Maher v. Maher
Decision Date | 27 May 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-181,03-181 |
Parties | HENRY EARL MAHER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. MARLENE LOUISE MAHER, n/k/a MARLENE LOUISE LAWSON, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Deborah Ford Mincer of The Mincer Law Firm, Cheyenne, WY.
Representing Appellee: Carol A. Serelson, Cheyenne, WY.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶1] Appellant Henry Maher (Maher) appeals the denial of his petition to terminate the alimony payments he is required to make to his former wife, appellee Marlene Lawson (Lawson). The alimony payments are required pursuant to an agreement entered into between the parties and incorporated into their divorce decree. Maher sought to terminate the alimony payments upon his former wife's remarriage. We affirm.
[¶3] On May 7, 1998, after almost twenty-five years of marriage, Maher filed for divorce from Lawson. The parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement prepared by Maher's attorney on May 22, 1998. The agreement provided, in applicable part:
The agreement also included an acknowledgment that the parties had the opportunity to retain separate counsel prior to execution of the agreement. Although the parties considered including a clause within the agreement that would end alimony upon remarriage, the parties could not agree on that clause and it was left out of the agreement. Further, Maher signed and filed a statement under oath indicating that the form of decree of divorce was fair and equitable to both parties. The agreement was then filed with the district court, and the district court entered a decree of divorce on July 7, 1998, incorporating the agreement.
[¶4] Maher remarried in November 1999, and Lawson remarried in March 2000. On July 18, 2000, Maher filed his Petition for Termination of Alimony, which was initially heard before a district court commissioner. Upon the recommendation of the district court commissioner, the district court formally denied Maher's petition. Thereafter, the district court granted Maher's Motion for Relief from Judgment filed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b).1
[¶5] A trial was then held before the district court on Maher's original Petition for Termination of Alimony. Ultimately, the district court denied the petition on June 9, 2003, finding that Maher had failed to show a material and substantial change of circumstances.
[¶6] A trial court's conclusions of law are not binding on this court and are reviewed de novo. Pagel v. Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶7, 57 P.3d 1226,
¶7 (Wyo. 2002); Maycock v. Maycock, 2001 WY 103, ¶12, 33 P.3d 1114, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001). The standard we apply in reviewing cases asserting an abuse of discretion by the trial court is whether the trial court reasonably could have concluded as it did. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, ¶11, 76 P.3d 836, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003); Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20, 23 (Wyo. 1993); Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Wyo. 1989).
[¶7] In his first two issues on appeal Maher, in essence, claims that the district court erred as a matter of law when it denied his petition to terminate alimony. According to Maher, the case of Swetich v. Smith, 802 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1990), citing the cases of Marquardt v. Marquardt by Rempfer, 396 N.W.2d 753 (S.D. 1986) and In re Marriage of Shima, 360 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1985), stands for the proposition that upon the filing of a motion to terminate alimony based on remarriage, the spouse receiving alimony has the burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances exist which justify the payment of continued alimony. We do not agree.
[¶8] While it is true that the Marquardt and In re Marriage of Shima cases may support the argument espoused by Maher, this court cited those cases only as authority showing that remarriage could be considered a sufficient change of circumstances to terminate alimony, but that it did not automatically terminate alimony payments without amendatory court action. As stated in Swetich, at 870-71:
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