Malin v. Mo. Ass'n of Cmty. Task Forces

• Decision Date: 21 July 2020
• Docket Number: WD 83322
• Citation: 605 S.W.3d 419
• Parties: Aaron M. MALIN, Appellant, v. MISSOURI ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY TASK FORCES, d/b/a ACT Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

605 S.W.3d 419

Aaron M. MALIN, Appellant,

v.MISSOURI ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY TASK FORCES, d/b/a ACT Missouri, Respondent.

WD 83322

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Opinion filed: July 21, 2020

Gilliam R. Wilcox, for Appellant.

Stephanie S. Bell, for Respondent.

Division One: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE

Aaron Malin ("Malin") brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County against the Missouri Association of Community Task Forces ("ACT Missouri") for violation of the Missouri Sunshine Law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of ACT Missouri after denying Malin's request made pursuant to Rule 74.04(f) to defer ruling on the motion for summary judgment to permit him to conduct discovery. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

On January 9, 2018, Malin submitted a written request to ACT Missouri under the Missouri Sunshine Law, chapter 610,¹ seeking "[a]ny and all documents relating to funding acquired from the Missouri Department of Mental Health" for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. ACT Missouri is a not-for-profit corporation organized in Missouri under chapter 355, and has entered into contracts with government agencies, including the Missouri Department of Mental Health, the Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, the Missouri Department of Transportation, and the United States Department of Health and Human Services.

Three days after receiving Malin's request for records, ACT Missouri responded, stating, "[w]e have received your previous requests for records and have responded to each request. To restate with respect to each and every request you have made, since ACT Missouri is not a covered entity under Chapter 610, and more specifically Section 610.010(4), there is no further response required."

On January 23, 2018, Malin filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County, seeking the requested records, civil penalties, and attorney's fees. Three months after the petition was filed, and prior to any discovery being conducted in the case, ACT Missouri filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was not a "quasi-public governmental body" as that term is defined in section 610.010(4)(f), and thus not subject to the Missouri Sunshine Law. Malin filed an affidavit under Rule 74.04(f)² requesting the trial court defer any ruling on the motion for summary judgment arguing that some discovery was necessary in order to respond to the motion for summary judgment and offering that "discovery is likely to demonstrate a factual dispute about whether [ACT Missouri] is a quasi-public governmental body." The affidavit averred that interrogatories and requests for production of documents had been served on ACT Missouri and that Malin anticipated taking one or more depositions "depending on the responses to [Malin's] written discovery[.]" Approximately two weeks later, Malin provided notice to take the deposition of a corporate representative of ACT Missouri. ACT Missouri opposed the Rule 74.04(f) affidavit and moved to quash the deposition notice. As it related to the issue of whether ACT Missouri met the definition of being a quasi-public governmental body, ACT Missouri argued, and continues to argue in this appeal, that "as a matter of law, ACT Missouri's primary purpose is found in its Articles of Incorporation for the purpose of determining whether it is a quasi-public governmental body under Section 610.010(4)(f)(a)[.]" The trial court denied Malin's Rule 74.04(f) request, quashed the deposition notice of the corporate representative and ordered that no further discovery would be permitted.

While ACT Missouri's motion for summary judgment was still pending, Malin filed his own motion for summary judgment, relying, in part, on discovery he had received during a 2015 lawsuit against ACT Missouri in which he had sought similar records.³ The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of ACT Missouri. Malin appeals.

Standard of Review

Malin's first two points allege error relating to the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ACT Missouri. We review such claims de novo. SNL Securities, L.C. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Com'rs , 23 S.W.3d 734, 735 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (citation omitted). We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and "accord [the non-moving party] all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record." Id. (citing Dunagan By and Through Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Ctr. , 967 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) ). Summary judgment is only appropriate "if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 735-36 (citing Dunagan , 967 S.W.2d at 287 ).

In his third point, Malin argues that the trial court erred by denying his Rule 74.04(f) request to defer ruling on ACT Missouri's motion for summary judgment so that he might conduct discovery on issues essential to his opposition to that motion. " ‘The trial court has discretion to grant or deny additional time to conduct discovery before ruling on a pending summary judgment motion.’ " Matysyuk v. Pantyukhin , 595 S.W.3d 543, 547 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting Brooks v. City of Sugar Creek , 340 S.W.3d 201, 209 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) ). " ‘A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.’ " Id. (quoting Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. , 514 S.W.3d 590, 596 (Mo. banc 2017) ).

Discussion

Points I and II of Malin's appeal relate to the central issue of this case – Is ACT Missouri a "quasi-public governmental body" under section 610.010(4)(f) of the Missouri Sunshine Law? The Sunshine Law provides that "[i]t is the public policy of this state that meetings, records, votes, actions, and deliberations of public governmental bodies shall be open to the public unless otherwise provided by law." § 610.011.1. In turn, a public governmental body is defined, in relevant part, as "any legislative, administrative or governmental entity created by the Constitution or statutes of this state, by order or ordinance of any political subdivision or district, judicial entities when operating in an administrative capacity, or by executive order, including: ... [a]ny quasi-public governmental body." § 610.010(4)(f). A definition for "quasi-public governmental body" is also provided:

The term "quasi-public governmental body" means any person, corporation or partnership organized or authorized to do business in this state pursuant to the provisions of chapter 352, 353, or 355, or unincorporated association which either:

a. Has its primary purpose to enter into contracts with public governmental bodies, or to engage primarily in activities carried out pursuant to an agreement or agreements with public governmental bodies; or b. Performs a public function as evidenced by a statutorily based capacity to confer or otherwise advance, through approval, recommendation or other means, the allocation or issuance of tax credits, tax abatement, public debt, tax-exempt debt, rights of eminent domain, or the contracting of leaseback agreements on structures whose annualized payments commit public tax revenues; or any association that directly accepts the appropriation of money from a public governmental body, but only to the extent that a meeting, record, or vote relates to such appropriation[.]

§ 610.010(4)(f)(a) & (b), RSMo. We address Malin's points out of order for ease of discussion.

Point II

In Malin's second point, he alleges the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of ACT Missouri arguing that ACT Missouri is a quasi-public governmental body based on being an "association that directly accepts the appropriation of money from a pubic governmental body[.]" See § 610.010(4)(f)(b). Because we find that ACT Missouri is not an "association" as the term is used in section 610.010(4)(f)(b), Malin's argument must fail.

" ‘The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning.’ " State Conf. of Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State , 563 S.W.3d 138, 150 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Dieser v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr. , 498 S.W.3d 419, 430 (Mo. banc 2016) ). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, we ‘must give effect to the legislature's chosen language.’ " Id. (quoting Treasurer of State-Custodian of Second Injury Fund v. Witte , 414 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Mo. banc 2013) ). "We presume every word, sentence, or clause in a statute has effect, and the legislature did not insert superfluous language." Id. (citing Mantia v. Mo. Dep't of Transp. , 529 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Mo. banc 2017) ).

The crux of Malin's argument is that we should view the term "association" in isolation and assign to it a broad definition that would capture corporate entities organized under chapter 355, RSMo, such as ACT Missouri.⁴ However, Malin's effort to define "association" in a vacuum is misplaced. Rather, the term "association" must be examined in the context of the entirety of section 610.010(4)(f). See In re KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co., 408 S.W.3d 175, 186 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) ("When determining the meaning of statutory language, the whole act must be taken into consideration, and the words of one section or statute must be read in the context of other statutes on the same subject as well as with cognate sections."). See also Kersting v. Replogle , 492 S.W.3d 600, 602 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (stating that a statute is not to be read in isolation but must be read in context of the entire statute).

Section 610.010(4)(f) defines the universe of entities that qualify as a quasi-public...