Lund v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 21 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIV. NO. 13-113 (JSM) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
| Parties | JULIE Y. LUND, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment [Docket Nos. 14 and 17]. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties jointly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. [Docket No. 12].
The Court, being duly advised in the premises, upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, now makes and enters the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 14] is DENIED.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 17] is GRANTED. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
___________________
JANIE S. MAYERON
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUMPlaintiff Julie Lund protectively filed disability insurance benefits ("DIB") on September 2, 2009. (Tr. 138-140).1 Lund alleged an onset date of August 30, 2008, based on a cervical spine fusion at C5-6, depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia, arthritis, asthma, and degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 159). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied Lund's application on January 5, 2010 (Tr. 61-63), and on reconsideration on July 9, 2010. (Tr. 64). Lund requested a hearing pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§404.929 et seq and 416.1429 et seq. (Tr. 93-95). A hearing was held on August 4, 2011, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael D. Quayle. (Tr. 36-60). Lund was represented by counsel. Jesse Ogren, a vocational expert ("VE") testified at the hearing, as did Lund. (Id.)
On August 30, 2011, the ALJ issued his decision denying benefits. (Tr. 20-30). On October 28, 2011, Lund sought a review of the ALJ's decision by the SSA's Appeals Council. (Tr. 8-19). On November 13, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Lund's request for review, making the ALJ's decision final. (Tr. 1-7). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
Lund sought review of the ALJ's decision by filing a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405. [Docket No. 1]. The parties have now cross-moved for summary judgment. [Docket Nos. 14 and 17].
Congress has prescribed the standards by which Social Security disability benefits may be awarded. The SSA shall find a person disabled if the claimant "is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant's impairments must be "of such severity that (the claimant) is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The impairment must last for a continuous period of at least twelve months or be expected to result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909.
If a claimant's initial application for benefits is denied, he or she may request reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-09, 416.1407-09. A claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsidered decision may obtain administrative review by an ALJ. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 416.1429. To determine the existence and extent of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis, requiring the ALJ to make a series of factual findings regarding the claimant's work history, impairment, residual functional capacity, past work, age, education and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Locherv. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 727 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit described this five-step process as follows:
The Commissioner of Social Security must evaluate: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003).
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, he or she may request review by the Appeals Council, though review is not automatic. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-404.982, 416.1467-1482. The decision of the Appeals Council (or of the ALJ, if the request for review is denied) is final and binding upon the claimant unless the matter is appealed to Federal District Court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council's action. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. The Court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
1. The credibility findings made by the ALJ.
2. The plaintiff's vocational factors.
3. The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.
4. The plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to exertional and non-exertional activities and impairments.
Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 1980)).
This Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 2000); Clark v. Chater, 75 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1996). "We may reverse and remand findings of the Commissioner only when such findings are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)) (same); Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment or findings of fact for that of the ALJ. Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 380 F.3d441, 445 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939. The Court should not reverse the Commissioner's finding merely because evidence may exist to support the opposite conclusion. Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1011; Mitchell v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213 (). Instead, the Court must consider "the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory." Gavin v. Apfel, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Heino v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jackson v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1989)) (same).
The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a); Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1991). Once the claimant has demonstrated he or she cannot perform prior work due to a disability, the burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005).
The ALJ made the following determinations under the five-step process. At step one, he determined that Lund had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 30, 2008, the alleged onset of her disability. (Tr. 25). At step two, the ALJfound Lund had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease with history of fusion procedure, fibromyalgia, arthritis, and asthma. (Id.).
At step three, the ALJ found that Lund's impairments or combinations of impairments did not meet or equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 26). In particular, the ALJ concluded that Lund's mental impairments of anxiety and depression, considered singly and in combination, did not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listings 12.04 (affective disorders) and 12.06 (anxiety disorders), and were not severe. (Tr. 26-27). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered whether the "B" criteria of the Listings was met—evidence of mental impairments that resulted in at...
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