as to those operating a railroad, it cannot be held constitutional as to a carpenter; that the State may not establish a rule for carpenters in the service of a railroad, and another rule for carpenters in the service of other people. We are unable to see the force of this distinction. A railroad cannot be run without bridges. Bridges cannot be build without carpenters. The work of a bridge carpenter on a railroad is perhaps no less perilous than the work of an operative on one of its trains. Coal tipples are no less essential to the operating of a railroad than bridges, because the engines cannot be operated without coal. The construction of a coal tipple is therefore essential to the operating of a railroad. As has been well said, the Legislature cannot well provide for all subjects in one act. Legislation must necessarily be done in detail, and an act regulating railroads violates no constitutional provision because it is made to apply only to railroads. Indianapols, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kane (Ind.) 80 N. E. 841; Schoolcrafts Adm'r v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 92 Ky. 233, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 517, 17 S. W. 567, 14 L. R. A. 579; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stahley, 62 Fed. 363, 11 C. C. A. 88; Callahan v. Railroad Co., 170 Mo. 473, 71 S. W 208, 60 L. R. A. 249, 94 Am. St. Rep. 746; Railroad Co. v. Callahon, 194 U. S. 628, 24 Sup. Ct. 857, 48 L. Ed. 1157; Railroad Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 504.
The defendant also insisted that the act cannot be enforced in this State, because it provides that the decisions and statutes of other states shall not be read or considered in the courts of Indiana. It is said that the statutes of Indiana are only considered in this State by comity, and that it will not be enforced in this State when the courts of Indiana do not treat the Kentucky statutes and decisions with like comity. The section in question has been held unconstitutional by the courts of Indiana. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25, 62 N. E. 488, 56 L. R. A. 468, 92 Am. St. Rep. 293. But, aside from this, when the plaintiff was injured at Howell, Ind., a cause of action accrued to him; and this cause of action which there accrued to him he is seeking to enforce by this action. The rights of the parties must depend on the facts as they then existed. The cause of action which Melton then had the courts of Kentucky will enforce. We have no doubt the courts of Indiana do the same as to a cause of action accruing here. But, if they did not, the fact that they did not administer justice would be no reason why this court should deny justice to a litigant here. No reason of public policy exists why the courts of this State should be closed to a citizen of this State seeking to enforce a meritorious cause of action.
The proof on the trial on behalf of the plaintiff showed that the chain was not the proper one for the work in which it was used, that it was supplied by the foreman, and that he had ordered the men to use it. The proof also showed that the chain was a defective one of its kind, and that this might have been discovered by an ordinary examination of it. The broken link has been brought to this court with the record, and an examination of it indicates that the iron was not properly welded when the link was made. The plaintiff also showed that a chain of long links like this, when put around a square sill, is much more liable to pull in two at the corners of the sill, where the strain would tend to pull the link open, than it would be if the chain was stretched straight and a direct strain put upon it. The only expert who testified on the trial stated that the chain had a strength of 6,000 pounds; that the rule was that a chain would have a strength 6 times as great if the strain was steady and 16 times as great if it came by jerks. The weight of the bent here was greater than one-sixth of the strength of the chain, and in lifting the bent they put much more strain upon the chain than the...
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