Thorpe v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington

• Decision Date: 10 November 1927
• Docket Number: 20763.
• Citation: 145 Wash. 498,261 P. 85
• Parties: THORPE v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF WASHINGTON.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

261 P. 85

145 Wash. 498

THORPE v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF WASHINGTON.

No. 20763.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 10, 1927

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Frater, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law for the death of her husband by Marie Thorpe, claimant. The Department of Labor and Industries of Washington allowed the claim for a part of the amount claimed by claimant, and on appeal to the superior court the award was affirmed, and claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Beardslee & Bassett, of Seattle, for appellant.

John H Dunbar and Mark H. Wight, both of Olympia, for respondent.

ASKREN J.

In March, 1918, appellant's husband was injured while engaged in an extrahazardous occupation. Upon claim being made therefor, he was paid compensation by the state after approval by the Department of Labor and Industries. On May 5 1926, he died as a result of his injuries and a disease contracted therefrom.

His widow, the appellant, filed her claim for compensation and the department allowed the claim. The amount of the allowance was determined by the department to be governed by the law that was in force at the time of the injury. The appellant claimed that she was entitled to compensation according to the schedule in force at the time of death--a substantial increase in amount. The appellant thereupon appealed to the superior court which upheld the department and dismissed the case. This appeal followed.

It is conceded by appellant that injuries are compensable only under the schedule in force at the time of the accident although subsequently increased because of express statutory provision, but it is argued that these provisions do not include claims for death which accrue subsequent to the change in the schedule as a result of the injury sustained prior thereto. In 1919 the Legislature amended the Compensation Act, but provided by section 9 as follows:

'For all cases of injuries to workmen which occurred before this act shall go into effect sections 7675, 7679, 7680 and 7684 shall continue in force as they were prior to and they shall be unaffected by the passage of this amendatory act. The amendatory provisions of sections 7674, 7676, 7679 and 7680 shall apply only to injuries occurring after they shall go into effect.' Rem. Comp. Stats. § 7702.

The sections referred to form the basis of right to compensation. In 1923 the act was again amended, but the schedule of compensation was not changed as to injuries occurring before the amendment. It provided (Laws of 1923, c. 136, § 20, p 412):

'For all cases of injuries to workmen which occurred and for all claims or actions pending or causes of action existing before this act shall go into effect, sections 7673 to 7796 of Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington shall continue in force as they were prior to and they shall be unaffected by the passage of this amendatory act.'

Appellant's argument is twofold. First, it is argued that the Legislature intended to draw a distinction by the act of 1923 between 'injuries' and 'claims or actions pending or causes of action.' It is said that the intent of that body was to make the old schedule applicable to all injuries occurring before the amendment, and to all claims or actions for death that had accrued, or were pending at the time of the amendment. Argument is made that the words 'claim or actions' mean claim or action of a dependent because they would add nothing to the phrase 'injuries to workmen' if they referred to the same thing. But a reading of the entire act discloses nowhere an intention to make a distinction between the rights of the injured workman arising from an injury and those of his dependents in case of his death, and we are satisfied that these words have reference to injuries for which no claim has been made, those for which claims have been made, and those for which actions are pending.

The second branch of appellant's argument is that her right to compensation did not arise from her husband's injury, but from his death. With this we can hardly agree. Her right to recover may arise at his death, but it certainly arises from his injury. The death of her husband gives her no right whatever unless it be established that it arose from an injury under the act. So that the injury itself is the real basis for allowance of compensation.

The declared object of the law is to provide compensation for injury. The compensation is to be paid to the...