Luke v. Cataldi
| Decision Date | 28 September 2005 |
| Citation | 883 A.2d 1114 |
| Parties | John R. LUKE and Diane C. Luke, John C. and Lynn Holetich, Dr. Philip Gelacek, Mary Biesuz, Thomas and Jean Woods, Dr. William R. Balash, John and Joan Witngens, George and Lori Gatto, Mr. and Mrs. John M. George, Thomas and Mary Ann Timney, Mary Ellen Austin, Mr. and Mrs. Wilbert Woods, Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Conway, Robert and Sheila Gahagan, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Selinger, Regis McGuire, and John McGuire, Rodney H. Hartman, Scott J. Hartman, Clifford and Jean Campbell, Harold Burton, William Findon, Jointly and Severally, Appellants v. Randy J. CATALDI, David Brestensky, Ron Covone, Supervisors of South Buffalo Township and Mark A. Nesbit, Zoning Officer of South Buffalo Township. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
John R. Luke, Pittsburgh, for appellants.
James H. Owen, Kittanning, for appellees.
BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge LEAVITT.1
This case is on remand from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Previously, on August 15, 2003, we affirmed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County (trial court) that had dismissed Appellants' complaint in mandamus. Luke v. Cataldi, 830 A.2d 655 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003),appeal granted, cause remanded, 579 Pa. 424, 856 A.2d 767 (2004) (Luke I). We did so based on our determination that Appellants, who sought to have a conditional use permit voided ab initio, had, but failed to avail themselves of, an adequate statutory remedy. The Supreme Court granted Appellants' petition for allowance of appeal and has directed us to reconsider our decision in light of Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Weisenberg Township, 578 Pa. 177, 850 A.2d 619 (2004).
The relevant facts, as pled in the complaint, are as follows. On April 26, 2000, McVille Mining Company and Buffalo Valley, Ltd.2 filed applications for conditional use permits to conduct coal mining activities in South Buffalo Township. The South Buffalo Township Planning Commission (Planning Commission) conducted a hearing on the matter and, thereafter, issued a written recommendation, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the applications be approved. On June 12, 2000, at an advertised regular public meeting, the Township's Board of Supervisors (Supervisors) considered a motion to approve the applications based upon the recommendation of the Planning Commission. The motion carried, and mining activities began in December of 2000.
Appellants are owners of property in South Buffalo Township. In October 2001, Appellants filed their complaint in mandamus against the Supervisors. In their complaint, the Appellants contended, inter alia, that (1) the Planning Commission hearing was a nullity because the Commission did not have a quorum; (2) the Supervisors did not hold a public hearing on the applications or give the public proper advance notice of their intention to act upon the applications; (3) the applicants failed to obtain the occupancy permits required by the Zoning Ordinance of South Buffalo Township; and (4) the applicants have conducted mining operations that are not permitted under the Zoning Ordinance. Appellants requested the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Supervisors (1) to hold public hearings on the conditional use permits and (2) to order the coal mining activities to cease, pending the outcome of the Supervisors' hearing.
The Supervisors filed preliminary objections, arguing that Appellants' mandamus action was, in actuality, a land use appeal subject to the requirements of the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC).3 One requirement in the MPC, relevant here, is that land use appeals be filed within thirty days of the grant of a conditional use permit. Appellants filed over a year after the Supervisors granted the applicants the conditional use permits in question. The trial court agreed with the Supervisors that Appellants' complaint was untimely filed and dismissed it.
Appellants appealed to this Court. They argued that the Supervisors were required to give public notice of the application for the conditional use permits and to conduct a hearing on them under Section 603(c)(2)4 and 913.2(a)5 of the MPC. Because the Supervisors did do so, according to Appellants, the conditional use permits issued by the Supervisors were void ab initio.
In rejecting Appellants' arguments in Luke I, we noted that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy designed to compel official performance of a mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant and a lack of any other adequate and appropriate remedy at law. Delaware River Port Authority v. Thornburgh, 508 Pa. 11, 20, 493 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1985). We reasoned that Appellants had an adequate remedy at law to challenge the Supervisors' grant of the conditional use permit, i.e., a land use appeal pursuant to the MPC. However, Appellants failed to meet the requirement in Section 1002-A of the MPC that "all appeals from all land use" decisions "shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the decision." 53 P.S. § 11002-A (emphasis added). We also found guidance from our holding in Schadler v. Zoning Board of Weisenberg Township, 814 A.2d 1265 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), which had not yet been reversed. We explained that under Schadler, "a challenge to procedure, no matter the defect, must be brought in accordance with the time limits set forth by the MPC." Luke I, 830 A.2d at 658-659. Because Appellants had failed to pursue their statutory remedy in a timely fashion, they did not state a claim for mandamus. We held that the trial court had correctly sustained the Supervisors' preliminary objections.
Appellants petitioned our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal. By per curiam order, the Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the matter "for consideration of this Courts decision in Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Weisenberg Township, 578 Pa. 177, 850 A.2d 619 (2004)." Luke v. Cataldi, 579 Pa. 424, 856 A.2d 767 (2004). Thus, we must now determine whether the Supreme Courts decision in Schadler has any bearing on the outcome of this case. We conclude that it does not.
In Schadler, the developer of a proposed mobile home park claimed that the townships mobile home park ordinance was invalid because of irregularities in the way in which it had been enacted. The township conceded it had failed to publish certain notices about the ordinance that were required in Section 506 of the MPC, 53 P.S. 10506, and in Section 1601 of the Second Class Township Code.6 Nevertheless, the zoning hearing board dismissed Schadlers challenge to the validity of the ordinance, concluding that it was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of the effective date of the ordinance. Schadler appealed to the trial court, which reversed, finding that the procedural deficiencies rendered the ordinance void ab initio; therefore, the thirty-day time limit for procedural challenges never began to run.
On appeal to this Court, Schadler argued that the trial courts ruling should be affirmed because it was consistent with our Supreme Court's decision in Cranberry Park Associates v. Cranberry Township Zoning Hearing Board, 561 Pa. 456, 751 A.2d 165 (2000).7 We disagreed. Unlike Schadler, which hinged on the interpretation of Section 1601 of the Second Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 66601, Cranberry Park was based on Section 1741 of the Second Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 65741.8 Section 1601 includes a "savings provisions" that insulates certain procedural infirmities from having any effect on the validity of an ordinance.9 Accordingly, we concluded that the thirty-day limitations period for procedural challenges always begins to run on an ordinance's stated effective date.
Schadler, 578 Pa. at 188, 850 A.2d at 626 (emphasis added). Because the procedural defects in the enactment of the ordinance in question were found not to be the type of defects protected by the savings provision in Section 1601, the ordinance was held to be void ab initio. As a result, Schadler's challenge was not time-barred.
Schadler is an important case that reaffirmed our Supreme Court's narrow reading of statutory provisions that seek to impose a time bar to the initiation of a procedural challenge to an ordinance.11
However, we find that Schadler is inapposite to this case. Schadler concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance, whereas Appellants challenge the grant of a land use permit.12 One cannot compare the enactment of an ordinance, governed by the Second Class Township Code, to the grant of a land use permit, a quasi-judicial act governed exclusively by the MPC.13 More to the point, the language of the MPC cannot be construed to void a permit ab initio where a challenge to that permit is not timely presented.
Appellants argue that Sections 603(c)(2)14 and 913.2(a)15 of the MPC required the Supervisors to hold hearings on the conditional use applications before granting the requested permits. Whether the meeting conducted by the Supervisors on the applications was sufficient to meet the Section 913.2(a)...
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