Lucido v. Superior Court (People)

• Decision Date: 07 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. A044275,A044275
• Citation: 259 Cal.Rptr. 339,211 Cal.App.3d 343
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 211 Cal.App.3d 343 211 Cal.App.3d 343 Arasimo Settemo LUCIDO, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Mendocino, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Page 339

259 Cal.Rptr. 339

Previously published at 211 Cal.App.3d 343

211 Cal.App.3d 343

Arasimo Settemo LUCIDO, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Mendocino, Respondent.

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

No. A044275.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

June 7, 1989.

Review Granted Aug. 24, 1989.

Ronald W. Brown, Public Defender, Lu Ann Hughes, Asst. Public Defender, Richard L. Huff, Ukiah, for petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. Helfman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for real party in interest.

POCHE, Associate Justice.

The question presented is this: If a trial court conducting a probation revocation hearing specifically finds that evidence of a crime allegedly committed by the probationer has not been demonstrated by the requisite quantum of proof, can that finding collaterally estop a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense? Our conclusion is that People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321 compels an affirmative answer.

BACKGROUND

The sparse record before us establishes that the relevant history of this dispute is simple. In March of 1988 petitioner Arasimo Settemo Lucido was admitted to probation after he had been found guilty of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1. By reason of a criminal complaint filed on August 1, 1988, petitioner was charged with having committed the identical offense on June 23, 1988. The complaint included an allegation of the prior conviction, thus elevating the subsequent offense to felony status. (See Pen.Code, § 314.) Later in August a preliminary examination was conducted, and petitioner was ordered held to answer.

Revocation of petitioner's probation was thereafter sought on the dual grounds of the new charge and petitioner's use of marijuana. At an unreported hearing conducted on the revocation petition, the latter ground was admitted by petitioner, and no evidence regarding it was introduced by either side. The pertinent portions of the "Findings and Order" filed by the justice court read: "After presentation of evidence by the prosecution and the defense, the court makes the following findings: [p] Clear and convincing evidence was not produced by the prosecution to establish that defendant [petitioner] committed a violation of Penal Code section 314(1) on June 23, 1988. Accordingly, defendant's probation is not violated on this ground. [p] Defendant is in violation of his probation for using marijuana during the term of his probation."

In respondent court petitioner made a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the prosecution should be collaterally estopped from proceeding with the new charge by reason of the adverse finding made at the revocation hearing. At the conclusion of a hearing conducted on this motion respondent court ruled: "On the authority of Chamblin v. Municipal Court, 1982, 130 Cal.App.3d 115, the motion to dismiss is denied." Petitioner then invoked the original jurisdiction of this court for extraordinary relief. We issued an alternative writ of mandate.

DISCUSSION

The parties' positions, and the choice they present us, could not be plainer. The People, appearing as real party in interest, defend respondent court's ruling as the only possible one in light of Chamblin v. Municipal Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 115, 181 Cal.Rptr. 636, where it was squarely held that a trial court's finding that a probationer had not committed a violation of the Penal Code would not collaterally estop a subsequent criminal prosecution because of the differing purposes, policies, and procedures attending a revocation hearing and a formal trial. We agree with petitioner's contention that Chamblin has been nullified sub silentio by the principles enunciated in People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321, where the Supreme Court held that an administrative decision could collaterally estop a subsequent criminal action involving the same issue.

The court in Sims specified the requirements petitioner must satisfy: "collateral estoppel has been found to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding 'if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].' " (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 at p. 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321 [citing and quoting People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 691, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622].) The court further noted: "It is implicit in this three-prong test that only issues actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine.... An issue is actually litigated '[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.... A determination may be based on a failure of ... proof....' " (People v. Sims, supra, [original emphasis].)

The "Petition Of The Probation Officer For Revocation Of Probation" gave the following reasons for revoking petitioner's probation: "Mr. Lucido is presently going through Court proceedings in Superior Court on new charges. Mr. Lucido's urine test dated August 4, 1988, shows positive results for cannabinoid. To date, Mr. Lucido has failed to participate in a drug program or mental health counseling." The matter of petitioner's failure "to participate in a drug program or mental health counseling" played no part whatsoever in the revocation proceedings. The reference to "new charges" against petitioner is misleading; according to the record the only charge which was then pending against petitioner was the felony indecent exposure charge. A written stipulation by petitioner's counsel and the prosecutor which was filed in the justice court after that court had revoked petitioner's probation, recites that "in the probation revocation hearing ... the only contested issue was the new Penal Code section 314(1) charge which allegedly occurred on June 23, 1988. All evidence presented related to this issue alone. The allegation of marijuana usage was admitted by the defendant [petitioner]."

It thus appears that the issue of whether petitioner violated section 314 was "properly raised" and was "submitted for determination" at the revocation hearing. The stipulation and the justice court's express finding leave no doubt that this issue was actually litigated and "determined," and that the determination was "based on a failure of proof." Petitioner has established the first of the tripartite test requirements--the issue of whether he violated section 314 on June 23, 1988, was actually litigated and is "identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated" at petitioner's trial. (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 at p. 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.)

At the time petitioner was admitted to probation the justice court did so after suspending imposition of sentence. At the time it revoked his original grant of probation the justice court reinstated him to probation upon different conditions. The latter order could have been appealed by either petitioner (Pen.Code, § 1466, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(2); People v. Woods (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 149, 154, 148 Cal.Rptr. 312) or by the People (Pen.Code, § 1466, subd. (a)(6); see People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 682, fn. 1, 143 Cal.Rptr. 885, 574 P.2d 1237). The merits of the revocation order could thus have been subject to appellate review. (See People v. Avery (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1201, fn. 5, 225 Cal.Rptr. 319.) There is nothing in the record to indicate that either party appealed. The revocation order being final, petitioner has met the second requirement for collateral estoppel. (See People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 at p. 486, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321; cf. In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 622-623, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206 [People bound by final judgment granting relief in habeas corpus from which no appeal was taken].)

There has never been any dispute that the People, represented by the District Attorney, were a party to all pertinent proceedings involving petitioner. The third and final prerequisite for invoking collateral estoppel is therefore satisfied.

In addition to these technical prerequisites for collateral estoppel, Sims identified certain "traditional public policies underlying application of the doctrine" (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 at p. 488, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321) which should also be considered. They, too, favor petitioner's position.

The first is the promotion of judicial economy "by minimizing repetitive litigation." (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d 468 at p. 488, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.) The necessity for the most sensible use of judicial resources "is even more important in criminal than in civil trials." (People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686 at p. 695, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) There is no logical reason why a court should be compelled to preside over two separate evidentiary presentations where the same parties try to prove and disprove the identical issue. The old adage against multiple bites at the same apple can find no more eloquent justification. This sort of vexation is not limited to courts. It is even more oppressive to the defendant, who is otherwise powerless "from being harassed by repeated litigation." (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 489, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.) Then there is "the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial...