Lufkin v. Jakeman

• Citation: 74 N.E. 933,188 Mass. 528
• Parties: LUFKIN et al. LAWRENCE v. JAKEMAN. LAWRENCE v. LUFKIN et al.
• Decision Date: 23 June 1905
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

188 Mass. 528

74 N.E. 933

LUFKIN et al. LAWRENCE v. JAKEMAN. LAWRENCE v. LUFKIN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 23, 1905

COUNSEL

W. Orison Underwood, Henry F. Knight, for plaintiffs.

Hollis R. Bailey and D. Frank Kimball, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

The first of these cases presents the question whether the plaintiffs are entitled to certain real estate under a resulting trust, as the heirs of their father, Richard Lufkin, or whether it belongs to the defendant, the holder of the legal title. The property was bought by Richard Lufkin in 1877, and paid for with his money, but the title was taken in the name of the defendant. He occupied it, erected valuable buildings upon it, received all the rents and profits, and paid all taxes upon it until his death, in 1901. His purchase and payment created a resulting trust in his favor against the defendant, who held the title as trustee for his benefit. McDonough v. O'Neil, 113 Mass. 92-95; Bailey v. Hemenway, 147 Mass. 326-328, 17 N.E. 645; Cooley v. Cooley, 172 Mass. 476, 477, 52 N.E. 631; Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 22 A. 149. The rule that, when the person paying the consideration for real estate is under a natural or legal obligation to provide for the person who takes the title there is a presumption of a gift and no presumption of a resulting trust, does not affect the present case. The plaintiffs' intestate was under no such obligation to the defendant. See Cooley v. Cooley, 172 Mass. 476, 477 52 N.E. 631; Jaquith v. Massachusetts Baptist Convention, 172 Mass. 439-445, 52 N.E. 544. He was engaged to be married to her whenever his wife should obtain a divorce from him and leave him free to marry again. It has been decided that a relation of this kind will not take a case out of the ordinary rule that creates a resulting trust in favor of him who pays the purchase money. Soar v. Foster, 4 Kay & Johnson, 152; Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 22 A. 149; Ryder v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360; Todd v. Morehouse, L. R. 19 Eq. 69; In re De Visne, 2 De G., J. & S. 17; Beecher v. Major, 2 Drew & Sm. 431.

Moreover, where there is a presumption of a gift, it may be rebutted by parol evidence. Dana v. Dana, 154 Mass. 491, 28 N.E. 905; Cooley v. Cooley, 172 Mass. 476, 52 N.E. 631; Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 22 A. 149. In this case the evidence tends to disprove any presumption of a gift, and the master had found that the purpose of the intestate was not to make a gift to the defendant.

The next question is whether the suit is barred by the statute of limitations. The findings show that Lufkin was in possession, and that there was no adverse holding by the defendant previous to his death. The rule is well settled that, against the beneficiary under an express trust, the statute of limitations does not run so long as there is no adverse holding or repudiation of the trust. Carpenter v. Cushman, 105 Mass. 417; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188-200, 41 N.E. 231; Currier v. Studley, 159 Mass. 20, 33 N.E. 709; Baxter v. Moses, 77 Me. 465, 478-481, 1 A. 350, 52 Am. Rep. 783; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90-114, 11 Am. Dec. 417. In Currler v. Studley, supra, in speaking of a resulting trust, it was said that, if the rights of the cestui que trust are recognized at the time of the conveyance, the statute of limitations begins to run in favor of the holder of the legal title against the equitable owner when the holder of the title begins to hold adversely. The late decisions generally hold that, if nothing appears to the contrary, the transaction itself implies a recognition of the rights of the equitable owner, and in this respect, until repudiation, a resulting trust is like an express trust. Soar v. Ashwell (1893) 2 Q. B. 390; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188-200, 41 N.E. 231; Wood on Limitations (3d Ed.) § 219, and note; Perry on Trusts (5th Ed.) § 865, note. See, also, Potter v. Kimball, 186 Mass. 120, 71 N.E. 308; Jones v. McDermott, 114 Mass. 400.

The facts already referred to are sufficient to enable the plaintiffs to enforce their equitable right, unless another fact found by the master, but not referred to in the pleadings on either side, leaves them without a right to relief. In the master's report is this sentence: 'I find that said Richard caused the title to the land in controversy to be put in the name of the defendant to defeat any possible claim of his wife to alimony; that this was known to defendant; that there was no evidence that either his first wife or any other person was in fact defrauded or injured; that said Richard was not insolvent at the time; and ruled that the said purpose of said Richard would not defeat the right of his children and heirs at law to maintain this bill.' It is contended that the resulting trust is so far a creature of Lufkin's fraud that a court of equity cannot enforce it. The plaintiffs' case depends upon the averment that their father paid the entire consideration for the property included in the deed to the defendant, and that the purchase was his. Proof of these averments, without more, establishes their case. This is because a resulting trust arises from such facts by implication of law. His fraudulent purpose in reference to the claim of his wife for alimony does not appear in the statement or in the proof of the plaintiffs' case, unless the parties go outside of that which is necessary to establish prima facie a right to relief. if the fraudulent purpose is introduced, it is to change the rights which the law would otherwise give as the result of such a transaction. Now the fraudulent purpose referred to was only in reference to a person in the position of a creditor. The defendant does not represent the rights of this person. No attempt has ever been made by this person to obtain any interest in the property. The rights which she once had are entirely immaterial in this suit.

A conveyance fraudulent as against creditors is good as between the parties. Neither party, as against the other, can set up a fraud of this kind. Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick 250; Dyer v. Homer, 22 Pick. 253; Wall v. Provident Institution for Savings, 3 Allen, 96; Harvey v. Varney, 98 Mass. 118; Stillings v. Turner, 153 Mass....