Maloney v. State

• Decision Date: 03 July 1957
• Docket Number: No. 31319,31319
• Citation: 3 N.Y.2d 356,165 N.Y.S.2d 465,144 N.E.2d 364
• Parties: , 144 N.E.2d 364 Ruth E. MALONEY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas F. Maloney, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. (Claim)
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 465

165 N.Y.S.2d 465

3 N.Y.2d 356, 144 N.E.2d 364

Ruth E. MALONEY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas F. Maloney, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

(Claim No. 31319.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 3, 1957.

N. Earle Evans, Jr., No. Syracuse, and Robert B. Anderson, New York City, for appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (John R. Davison, Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

VAN VOORHIS, Judge.

The widow of a State employee filed a claim against the State of New York in the Court of Claims to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering and for the alleged wrongful death of her husband, who was fatally injured in an accident on New York State derrick barge 2A, a nonpropelled boat, used in the repair and maintenance of the State canal system. The claim was filed under section 688 of title 46 of the United State Code Annotated, Known as the Jones Act. The Court of Claims, after trial, found that the underlying accident and liability were maritime in character, dependent upon negligence and every other substantial element which, in the circumstances, would render an individual or a private corporation liable under the Jones Act. It withheld an award on the ground that the exclusive Federal jurisdiction of maritime matters precludes an award in the Court of Claims, and that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the Jones Act.

The Appellate Division agreed with the Court of Claims that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the Jones Act, and was of opinion that the intention of the Legislature was to make compensation the exclusive remedy in all its employments, even maritime, and that otherwise it retained its general immunity as to all claims of its employees injured in the course of their employment.

The decedent sustained his fatal injuries while working at the spool or which as the barge pulled itself at lock No. 7 on the Oswego River canal on October 16, 1951. He was alone in the engine room, when his screams brought another crew member to the room, who climbed to the platform and stopped the spool from turning. The decedent was then down on one knee, his left arm twisted behind him under three or four turns on the spool. He was loosened by cutting the rope, and taken to the hospital. He remained conscious after the accident until his death at the hospital on October 23, 1951, one week after the accident.

It is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence that a State may not be sued without its consent (Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842; Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-500, 41 S.Ct. 588, 65 L.Ed. 1057; Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329, 54 S.Ct. 745, 78 L.Ed. 1282). A waiver of immunity from liability must be clearly expressed (Goldstein v. State of New York, 281 N.Y. 396, 403, 24 N.E.2d 97, 100, 129 A.L.R. 905; Smith v. State of New York, 227 N.Y. 405, 410, 125 N.E. 841, 842, 13 A.L.R.2d 1264).

Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act provides: 'Waiver of immunity from liability. The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the Limitations of this article. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect, alter or repeal any provision of the workmen's compensation law.' (Italics supplied.)

The right to bring an action under the Jones Act exists only by reason of that statute. Under the general maritime law, there was no right to recovery for injuries to a seaman, resulting in death. The Jones Act has superseded the State Wrongful death statutes with respect to fatal injuries received by seamen in the course of their employment (Willock, Commentary on Marine Workers, 46 U.S.C.A., pp. 211, 240, 255). The remedies of the Jones Act may be enforced either in the admiralty courts, under admiralty procedure, without a jury, or in the Federal or State courts administering the common-law remedies, with the right of trial by jury. An action under the act is barred, unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued (Willock, Commentary on Marine Workers, 46 U.S.C.A., pp. 257-261, 268). It is indicated in the Commentary at page 258 that the Jones Act applies only to vessels of private ownership or operation. The jurisdication of the Court of Claims is entirely statutory (Smith v. State of New York, supra). There is no right of trial by jury in the Court of Claims (Court of Claims Act, § 12, subd. 3). The Statute of Limitations for the maintenance of an action under the Jones Act is different from that prescribed by the State (Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd. 3).

Subdivision 1 of section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, Consol.Laws, c. 67, provides: 'Compensation shall be payable for injuries or death incurred by employees in the following employments * * * Group 16. Any employment by the state'.

The Appellate Division held that since the deceased was covered by workmen's compensation, the employer's liability to pay compensation is exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever. Referring to section 8 of the Court of Claims Act and to subdivision 1 of section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the Appellate Division, said:

'We consider these statutes controlling. The State, undoubtedly aware of the provisions of the Jones Act, which was enacted in 1920 and which applies only where there is an employer-employee relationship, has made compensation the exclusive remedy available to state employees injured in the course of their employment and has withheld consent to be sued in such cases. * * *

'The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 does establish a uniform principle of substantive law, applicable in its field unhampered by the exceptions or alterations of state law; but it does not and cannot alter the sovereign's immunity from suit or enlarge the jurisdiction of state courts. Local control of the jurisdiction of state tribunals...