Manning v. Nobile

• Decision Date: 11 December 1991
• Citation: 411 Mass. 382,582 N.E.2d 942
• Parties: John C. MANNING, Jr. 1 v. Christopher NOBILE et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 942

582 N.E.2d 942

411 Mass. 382

John C. MANNING, Jr. ¹ v. Christopher NOBILE et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 4, 1991.

Decided Dec. 11, 1991.

Alan L. Cantor, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Peter L. Puciloski, Susan A. Hartnett, Boston, with him, for Marriott Corp.

Eugene F. Nowell, Boston, for Christopher Nobile.

Before ABRAMS, NOLAN, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

In June, 1986, the plaintiff, John C. Manning, Jr. (Manning), struck a tree while driving an automobile. The accident happened in the early morning, after Manning left a party hosted by a coworker, Christopher Nobile (Nobile), in a suite at the Long Wharf Marriott Hotel (Marriott). At the party, Manning consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and, on the record before us, apparently was intoxicated. At issue is the liability of Marriott and Nobile. A Superior Court judge allowed summary judgments for the Marriott Corporation and Nobile. ³ For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the judge correctly allowed the motions for summary judgments. We affirm.

1. Facts. On Friday, June 20, 1986, the Commonwealth Mortgage Company (Commonwealth) hosted its fiscal-year-end function at the Downtown Club in Boston. Manning, a mortgage originator at Commonwealth, attended the event; he was driven to the club by a colleague. The two arrived at the function between 6:30 and 6:45 P.M.

After the main celebration, Commonwealth employees were invited to attend a second, "follow-on" party at the Marriott. This event was hosted by Nobile, a senior vice president and regional manager at Commonwealth, in a suite of rooms he had rented for the evening. Commonwealth reimbursed Nobile for his expenses associated with the event. Marriott provided both snacks and alcoholic beverages for the party. Marriott's catering manager offered to provide bartenders for the evening, but Nobile declined to use them. Nobile supplied additional alcohol as well as hired his young nephew, a trained bartender, to assist in serving drinks.

Commonwealth employees began arriving at the Marriott suite between 8 and 9 P.M. Nobile's nephew made drinks for some guests; others made their own drinks. It is not entirely clear from the record how many guests actually attended the party, but Nobile had anticipated between 100 and 150 guests. ⁴

As the evening progressed, Manning became noticeably intoxicated. Sometime after 10:30 P.M., Nobile detected signs of Manning's intoxication and urged him to stay the night in one of the Marriott's rooms that Nobile had reserved for that purpose. Manning refused, and Nobile then asked another employee, Peter Collins, to drive Manning home. ⁵ Collins, who earlier had been asked by his supervisor to serve as a designated driver, agreed. Nobile informed Manning that Collins would drive him home. After this exchange, Nobile took no action to prevent Manning from drinking.

Shortly after midnight, Manning and Collins left the Marriott with two others, Amy Wrigley and Martin Smith. Smith left the group, and Manning, Wrigley, and Collins walked to Collins's automobile. As the three were getting into Collins's automobile, Wrigley mentioned that she wanted to go back into the Marriott to use the bathroom. Collins volunteered to escort her. Manning, who already was in the front seat of the automobile, gestured to Collins to leave his keys in the ignition so that he could continue listening to tapes on the stereo while the other two were gone. Collins left the key in the ignition and returned to the Marriott with Wrigley.

A short time later, Collins and Wrigley came back to the spot where they had left the automobile. Neither the automobile nor Manning was anywhere in sight. Collins telephoned the police to report the theft of his car. Collins asked the police to take whatever action possible to apprehend a drunk driver.

At 12:46 A.M., Manning crashed Collin's automobile into a tree on Commonwealth Avenue. As a result of the accident, Manning suffered injuries which have left him in a persistent vegetative state. Manning, whose hospital records indicate that he had an elevated level of alcohol in his bloodstream, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

2. Summary judgment for Marriott. ⁶ The motion judge concluded that Marriott was entitled to the protection of G.L. c. 231, § 85T (1990 ed.). ⁷ As a result, the judge ruled that at trial, Manning would have to demonstrate that Marriott's actions were "wilful, wanton, or reckless." See note 6, supra. Because the judge concluded that Manning could not meet this burden as a matter of law, he allowed Marriott's motion for summary judgment.

Manning argues that the language of the statute limits its scope to the "negligent serving of alcohol to an intoxicated person by a licensee" and that, because Marriott did not serve Manning, the statute does not apply to the facts of his case. Manning maintains that the Legislature only intended to extend the statute's protection to businesses that directly serve alcoholic beverages to customers. Manning rests his reading of the statute on its use of the word "serve."

We do not believe that by using the word "serve," the Legislature intended to restrict the statute's scope to cases in which a defendant or its employee physically dispenses alcohol to the plaintiff. The word "serve" is a broad one. It may mean "[t]o help persons to food," but it can also mean "[t]o furnish [or] supply." Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary, 2075 (1961). When this court is confronted with a statutory ambiguity, its duty is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872, 482 N.E.2d 818 (1985), and cases cited. In determining the scope of the statute, we look not only at the Legislature's words, but also at "the cause of [the statute's] enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished." Id. Because the statute clearly expresses a legislative intent to protect commercial vendors from suits alleging negligence by patrons who injure themselves as a result of intoxication, we reject the plaintiff's cramped view of the statute's scope. We therefore conclude that the judge was correct in concluding that Marriott would not be liable to Manning unless its conduct was wilful, wanton, or reckless.

Manning asserts that, even if G.L. c. 231, § 85T, protects Marriott against an action for negligent provision of alcohol, Manning's claim for negligent supervision of a party on its premises is outside the statute's scope. We do not agree. Marriott's alleged failure adequately to supervise the consumption of alcoholic beverages on its premises "aris[es] out of the [allegedly] negligent serving of alcohol." G.L. c. 231, § 85T. Manning's negligent supervision claim is nothing more than a restatement of his claim for negligent provision of alcohol. The claim is therefore governed by the wilful, wanton, or reckless standard.

We have defined "wilful, wanton, or reckless" ⁸ conduct as: "intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another." Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 789, 556 N.E.2d 973 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944). See Desmond v. Boston Elev. Ry., 319 Mass. 13, 16, 64 N.E.2d 357 (1946). Two characteristics of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct distinguish it from negligence. First, the defendant must knowingly or intentionally disregard an unreasonable risk. See Catalina, supra; Welansky, supra. Second, the risk, viewed prospectively, must entail a "high degree of probability that substantial harm would result" to the plaintiff. Desmond v. Boston Elev. Ry., supra at 16, 64 N.E.2d 357. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965).

We acknowledge that "summary judgment is seldom sought or granted in negligence actions." Inferrera v. Sudbury, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 575 N.E.2d 82 (1991), quoting Foley v. Matulewicz, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 1004, 1005, 459 N.E.2d 1262 (1984). See 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2729, at 194 (1983). This "rule is equally applicable to actions involving allegedly reckless conduct." Inferrera v. Sudbury, supra, citing Saaybe v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 F.Supp. 65, 69 (E.D.Pa.1977). See also 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra at 228-231. That rule is not absolute. See, e.g., Hawco v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 398 Mass. 1006, 499 N.E.2d 295 (1986) (no error in directing verdict for defendant MBTA on count alleging wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct); Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 705, 308 N.E.2d 467 (1974) (actions of housing authority in allowing juvenile to arrive in a position of danger not wilful, wanton, or reckless as a matter of law). Because Marriott would not have the burden of proof at trial, it could satisfy its burden on a motion for summary judgment by establishing that Manning could not prove an essential element of his claim. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (White, J., concurring). In its motion, Marriott states there is no evidence that its conduct was wilful, wanton, or reckless. With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence.

The facts, viewing contested facts in the light most favorable to Manning, indicate that Marriott adopted a policy of requiring the presence of its bartenders at parties of more than thirty-five people. This policy was either forgotten or ignored by the catering manager, who allowed twenty-one bottles of alcohol to be sent without a Marriott bartender-- or any bartender at all, as far as Marriott or its employees knew--to a party of between 100 and 150 people. ...