Manley v. Bank of Am., N.A., 01-18-00080-CV
| Decision Date | 20 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-18-00080-CV,01-18-00080-CV |
| Parties | STEPHEN MANLEY, Appellant v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas
Appellant Stephen Manley is appealing the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of appellee Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). In three issues, Manley argues that (1) the county court erred by rendering summary judgment in BANA's favor by default because he appeared in the case and responded to the motion, (2) the justice court and county court lacked jurisdiction, and (3) the justice court and county court abused their discretion by not submitting the case to a jury.1
We affirm the county court's judgment and dismiss Manley's claims against the justice court.
In 2010, Hilda L. Durden executed a promissory note payable to BANA and a Deed of Trust in favor of BANA that placed a lien on the property located at 402 Heatherbrook Drive, Houston, Texas 77085 (the Property). The Deed of Trust Hilda Durden executed contains a tenant-at-sufferance provision stating:
If the Property is sold pursuant to this Paragraph 21, Borrower or any person holding possession of the Property through Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If possession is not surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be tenants at sufferance and may be removed by writ or possession.
After Hilda Durden defaulted on the note, the Property was purchased by BANA at a Substitute Trustee's Sale held on April 4, 2017.
On June 23, 2017, BANA filed a forcible detainer action in a Harris County justice court against Manley and all other occupants of the Property. BANA alleged that it purchased the Property at the trustee's sale, Manley is a tenant at sufferance under the Deed of Trust, and Manley failed to vacate BANA's property after proper notice.
On July 5, 2017, Manley filed an answer, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses, along with a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Manley claimed ownership of the Property pursuant to a General Warranty Deed dated February 24, 2016, which Manley obtained from Michael Durden as Grantor.
The justice court held a jury trial on July 5, 2017. After the close of arguments, the court granted a directed verdict in BANA's favor. Manley appealed the justice court's verdict to Harris County's County Court at Law No. 4 and requested a jury trial.
BANA filed a motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2017, in which it argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its forcible detainer action because the evidence established that its right to immediate possession of the Property is superior to any right Manley may have in the Property, and that Manley is a tenant at sufferance pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust. Manley filed a response, to which BANA replied. BANA's motion for summary judgment was submitted to the court on January 19, 2018. The court granted the motion on January 25, 2018.
Manley filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
We address Manley's jurisdictional arguments first. In his second issue, Manley argues that the justice and county courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction over BANA's forcible detainer claim because there is a genuine dispute as to title that is so intertwined with the issue of possession that it deprived the lower courts of jurisdiction. Specifically, Manley argues that the 2016 warranty deed raises a question of fact regarding whether he or BANA has title to the Property, and there is no landlord-tenant relationship that would allow the lower courts to resolve the issue of possession without first resolving the title dispute. Manley further contends that the lower courts did not have jurisdiction because BANA did not have standing to file the forcible detainer action against him.
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012); Trimble v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 516 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) () (quoting City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985)).
Jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to the county court for a trial de novo. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 27.031(a)(2); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). Neither the justice court nor the county court has jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to land. See generally Black v. Washington Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
Thus, to prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. See Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29; see also Espinoza v. Lopez, 468 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). If, however, an issue of title is so intertwined with the issue of possession that a court must resolve the title dispute before determining which party has a superior right to immediate possession, then the justice court and the county court lack jurisdiction to resolve the matter. Espinoza, 468 S.W.3d at 695; Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
Because a forcible detainer action's purpose is not to establish title, a plaintiff bringing a forcible detainer action "is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession." Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29 (quoting Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417). When there is a landlord-tenant relationship between the purchaser at foreclosure and the current possessor of the property, such a relationship "provides a basis for the trial court to determine the right to immediate possession, even if the possessor questions the validity of a foreclosure sale and the quality of the buyer's title." Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29 (). Although such a relationship is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship indicates that the case may present a title issue. See Espinoza, 468 S.W.3d at 695-96; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
Here, Manley claims ownership of the Property under a Warranty Deed he acquired from Michael Durden in 2016 which purportedly conveyed to Manley "all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any way belonging" to the Property. The record reflects that the legal and equitable estates to the Property had been severed six years earlier when Hilda Durden executed the Deed of Trust to BANA in 2010; Hilda Durden retained the legal title and BANA acquired the equitable title. See Flag-Redfern Oil Co. v. Humble Exploration Co., 744 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. 1987); Ford v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 01-07-00183-CV, 2008 WL 4670514, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, as a result of the severance in 2010, the only right belonging to the Property that could have been conveyed to Manley in 2016 is the legal title that was initially retained by, and held through, Hilda Durden.
The Deed of Trust creates a landlord-tenant relationship between BANA and Hilda Durden and anyone holding possession of the Property through Hilda Durden in the event of foreclosure. As an intervening purchaser of legal title to the Property that was previously held by Hilda Durden, Manley acquired possession of the Property through Hilda, and is bound by the Deed of Trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause. See Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ( deed of trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause binds subsequent occupants whose interests are junior to deed of trust); see also Ford, 2008 WL 4670514, at *3 ().
Because Manley purchased Hilda Durden's legal right to the Property after the Deed of Trust was executed, the Deed of Trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause created a landlord-tenant relationship that makes Manley a tenant at sufferance when the Property was foreclosed upon. This landlord-tenant relationship provided the justice and county courts with a basis to determine which party was entitled to immediate possession of the Property, without resolving the title dispute. See Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29.
Because the evidence shows that a landlord-tenant relationship exists between Manley and BANA that would have provided the lower courts with an independent basis for resolving the issue of possession, the justice court, and county court on appeal, have jurisdiction over BANA's forcible detainer claim. See generally id.
Standing, a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction, requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court. Heckman v. Williamson Co., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012). Generally, to have standing (1) the plaintiff must be personally injured; (2) the plaintiff's injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) the plaintiff's injury must be likely to be redressed by the requested relief. See id. A standing...
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