Lurie, Matter of
| Decision Date | 16 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. SB--73,SB--73 |
| Citation | 546 P.2d 1126,113 Ariz. 95 |
| Parties | In the Matter of a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Horace L. LURIE, Respondent. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Marvin Johnson, P.C., Phoenix, for respondent.
Respondent, Horace L. Lurie, was charged with unethical conduct. After hearing the Local Administrative Committee found respondent guilty of unethical conduct and recommended suspension from the practice of the law for six months. These findings of fact and recommendations were affirmed and adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Arizona. Respondent timely objected in this court to the said findings and recommendations.
We must determine whether the respondent misappropriated funds entrusted to him as secretary-treasurer of a closed corporation.
The purpose of discipline is to protect the public and not to punish the attorney. In Re Moore, 110 Ariz. 312, 518 P.2d 562 (1974); In Re Kastensmith, 101 Ariz. 291, 419 P.2d 75 (1966). Evidence of professional misconduct must be clear and convincing and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt. In Re Moore, supra; In Re Wilson, 106 Ariz. 34, 470 P.2d 441 (1970). While it is the duty of the Supreme Court to make an independent determination of the facts from the record, In Re Johnson, 106 Ariz. 73, 471 P.2d 269 (1970); In Re Wilson, supra, we will nevertheless give serious consideration to the recommendations of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Arizona, In Re Brown, 101 Ariz. 178, 416 P.2d 975 (1966), as well as the findings and recommendations of the local administrative committee. This is especially true when the determination of ultimate facts rests on the weight and credibility of witnesses who have testified in person before that committee. While we cannot avoid the responsibility of determining ultimate facts in disciplinary proceedings, the court is still restricted to the cold record before it and the local The facts are strongly contested. In the fall of 1967, the respondent, together with Arlen Wisseman and Donald Potter, formed the VelMir Corporation, an Arizona corporation, for the purpose of acquiring ownership of the Pony Soldier Motel in Kingman, Arizona. The motel was in financial difficulties and it was contemplated that it would be foreclosed by the mortgage holder and that the VelMir Corporation would be in a position to step in, assume the mortgage, and operate the motel. For the purpose of going into this business venture, Mr. Wisseman and Mr. Potter each contributed the amount of $5,000 for a one-third share of the stock. According to Wisseman and Potter, the respondent was to contribute 1,000 shares of stock with a value of $5,000 for a one-third interest. Respondent maintains that this was a loan to the corporation whereas Potter and Wisseman contend that it was a contribution to the capital of the corporation. Respondent also contends that there was an agreement among the incorporators that he would contribute his services as an attorney in lieu of a capital contribution.
administrative committee who heard the witnesses testify and observed their demeanor, as well as the Board of Governors who heard the respondent and were able to question him, are in a superior position to determine the credibility of those witnesses who appeared in person.
The VelMir Corporation was successful in acquiring the ownership of the Pony Soldier Motel in 1970 and the respondent performed services as an attorney in the acquisition of that motel. He also took over the handling of the financial affairs of the VelMir Corporation including all bookkeeping for the corporation. Respondent claims he was in effect running the motel while the other parties contend that respondent only kept the books while they were responsible for the day to day operation of the motel. In any event, respondent had control of the funds of the motel operation. He was the custodian of the funds of the corporation and was authorized to write checks on the bank accounts. Between May of 1970 and August of 1971, respondent caused numerous checks to be drawn upon the account of the VelMir Corporation. According to respondent, the following checks were drawn in respondent's favor for the following purposes:
$600 loan advance for opening expenses
$50 travel to closing
$1,000 loan
$1,000 loan
$1,000 loan
$1,000 loan
$1,500 loan
$1,000 for attorney's fees
$300 for attorney's fees
$344.24 to Skyline Distributing Company
$1,320.96 to Skyline Distributing Company
The two checks to the Skyline Distributing Company were for a washer delivered to a relative or friend in Phoenix and a stove and refrigerator for respondent's house in Phoenix. These matters were billed to the motel. The amounts of $1,000 and $300 were for unbilled attorney's fees. The amount of $1,500, described as a loan, was used to pay off a debt of respondent owed to the Arizona Bank.
After Wisseman and Potter discovered these withdrawals, they negotiated to buy respondent out which was done even though it is admitted that the purchase price has not been fully paid. Potter testified:
'Q. * * * Prior to the time that you saw the checks which are Exhibit 3, did you have any knowledge of their existence?
'A. No, sir.
'Q. Were those checks authorized by you?
'A. No, sir.
'Q. Were they prepared or drawn with your knowledge or consent?
'A. No, sir.
'Q. Mr. Potter, there is one question that has arisen several times this evening, and that relates to the fact that you and Mr. Wisseman went ahead and purchased Mr. Lurie's interest with at least a suspicion 'A. Well, in my own mind, I would say the reason that I agreed to was that if we had a partner that we were in doubt of, we'd be better off to buy him out and then have the control within our own--within the two bodies.
that something was wrong, and the question that has arisen more than once is why did you go ahead with the purchase when you had these suspicions?
'
The complaint of the State Bar alleged:
'That while acting in the dual capacity of lawyer, representing VelMir Corporation, an Arizona corporation, and, concurrently as secretary-treasurer of said corporation, you did, without authorization, and without the advance knowledge of the other officers, directors and stockholders of said corporation, and without any other later ratification by them, use the funds of said corporation for your private and personal benefit.
'The foregoing acts are in violation of some or all of the following rules from the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers as adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court; DR 1--102(A), DR 9--102(A) and (B).'
After hearing the committee found:
'6. After the acquisition of the Pony Soldier Motel respondent, with the consent of Mr. Potter and Mr. Wisseman, took over the handling of the financial affairs of the VelMir Corporation and the bookkeeping for the corporation. He also became the custodian of the checkbooks of the corporation as to checking accounts at the Arizona Bank and the Great Western Bank. He was authorized to write checks on the corporation accounts at both banks.
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Jones v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd.
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