Sellers v. Sellers, 88-157
| Decision Date | 22 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-157,88-157 |
| Citation | 775 P.2d 1029 |
| Parties | Dwight L. "Spike" SELLERS, Appellant (Defendant), v. Mary Jane SELLERS, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Frank R. Chapman, Beech Street Law Offices, Casper, for appellant.
Keith P. Tyler, Casper, for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
This is a divorce case. The husband, appellant Dwight L. "Spike" Sellers, challenges the property division made by the district court. He contends that the district court abused its discretion by
(1) awarding all of the parties' real estate to his wife;
(2) designating payments to him of $1,000 per month as "alimony" rather than "property settlement"; and
(3) failing to consider the tax consequences of the award of alimony.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties were married in 1979. Each had grown children from a previous marriage. Prior to this marriage, they executed an antenuptial agreement which provided that the parties retain their separately held property as if unmarried. The agreement also provided that they could create joint tenancies or tenancies by the entirety if desired. During the marriage, several parcels of land were acquired, along with livestock and equipment. The couple carried on a ranching operation, which consistently lost money. In 1987 the wife, Mary Jane Sellers, filed for divorce. After a trial to the court, the district court in its judgment and decree awarded to Mary Jane all of the real property jointly held by the parties, the ranch assets, and her separately held property. Dwight Sellers was awarded his separately held property, $10,000 cash, and alimony payments totalling $120,000 to be paid at the rate of $1,000 per month for ten years.
In his first argument, Dwight contends that the award of all the parties' jointly held real property to Mary Jane was a "grossly disproportionate, unjust, and inequitable division" of the parties' property. We have discussed the appellate review of property divisions on a number of occasions. When the district court disposes of property under W.S. 20-2-114, it exercises a large discretion in determining what is a just and equitable division, and the disposition will not be disturbed except on clear grounds. See, e.g., Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo.1980). Some of the factors which the district court should consider are:
"the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children." W.S. 20-2-114.
There was considerable testimony concerning difficulties in the marriage, such as drinking and physical abuse, that resulted in the parties' separation. No purpose would be served by reiterating here these circumstances which led to the filing of this divorce action. As to the condition in which the parties will be left, Dwight leaves the marriage with essentially the same separate property he had prior to the marriage.
The jointly held real estate consisted of three parcels of land, known as Corral Creek, Spruce Creek, and Iron Creek. Iron Creek and Spruce Creek were purchased during the marriage, and were titled in the names of both parties. Iron Creek is heavily mortgaged.
Mary Jane purchased Corral Creek prior to the marriage and later transferred the title into the names of both parties. Dwight now contends that he sold some of his separate real property, known as Meadow Acres, to Mary Jane's son at a price below market value in part because Mary Jane transferred the title to Corral Creek into their joint names. Dwight's own testimony at trial, however, established that the Meadow Acres transaction was not in consideration of the title change for Corral Creek. What was not disputed is that the proceeds of the sale of Dwight's property were used primarily to pay an obligation arising from the property settlement in his previous divorce.
Much of the evidence introduced at trial concerned the disparity in money contributed to the ranching operation. Mary Jane had substantial income from trusts during the marriage, and contributed in excess of $1.5 million, while Dwight contributed a total of approximately $120,000. The evidence indicates that the real property at issue here was purchased primarily, if not solely, from Mary Jane's income. Considering the factors indicated above, there was ample evidence to support the division of the real property; and there was, therefore, no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its decision.
Dwight also contends that the court must have intended to punish him by awarding the three parcels of land to Mary Jane. While he correctly states the rule that judicial discretion should not be exercised to reward one party and to punish the other, Paul, 616 P.2d at 712, he has identified nothing in the record which indicates that either reward or punishment was intended. He asks us to presume that punishment was intended by looking at the result alone. We discussed a similar situation in Beckle v. Beckle, 452 P.2d 205, 208 (Wyo.1969), saying:
We do not perceive either an abuse of discretion or an intent to punish appellant by the award of the real property.
Dwight's second argument is that the district court improperly designated the monthly payments of $1,000 as alimony rather than as part of the property settlement. The district court clearly has the power to award alimony:
"The court may decree to either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's ability * * *." W.S. 20-2-114.
The pertinent provision of the decree is as follows:
Dwight does not contend that this provision is ambiguous or erroneously drafted; rather, he asserts that the designation of the payments as alimony was an abuse of discretion.
The purpose of alimony is to provide a post-divorce substitute for the support provided to a spouse during the marriage. Martens v. Martens, 364 P.2d 995 (Wyo.1961). It is for the support and maintenance of a former spouse who is unable to adequately provide for themselves. Id. As such, alimony awards have some unique features. Alimony obligations may be modified upon a proper showing of a change in circumstances. W.S. 20-2-116; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265 (Wyo.1978). Alimony payments terminate on the death of either party or on the remarriage of the payee. Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525 (Wyo.1961).
An award of property is a preferable modern substitute for alimony. Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731 (Wyo.1987). While in some cases alimony may be a necessity,
"under ordinary circumstances it should be recognized that one spouse should not have a perpetual claim on the earnings of the other; that divorce, insofar as possible should sever the ties of the parties and they should begin to start their lives anew." Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo.1984).
When alimony is awarded in the absence of a stipulated settlement between the parties, the record must reflect some evidence that alimony, with its special features, is needed. If the intent is to adjust the equities between the parties at the time of the divorce, property division, which may encompass a series of payments, is the preferable method. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d at 821.
The allowance or disallowance of alimony is a matter which lies within the discretion of the trial court. Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, 443 P.2d 524 (Wyo.1968). We have previously...
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