Lynch v. State

• Decision Date: 20 January 1944
• Docket Number: 29163.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: LYNCH v. STATE et al. [*]

145 P.2d 265

19 Wn.2d 802

LYNCH v. STATE et al. ^[*]

No. 29163.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

January 20, 1944

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Avira Lynch against the State of Washington, Department of Labor and Industries, and L. J. Harris, doing business as Harris Coal Company, upon a claim for a widow's pension following the death of James Lynch, claimant's husband. From a judgmenr affirming an award of a $35 a month pension, avira Lynch appeals.

Affirmed.

SIMPSON C.J., and GRADY, BLAKE, and MALLERY, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, judge.

Vanderveer Bassett & Geisness, of Seattle, for appellant.

Smith Troy, Ralph L. J. Armstrong, and L. E. O'Neill, all of Olympia, for the State and Department of Labor and Industries.

T. J Hanify, of Tacoma, Laube & Laughlin, Little, Leader, LeSourd & Palmer, and Hulbert, Helsell & Paul, all of Seattle, L. B. Donley, of Aberdeen, and Grosscup, Morrow & Ambler, of Seattle, for L. J. Harris.

Clarence J. Coleman, of Everett, amicus curiae.

STEINERT, Justice.

This case involves a claim for widow's pension under what is commonly known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 7673 et seq. The facts, so far as the present proceeding is concerned, are not in dispute.

James Lynch, a coal miner, was formerly employed by L. J. Harris doing business as Harris Coal Company. On or about October 27, 1937, Mr. Lynch suffered a physical impairment for which he made application for compensation by filing a claim with the department of labor and industries on March 16, 1939. The department rejected the claim, solely upon the ground that it had not been filed within the statutory period of one year following the occurrence of the alleged injury. No appeal appears to have been taken from that decision.

Thereafter, on April 15, 1940, Mr. Lynch died, and on April 27, 1940, his widow, Avira Lynch, filed with the department her application for a widow's pension, alleging in her petition that the death of her husband was the result of the injury sustained by him in October, 1937. The application was denied by the supervisor of the department on May 16, 1941, and on a rehearing Before the joint board the action of the supervisor was sustained by order entered April 13, 1942. The ground upon which the widow's application was denied was that the workman's death was not the result of an injury sustained in the course of his employment, but was due solely to a diseased condition brought about by natural causes.

The claimant widow thereupon appealed to the superior court, and in a trial subsequently had Before a jury a verdict was returned in her favor on December 9, 1942. The court on December 19, 1942, entered judgment on the verdict, reversing the decision of the joint board and directing the department to award the widow a pension.

The statute in existence at the time of the workman's alleged injury in October, 1937, and also at the time of his death on April 15, 1940, fixed the amount of a widow's pension in the sum of thirty-five dollars a month. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 7679. While the widow's application for pension was still pending Before the department, and prior to the time of its disposition in the superior court, the legislature in 1941 amended the statute by increasing the amount of a widow's pension to fifty dollars a month. Laws of 1941, chapter 209, p. 625, § 1(a)(1), Rem.Supp.1941, § 7679(a)(1). However, as will be explained in more detail a little later, the 1941 act of the legislature was submitted to the vote of the people in the form of referendum measure number 22 and did not become fully effective until the adoption of the measure had been officially proclaimed by the governor on December 3, 1942.

Upon remand of the cause by the superior court to the department on December 19, 1942, the supervisor entered an order on January 6, 1943, allowing and fixing the widow's pension in the sum of thirty-five dollars a month; charging the employer's accident cost experience with the sum of forty-five hundred dollars; and setting up a statutory reserve of $7,339.42. That order was based upon the statute in force prior to the adoption of the 1941 act. The ruling of the supervisor was approved by the joint board on February 1, 1943.

The widow, deeming herself aggrieved by the decision of the department, in that it awarded her a pension of only thirty-five dollars a month, instead of fifty dollars as contended for, again appealed to the superior court. Upon a hearing Before the court, without a jury, findings were made, in accordance with which judgment was entered dismissing the widow's appeal from the decision of the department. From that judgment the claimant widow appealed to this court.

The specific question presented on the appeal is whether the appellant widow is entitled to be paid a pension of fifty dollars a month, rather than the sum of thirty-five dollars a month, from and after December 3, 1942, the effective date of chapter 209, Laws of 1941, embodied in referendum measure number 22. She makes no claim for increased pension for any period prior to that date. Expressed somewhat more definitely with reference to the agreed facts in the case, the question is whether the widow shall now receive a pension in accordance with the law as it existed on October 27, 1937, the date of the injury alleged to have been sustained by her husband, or whether she is entitled to received a pension determined by the law which was enacted by the legislature in 1941, after the workman's death, and which did not become finally effective until its adoption by the electorate, as officially proclaimed on December 3, 1942.

Since the legislative act of 1941, chapter 209 (Rem.Supp.1941, § 7679), merged into, and depends for its effectiveness upon, the subsequently adopted referendum measure, we shall, unless indicating otherwise, hereinafter refer to the 1941 act as referendum measure 22.

While the ultimate issue in this case concerns the extent of application of a legislative provision, the determination of that issue requires judicial construction of the act, or referendum measure, immediately in question. Counsel for the opposing parties invoke, and accordingly concede the necessity for, a construction of the measure by the court, and their divergent interpretations of its true meaning make all the more certain the necessity for such construction.

The fundamental purpose or object of all judicial construction or interpretation of legislative enactments is to ascertain, if possible, and give effect to, the intention of the lawmakers. Layton v. Home Indem. Co., 9 Wash.2d 25, 113 P.2d 538, and authorities therein cited.

In the process of arriving at the intent of the legislative body, the first resort of the courts is to the context and subject matter of the legislation, because the intention of the lawmaker is to be deduced, if possible, from what it said. Behrens v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1, King County, 107 Wash. 155, 181 P. 892, 185 P. 628; In re Sanborn, 159 Wash. 112, 292 P. 259.

Turning to the language of referendum measure 22, we find no provision therein making the increase in pension applicable to pension rights arising out of industrial injuries occurring prior to the effective date of the measure; on the other hand, the measure contains no saving clause restricting its applicability to pension rights based upon injuries occurring subsequent to the effective date of the referendum measure. The language of the measure therefore affords us no light in our inquiry as to the intent of the lawmaking body which enacted it, and in consequence we must resort to other aids for judicial construction.

It is a fundamental rule in this state that a statute will be presumed to operate prospectively only, and that it will not be held to apply retrospectively in the absence of language clearly indicating such legislative intent. Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 264; In re Cascade Fixture Co., 8 Wash.2d 263, 111 P.2d 991; Layton v. Home Indem. Co., supra; Nelson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 9 Wash.2d 621, 115 P.2d 1014; Cowiche Growers, Inc., v. Bates, 10 Wash.2d 585, 117 P.2d 624; State ex rel. Cooper v. Warnock.

16 Wash.2d 697, 134 P.2d 706.

It is also the general rule in this state that awards payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act are governed by the law in effect at the time the injury to the workman occurred. Thorpe v. Department of Labor and Industries, 145 Wash. 498, 261 P. 85; Foster v. Department of Labor & Industries, 161 Wash. 54, 296 P. 148, 73 A.L.R. 1012; Sheldon v. Department of Labor and Industries, 168 Wash. 571, 12 P.2d 751; Sandahl v. Department of Labor and Industries, 170 Wash. 380, 16 P.2d 623; McKay v. Department of Labor and Industries, 180 Wash. 191, 39 P.2d 997, 98 A.L.R. 990.

If referendum measure 22 be read and construed in the light of the rules hereinBefore stated, our conclusion must be that the provision for increased pensions to the widows of injured workmen speaks in futuro and includes only those cases where the injury to the workman occurs subsequent to the effective date of the measure, December 3, 1942. This would exclude the appellant from the benefit of the increase.

Appellant urges, however, that after the effective date of the 1941 statute 'like compensation should be paid to those injured Before and after the effective date,' and she contends that such an application of the law would in no true sense be retroactive. In support of her contention she cites the case of Talbot v. Industrial Ins. Commission, 108 Wash. 231, 183 P. 84, 85, 187 P. 410. In that case, the claimant workman became permanently and totally disabled...