Macias v. State
| Decision Date | 20 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D06-808.,4D06-808. |
| Citation | 959 So.2d 782 |
| Parties | Jaime MACIAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bruce S. Rogow and Cynthia E. Gunther of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Diane F. Medley and David M. Schultz, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant Jaime Macias timely appeals a conviction of sexual battery by a person of control or authority and declaration as a sexual predator. We affirm.
The victim in this case, A.B., entered the Broward County Adult Drug Court Program after being arrested for possession of cocaine. A few months later, she failed a drug urinalysis. Knowing this could lead to time in jail, she asked to speak with the program supervisor, i.e., Macias. Macias told her that he would speak with Yvonne Sherman, A.B.'s Drug Court Program counselor, but that in the meantime she should wait downstairs until he called her on her cellular phone.
The victim testified that she received a call from Macias a few minutes later wherein Macias told her that she had gotten away with a lot in the program and asked her if she was "good with my mouth." According to the victim, Macias came downstairs and repeated the question, and she A.B. apparently agreed and met Macias at the Winn-Dixie and entered his van, where he allegedly told her that "if he wanted to do what I needed him to do, then I needed to do what he needed me to do." She then performed fellatio upon Macias. She did not report the incident because Macias allegedly told her not to tell anybody. A few days later, a representative from the program recommended to the Drug Court that A.B. receive the "drug patch" and not serve time in the custody of the State. The court followed this recommendation.
The victim's drug abuse nevertheless continued and, a few months after being released from the Drug Court Program, she voluntarily entered a residential drug rehabilitation program — the Broward Addiction Recovery Center ("BARC"). Once there, she told a BARC counselor about the events that transpired between Macias and herself in his van. As a result of this disclosure, BARC reported the incident, a police investigation ensued and the State ultimately brought charges against Macias for sexual battery under section 794.011(4)(c), (g), Florida Statutes (2003).
At trial, the State, over defense counsel's objection, adduced the Williams rule testimony of A.A. This victim, like A.B., had been a participant in the Broward County Adult Drug Court Program. She testified concerning a meeting she had with Macias that occurred about two months after the incident between Macias and A.B. During the meeting, A.A. told Macias that she planned on going to college and he evidently responded that she would not be able to do that while she was in the Drug Court Program, but that he "could make a deal with her," he "could pull strings for me, seeing that he was the supervisor, to help me get out there . . . quicker, I think he said 10 months, and the minimum time that I was aware of was a year." He gave her "a speech about opportunities, choices and consequences, because that was his catchphrase."
I heard him say it a lot during that meeting, opportunities, choices and consequences. And, basically, how he propositioned it to me was that he had an opportunity for me and it was up to me to make the choice and I could take the consequences ... the good or bad, they didn't necessarily have to be bad consequences . . . . And he was saying are you willing to do anything. And he was telling me about how he had people do extra curricular, AA meetings.... So, finally, when we got to the end of the conversation, I was like, yes, I'm willing to do anything. And he was like, I have a very good deal for you, you can't tell anyone .... and he said that I had to take care of him. . . . He used those exact words.... I was really shocked, actually, and I was really hoping that he did not mean sexually, because that's how I took it.... And I said, well, yeah, I'm willing to do anything that is legal and moral. And he just said, well, we don't have a deal then.
In its Order on Williams Rule Evidence, the court found the following:
In the instant case, as well as the prior alleged incident, the victims were told that if they "took care of [Defendant]," he would "pull some strings" in order to get them out of the program faster. This Court finds that the other alleged instance of sexual misconduct is sufficiently similar to be admissible as "Williams Rule" evidence. As such, the evidence is relevant and is admissible at trial. Furthermore, its probative value outweighs any prejudice.
On appeal, Macias contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting A.A.'s testimony. "On the Williams Rule issue, the standard of review applicable to the consideration of whether evidence was properly admitted is abuse of discretion." Stav v. State, 860 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Geldreich v. State, 763 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). The codification of the Williams rule provides:
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959). In Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987), superseded by statute on other grounds, § 90.404(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002), the Florida Supreme Court set forth the test for relevancy of similar fact evidence:
To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, the similar fact evidence must meet a strict standard of relevance. The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Johnson v. State
...crime evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kane v. State, 975 So.2d 1277, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Macias v. State, 959 So.2d 782, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)). We reject the defendant's contention that the September robbery was not admissible because the state did not present clear and......
-
Johnson v. State
...crime evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kane v. State, 975 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Macias v. State, 959 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)). We reject the defendant's contention that the September robbery was not admissible because the state did not present clear a......
-
Pratt v. State
... ... McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1255 (Fla.2006). It is also settled that Williams rule evidence must meet a high standard of relevance, be strikingly similar to the crime charged and share some unique characteristics distinguishing the past crime and the crime on trial from other offenses. Macias" v. State, 959 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Even then the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that its probative value is greater than the unfair prejudice associated with such evidence. McLean, 934 So.2d at 1256. The evidence in this case satisfies none of these requirements ... \xC2" ... ...
-
PULCINI v. State of Fla., 4D08-2885.
... ... rule testimony where collateral act of molestation and the charged molestation shared "numerous similarities"); see also Grier, 27 So.3d at 101 (upholding admissibility of collateral crime evidence where "many points of similarity between the charged act and collateral act exist"); Macias v. State, 959 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (finding only one "fundamental difference" between the charged offense and collateral act). Here, the collateral acts do not share sufficient points of similarity with the charged crime to be admissible ... Based on the ... ...