Manatee Cnty. v. Mandarin Dev., Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2D18-4053
• Citation: 301 So.3d 372
• Parties: MANATEE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. MANDARIN DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

301 So.3d 372

MANATEE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant,

v.MANDARIN DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Case No. 2D18-4053

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 18, 2020.

Christopher M. De Carlo, Anne M. Morris, and William E. Clague, Bradenton, for Appellant.

S. William Moore of Moore Bowman & Rix, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.

VILLANTI, Judge.

In this case that pitted a property developer against Manatee County, the County appeals two aspects of the final judgment: first, the trial court's finding that one section of the County's Land Development Code was facially unconstitutional, and second, the finding that the County was liable to Mandarin Development, Inc., for an uncompensated taking of a portion of the property owned by Mandarin. Because the ruling on the takings claim is supported by the evidence presented at the bench trial, we affirm that portion of the final judgment without further discussion. However, because Mandarin's challenge to the facial constitutionality of the Land Development Code was barred by the statute of limitations, we reverse that portion of the final judgment.

Pursuant to sections 163.3177(6)(d) and 163.3202(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the County developed and adopted a Comprehensive Plan and a Land Development Code which contained, among numerous other provisions, provisions relating to the protection and conservation of wetlands. Pertinent to the issue in this case, the Comprehensive Plan requires the County to identify and classify wetlands based on the nature and function of those wetlands, and it requires property owners to set aside and maintain certain buffer areas around all identified wetlands, with the size of the buffer depending on the County's classification of the wetlands. In addition, the Land Development Code requires that, as a condition of any property development, the property owner dedicate a conservation easement to the County over any required wetland buffers, with the size of the required easement again being related to the County's classification of the wetlands. The purpose of the wetlands buffer is to protect the wetlands from encroachment, damage, or destruction, while the purpose of the conservation easement is to allow the County to enter the property periodically to ensure that the wetlands are, in fact, being protected.

In 2006, Kimball Hill Homes filed a preliminary site plan with the County for the development of a 41.2-acre parcel of property that is bounded on the north by the Braden River, on the east by I-75, on the south by an existing subdivision, and on the west by Honore´ Avenue. In addition to the northern border that abuts the Braden River, the property contains a linear wetland that runs generally south to north through roughly the middle of the parcel and two ponds on the northern half of the parcel. In total, these wetlands comprise approximately three acres of the 41.2-acre parcel. Kimball Hill Homes proposed to construct a 126-unit multifamily home project on the property, which the County approved in 2007. As a condition of the approval, the County identified wetlands buffers along the river, the ponds, and the linear wetlands, and it required the dedication of conservation easements totaling 9.55 acres over those identified wetlands buffers.

In late 2007, Riva Trace, LLC, purchased the property from Kimball Hill Homes. Riva Trace filed an amended site plan that proposed to build eighty-six single-family homes on the site. During the approval process for the amended site plan, Riva Trace sought and obtained a number of variances to the applicable Land Development Code requirements; however, it did not seek a variance relating to the wetlands buffers or required conservation easements. Hence, despite the reduction in the density of the development, the amended site plan approved by the County in 2010 contained the same requirements concerning wetlands buffers and conservation easements as the previous site plan. Shortly after the amended site plan was approved, Mandarin took ownership of the property from its corporate predecessor, Riva Trace, and began active development of the property.

In 2012, after significant development had already occurred on the property, Mandarin sent a letter to County staff asking for a variance from the wetlands buffer requirement.¹ County staff responded that no such relief was possible under the Comprehensive Plan or the Land Development Code. Two years later, Mandarin sent a letter to the County requesting compensation for the dedication of the required conservation easement on the basis that such dedication constituted an impermissible taking without compensation. The County denied this request.

Shortly thereafter, Mandarin filed a three-count complaint against the County. Count I sought a declaration that the wetlands buffer and conservation easement provisions of the County's Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code were facially unconstitutional under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.² Count III of the complaint alleged that application of the challenged provisions to Mandarin resulted in a per se violation of the Takings Clause. In response, the County argued, inter alia, that Mandarin's facial challenges to the Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code were barred by the statute of limitations. It also denied that imposition of the required wetlands buffers and conservation easements constituted a taking.

Prior to trial, the County filed a motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations defense to the challenge to the facial constitutionality of the wetlands provisions. After a hearing, the trial court denied this motion. At the conclusion of the subsequent bench trial, the court found that the challenged provisions of the Comprehensive Plan and most of the challenged provisions of the Land Development Code were not facially unconstitutional; however, it determined that one section of the Land Development Code—section 706.8.B—was facially unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The court also found in favor of Mandarin on the County's liability under the takings claim, and it scheduled a jury trial on the issue of the compensation due Mandarin for the taking. Shortly thereafter, Mandarin and the County reached an agreement on the value of the takings claim, and the trial court entered a final judgment as to all of the claims. The County then brought this appeal.

As mentioned above, after thorough consideration, we reject the County's arguments concerning Mandarin's takings claim without further discussion. However, we agree with the County that the statute of limitations barred Mandarin's claim based on the alleged unconstitutionality of section 706.8.B of the Land Development Code. Therefore, we must reverse that portion of the final judgment that found section 706.8.B of the Land Development Code facially unconstitutional.³

The discrete question before this court is when the statute of limitations begins to run on a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a land use ordinance. The County asserts that the statute of limitations for a facial challenge started to run when the Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code were originally adopted in 1990. In contrast, Mandarin argues that an unconstitutional ordinance is void; that statutes of limitation can never bar a challenge to a void ordinance; and that therefore there is no statute of limitations applicable to its facial challenge. While the answer may be different in the context of an as-applied challenge, in the context of a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a land use ordinance, the County is correct that the statute of limitations begins to run when the ordinance is enacted or adopted.

Initially, we note that Mandarin raised its challenges to the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code in a declaratory judgment action. Declaratory judgment actions are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for all causes of action not otherwise specifically listed in the statute). And in the usual circumstance, the four-year statute would begin when there is an actual controversy between the parties that the court must address. As the supreme court has explained:

Individuals may challenge the validity of a statute in a declaratory action. § 86.021, Fla. Stat. (1989). This Court has long held, however, that individuals seeking declaratory relief must show that

there is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the declaration; that the declaration should deal with a present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts; that some immunity, power, privilege or right of the complaining party is dependent upon the facts or the law applicable to the facts; that there is some person or persons who have, or reasonably may have an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the subject matter, either in fact or law; that the antagonistic and adverse interest are all before the court by proper process or class representation and that the relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity. These elements are necessary in order to maintain the status of the proceeding as being judicial in nature and therefore within the constitutional powers of the courts .

May v. Holley, 59 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952) (emphasis added). AccordWilliams v. Howard, 329 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1976) ; Bryant v. Gray, 70 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1954). Thus, although a court may entertain a declaratory action regarding a statute's validity, there must be a bona fide need for such a declaration based on present, ascertainable facts or the court lacks jurisdiction to render declaratory

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