Luis M. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.

Decision Date19 June 2014
Docket NumberNo. S207314.,S207314.
Parties LUIS M., a Minor, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Guillermo Arevalo–Farias and Rourke F. Stacey, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Steve Cooley and Jackie Lacey, District Attorneys, Brentford J. Ferreira, Phyllis Asayama, Roberta Schwartz and Cassandra Hart, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, Allison E. Burns and David C. Palmer, Newport Beach, for City of Lancaster as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

CORRIGAN, J.

Luis M. challenges an order that he pay the City of Lancaster (the City) over $3,800 in restitution for felony vandalism based on nine acts of defacement by graffiti. The Court of Appeal granted this minor's writ of mandate.

When a minor's actions involve graffiti, the Legislature has expanded the juvenile court's general authority to grant restitution. It has enacted a tailored scheme permitting reliance on a city's average costs to investigate and remediate graffiti. ( Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 742.14 & 742.16.)1 The statutes contain specific guidelines for what costs may be included. They also require periodic review and adoption of a local ordinance. The City had not passed such an ordinance nor had it reviewed its "cost model" within the statutory timeframe. Thus, the expanded restitution model cannot support the award here.

The court had more general restitution authority under section 730.6. As explained below, however, the court's award was not based on sufficient evidence that the amount of claimed loss was a result of Luis's conduct. The award also included police investigation costs not usually recoverable under the more general restitution statutes.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which directs the juvenile court to vacate its restitution order and to hold a new restitution hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

Accused in a section 602 petition of committing felony vandalism,2 Luis admitted he had done so and was placed on probation with deferred entry of judgment.3 As to restitution, crime prevention officer Marleen Navarro testified that the offense involved nine acts of graffiti at six locations. She did not produce photographs or otherwise describe the graffiti except to note that it involved a traffic arrow sign and several electrical boxes.

Navarro used a 2006 cost model to estimate annual abatement costs. The five-year-old model included: (1) the labor costs for public works personnel to remove graffiti and a sheriff's deputy to investigate the incidents; (2) the cost of the vehicles, sprayers, and other equipment used for abatement; (3) the cost of paint and cleaning supplies; (4) the cost of contract services for tracking graffiti; and (5) traffic control and risk management costs.

Navarro had no information about the actual abatement costs related to Luis's conduct. However, she testified that in 2006 the City had spent $1,380,208 abating approximately 3,200 incidents of graffiti at an average cost of $431.32 per incident.4

Using the 2006 data, she estimated that the City spent $3,881.88 to abate Luis's acts of graffiti in 2011. The juvenile court ordered restitution in that amount, over Luis's objection.

We granted review to decide how a juvenile court may calculate restitution to a governmental entity for graffiti abatement.

II. DISCUSSION

Enacted in 1982, Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights," amended the California Constitution to provide that "all persons who suffer losses" resulting from crime are entitled to "restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) In 1983, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1202.4, which requires a full victim restitution order in criminal cases for every determined economic loss unless there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to do so. ( Pen.Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) In 1994, the Legislature enacted section 730.6 to provide "parallel restitutionary requirements for juvenile offenders." ( People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 240, fn. 15, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205, 980 P.2d 912.)5

An order of direct victim restitution acts to make the victim whole, rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior ( In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 6, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 545 ; accord, People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1097, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278 ), and is reviewed for abuse of discretion ( In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 ; accord, People v. Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th 734, 737, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 279 P.3d 585 ). " ‘In keeping with the [voters'] "unequivocal intention" that victim restitution be made, statutory provisions implementing the constitutional directive have been broadly and liberally construed.’ " ( Stanley, supra, at p. 737, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 279 P.3d 585, quoting People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1525, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 415.)

As relevant here, section 730.6, subdivision (a)(2) provides: "[T]he court shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law ... [¶] ... [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h)." Subdivision (h) provides in part: "Restitution ordered pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined.... The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.... A restitution order ... shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602, including ... [¶] (1) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible." (Italics added.)

These general provisions do not authorize restitution orders for law enforcement investigative costs. (See People v. Martinez (2005) 36 Cal.4th 384, 393 & fn. 1, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 779, 115 P.3d 62 (Martinez ) [discussing Pen.Code, § 1202.4 ]; People v. Ozkan (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 854 [same]; People v. Torres (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1, 4–5, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 644 [same].) "Under the relevant case law and the statutory scheme, public agencies are not directly ‘victimized’ for purposes of restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4 merely because they spend money to investigate crimes or apprehend criminals." ( Ozkan, supra, at p. 1077, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 854.)

In addition to these general restitution provisions, the Legislature has specifically provided for recovery of graffiti remediation costs. In 1994, the Legislature added the Graffiti Removal and Damage Recovery Program (Graffiti Program) as part of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (§ 742.10 et seq. ; Stats. 1994, ch. 909, § 11, p. 4603 et seq.) The aim of this legislation is to (1) help public and private property owners recover full damages from a minor who so defaces property; (2) safeguard the fiscal integrity of cities and counties by enabling them to recoup the full costs of graffiti remediation, as well as the costs of identifying and apprehending the minor; (3) minimize the costs of collecting restitution; (4) deter graffiti; and (5) rehabilitate the minor. ( § 742.10, subds. (a) - (f).)

The Graffiti Program authorizes a city or county to calculate and recover restitution based on average costs rather than requiring individualized proof under the general provisions of section 730.6. Specifically, section 742.14, subdivision (a), permits adoption of a city or county ordinance authorizing a probation officer to recoup, through juvenile court proceedings, the costs of graffiti remediation. The ordinance must include findings of "the average costs per unit of measure incurred by ... law enforcement ... in identifying and apprehending" violators of certain crimes.6 ( § 742.14, subd. (b).) Further, if the city or county has authorized the use of public funds to remediate graffiti ( Gov.Code, § 53069.3 ), the ordinance must include findings of "the average cost ... per unit of measure of removing graffiti and other inscribed material, and of repairing and replacing property of the types frequently defaced with graffiti ... that cannot be removed cost effectively." ( § 742.14, subd. (c).) Government Code section 53069.3 defines "city or county funds" used to remove graffiti as including "court costs, attorney's fees, costs of removal of the graffiti ..., costs of repair and replacement of defaced property, costs of administering and monitoring the participation of a defendant and his or her parents ... in a graffiti abatement program, and the law enforcement costs incurred by the city or county in identifying and apprehending the person who created, caused, or committed the graffiti ... on the publicly or privately owned ... property within the city or county." ( Gov.Code, § 53069.3, subd. (d)(3).) The cost findings "shall be reviewed at least once every three years, at which time the city [or] county ..., by resolution, shall adopt updated cost findings in accordance with subdivisions (b) and (c)." ( § 742.14, subd. (a).)

Section 742.16 addresses the juvenile court's authority to make a restitution award. If the graffiti causes a public entity to remove graffiti or repair or replace damaged property in accordance with the provisions of section 742.14, the court must determine the total remediation costs as well as the costs of identifying or apprehending...

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