Lucero v. New Mexico State Highway Dept.
Decision Date | 13 March 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 5259,5259 |
Citation | 1951 NMSC 17,228 P.2d 945,55 N.M. 157 |
Parties | LUCERO v. NEW MEXICO STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT et al. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Joe L. Martinez, Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.
Simms, Modrall, Seymour & Simms, and Joseph E. Roehl, all of Albuquerque, for intervenor-appellant.
Edwin L. Felter, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.
The appellants were the defendant and intervenor, respectively, below and seek the reversal of an adverse judgment there rendered which awarded damages against the defendant in the sum of $5,000 on account of personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he was struck by a tire blown from the wheel of a road grader being operated by a state employee. The intervenor had paid a consent judgment for more than $3,000 in a suit against it under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sought subrogation in the amount paid on account of such claim.
The action was brought under authority of Chapter 162, Laws of 1947, the material part of which reads as follows:
In view of the fact a number of like acts were passed at the 1947 and 1949 sessions of the Legislature, and numerous suits authorized thereby are now awaiting our decision in this case before trials are held in the District Court, we will pass directly to a consideration of the decisive constitutional question.
We will first consider the claim that the legislative act in question violates Sec. 24 of Art. 4 of the Constitution of New Mexico, in that it is a special law in a field where a general law could be made applicable.
Undoubtedly, Chapter 162, supra, is a law applying only to the plaintiff here, which gives him alone a right to sue the state for injuries resulting from its negligence. It is settled by the case of Vigil v. Penitentiary, 52 N.M. 224, 195 P.2d 1014, that a tort action may not be maintained against the state absent legislative permission.
We recently considered the question of special and general laws in, Crosthwait v. White, 55 N.M. 71, 226 P.2d 477, and there followed the decision in State v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 20 N.M. 562, 151 P. 305, and again approved the following definition of general and special laws in 1 Lewis' Sutherland Stat.Const. (2d Ed.) Sec. 197, and Sec. 199:
'Laws of a general nature are such as relate to a subject of a general nature, and a subject of a general nature is one that exists or may exist throughout the state, or which affects the people of the state generally, or in which the people generally have an interest.
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'Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and circumstances; * * *.'
This definition of a special law fits Chapter 162, supra, like a glove. It was enacted for the sole purpose of allowing Lucero to sue the state for damages claimed to have been suffered on account of its negligence after he had received the statutory amount provided for Highway Department employees by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1941 Comp. Sec. 57-901 et seq. No other person who might have a like claim could prosecute such a suit under this act passed for the benefit of Lucero. The question then arises whether a general law could be enacted under which such a suit could be brought. The query answers itself. A general law could be enacted providing that the state shall be liable to persons injured or killed on account of the negligence of the state, its officers or employees, and such injured persons or their representatives may maintain suit therefor and obtain judgment against the state. Under the authorities it would be debatable whether the legislature could authorize recovery for a past tort, but, if not, then Lucero may not maintain this action for the same reason.
Laws allowing specified individuals to sue the state for torts have been enacted in other states. We will turn to a consideration of the reported cases construing them.
In 1931 the Legislature of Oklahoma passed an act appropriating money to be paid to the widow of an employee of the highway department who sustained a fatal injury in the performance of his work. In Hawks v. Bland, 156 Okl. 48, 9 P.2d 720, 723, the Supreme Court held it to be a special act and therefore unconstitutional ...
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