Ma v. Bon Appetit Mgmt. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:17CV2056 |
| Parties | QIUSHA MA, et al., PLAINTIFFS, v. BON APPETIT MANAGEMENT CO., DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is defendant Bon Appetit Management Company's ("Bon Appetit") motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 28 ["Mot."]). Plaintiffs filed their opposition (Doc. No. 30 ["Opp'n"]) and defendant filed a reply (Doc. No. 33 ["Reply"]). For the reasons discussed herein, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Qiusha Ma ("Ma") is a tenured professor of Chinese at Oberlin College ("Oberlin") in Oberlin, Ohio. (Doc. No. 28-4 ["Ma Dep."] at 380.1) Plaintiff Nengli Shi ("Shi") is Ma's husband. (Id. at 381-82.) Oberlin contracted with defendant Bon Appetit to manage Oberlin's food service employees and food service program at Oberlin dining halls, including Stevenson Dining Hall.
On October 16, 2015, a moveable wall partition in Oberlin's Stevenson Dining Hall came off the track from which it was suspended from the ceiling. (Doc. No. 28-5 ["Nemeth Dep."] at 516-18; Krasnevich Dep. at 649.) A Bon Appetit employee filed a maintenance request with Oberlin's maintenance staff to fix the broken wall partition. (Nemeth Dep. at 516-18; Krasnevich Dep. at 649.) Members of Oberlin's maintenance staff removed the broken wall partition and leaned it against a permanent exterior wall in the rear corner of Stevenson Dining Hall. (Krasnevich Dep. at 649.) As of the morning of November 6, 2015, the broken wall partition had not been fixed and remained leaning against the rear exterior wall in Stevenson Dining Hall. (Id. at 650-51.)
On November 6, 2015, Ma went to Stevenson Dining Hall to have lunch with students in the Chinese Language Program. (Ma Dep. at 392-93.) At some point that day, between morning and lunch, an unknown individual moved the broken wall partition and propped it up next to other moveable wall partitions in the cafeteria. (Krasnevich Dep. at 650-51.) Ma sat down at a table next to where the broken wall partition had been propped against the other moveable wall partitions. (Ma Dep. at 396-97.) A student sitting on the other side of the broken wall partition accidentally hit the broken wall partition, causing it to fall onto Ma as she sat. (Krasnevich Dep. at 650-51.) Ma sustained serious and permanent injuries. (Ma Dep. at 408-438.)
On October 2, 2017, plaintiffs filed their complaint against Bon Appetit. In their complaint, Ma brought a claim for negligence and Shi brought a derivative claim for loss of consortium. Following the completion of discovery, Bon Appetit filed the present motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed their opposition, and defendant filed a reply.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), when a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, it shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
An opposing party may not rely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, by affidavits or by materials in the record, the opposing party must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Affidavits or declarations filed in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). A movant is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
In reviewing summary judgment motions, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, 909 F.2d 941, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1990), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 113 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1991). A fact is "material" only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is "genuine" requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Thus,in most civil cases the Court must decide "whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [nonmoving party] is entitled to a verdict[.]" Id. at 252.
Summary judgment is appropriate whenever the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The nonmoving party is under an affirmative duty to point out specific facts in the record as it has been established that create a genuine issue of material fact. Fulson v. City of Columbus, 801 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D. Ohio 1992). The nonmoving party must show "more than a scintilla of evidence" to overcome summary judgment; it is not enough for the nonmoving party to show that there is some "metaphysical doubt" as to material facts. Id.
In its motion for summary judgment, Bon Appetit claims that Ma's negligence claim must fail because (1) Bon Appetit did not owe Ma a duty; (2) even if Bon Appetit did owe Ma a duty, it did not breach any such duty; and (3) Ma's negligence claim is barred by Ohio's Worker's Compensation Act. Further, Bon Appetit claims that Shi's derivative loss of consortium claim fails as a matter of law because Ma's negligence claim fails.
Under Ohio law,2 to succeed on a negligence claim, plaintiff must prove: 1) the existence of a duty; 2) breach of that duty; and 3) that the breach was the proximate cause of her injury. Asadv. Continential Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 772, 781 (N.D Ohio 2004) (citing Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 2000)). The threshold question—the existence of a duty—is a question of law for the Court to determine. Id. (citing Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1989)). A duty is a legal obligation for one person to act for the benefit of another person due to the relationship between them. Dryer v. Flower Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
Negligence actions may be premised on either acts of omission (nonfeasance) or acts of commission (misfeasance). Asad, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 782. Ohio law recognizes the distinction. Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 & n.2 (Ohio 1997). Nonfeasance usually involves a special relationship and the "failure to do an act that a person is under a duty to do and that a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the failure to take action to protect another from harm." Asad, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (citing 57 AM. JUR.2D Negligence § 13). "[M]isfeasance, on the other hand, arises from 'the improper doing of an act that a person might lawfully do or active misconduct that causes injury to another.'" Id. (citing 57 AM. JUR.2D Negligence § 13).
Put another way, Ohio law imposes a duty on everyone to refrain from active misconduct that causes an injury to another, but it does not impose a general duty to take affirmative action to aid or protect another. Estates of Morgan, 673 N.E.2d at 1319. An affirmative duty to aid or protect another only arises when a "special and definite relationship" exists between the parties. Jackson v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 675 N.E.2d 1356, 1358 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). Examples of special anddefinite relationships include: (1) common carrier and its passengers, (2) innkeeper and guests, (3) possessor of land and invitee, (4) custodian and individual taken into custody, and (5) employer and employee. Id.
Here, there is no evidence that Bon Appetit actively created the harm that led to Ma's injury, and Ma does not argue that Bon Appetit did. (Mot. at 250 (); Opp'n at 788 ().) Thus, Ma advances her negligence claim based on nonfeasance. As such, Ma must first establish the existence of a special and definite relationship.
Ma alleges a landowner-invitee relationship existed between the parties at the time of the incident. Bon Appetit posits that no such relationship existed because Bon Appetit did not own the dining hall, did not lease the dining hall, and otherwise did not exercise any control over the premise of the dining hall.
Under Ohio law, a plaintiff's status on a defendant's premises determines the scope of the legal duty owed (trespasser, licensee, or invitee). Pelland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1023 (N.D Ohio 2017) (citing Shump v. First Cont'l-Robinwood Assocs., 644 N.E.2d 291, 294 (Ohio 1994)). As defined by Ohio law, a business invitee is a person who is on the premises...
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