Mansfield v. Shelton

• Decision Date: 06 March 1896
• Citation: 35 A. 271,67 Conn. 390
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MANSFIELD v. SHELTON et al.

35 A. 271

67 Conn. 390

MANSFIELD

v. SHELTON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 6, 1896.

Case reserved from superior court, New Haven county; Shumway, Judge.

Action by Burton Mansfield, trustee of the will of Charles Shelton, deceased, against William R. Shelton and others. Case reserved.

William L. Bennett, for A. Louise Woolson, William R, Shelton, and the executor of the will of Caroline M. Shelton, deceased.

J. Frederic Kernochan and Samuel H. Fisher, for Grace Martin, William Budington, Z. Grenell, Inez Grenell, and Julia Pierson.

FENN, J. This is a case reserved by the superior court for the advice of this court. The questions presented relate to the construction and legal effect of provisions contained in the last will and testament of Charles Shelton, who died about June 4, 1888, seised and possessed of an estate, consisting of real and personal property, of the value of about $33,000. That portion of the will of Charles Shelton material to the present inquiry is as follows: "All the rest and residue of my estate, both real and personal, and wherever situated, I give, devise, and bequeath to my said wife, to be used and appropriated by her, as much as she may wish for her happiness, without any restrictions or limitations whatsoever; and upon the decease of my said wife, and after the payment of all her debts and the settlement of her estate, I give, devise, and bequeath whatever of property or estate of such residue and remainder shall remain undisposed of at the decease of my said wife to Edward A. Cornwall, of Cheshire, of said New Haven county, in trust, to keep and hold the same, or invest the same, as said trustee shall deem to the best advantage, for the use and benefit of the children of the present wife of my nephew Charles W. Shelton, and of the survivor or survivors of such children, so long as they shall live, or any one or more of them, and that such trustee pay and deliver to such surviving children, in equal portions to each, from time to time, and at least as often as once in each year, the net avails of the income of said estate so given to him in trust as aforesaid, upon the annual settlement of his trust account with the court of probate: provided, nevertheless, that, in the event of the decease of my said wife, my said sister, Grace A. Budington, shall, upon the finding of the judge of probate in which my estate shall be pending for settlement, be found to be in needy and in necessitous circumstances, then, upon such finding and decree of such court of probate, I give and bequeath to the said trustee one-third of such residue of said estate so given to my said wife for the use of my sister during her life, and the remaining two-thirds of the same to be held for the use and benefit of the children of my said nephew's wife, the income of which one-third shall be paid to my said sister annually, so long as she shall live; and upon her decease the whole of said income is to be paid, as aforesaid, to said children and the survivor of them. But, if my said nephew shall die without leaving issue surviving him by his present wife, then such part or portion of said residue or remainder of my estate as shall remain undisposed of at the decease of my wife I give, devise, and bequeath to my brother, William R. Shelton, and my said sister, and to their heirs forever, to be equally divided between them, share and share alike; and, in the event of the death of my brother before the decease of my wife, the portion of said residue so given to my said wife, which would thus belong to him, if living, I give, devise, and bequeath to his wife, Anna L. Shelton, and her heirs forever." Soon after the death of the testator, his will was duly probated in the court of probate for the district of New Haven; and the widow, Caroline M. Shelton, who was named as executrix, duly qualified as such. In July, 1889, she returned her account with the estate, and the same was accepted by the court of probate. After the due settlement of the estate, and the payment of the legacies bequeathed by his will, she possessed and enjoyed the residue thereof until her death, which occurred June 28, 1894. Edward A. Cornwall, the trustee named in said will, having died before the decease of Charles Shelton, the said Caroline M. Shelton on the 14th day of February, 1893, was duly appointed by the court of probate for the district of New Haven trustee under the said will, in the place of the said Edward A. Cornwall, deceased, and duly qualified as such trustee. The plaintiff, who is the present trustee under the will of said Charles Shelton, in the place of said Caroline M. Shelton, deceased, has received and is possessed of real and personal property of the value of about $23,000, being the rest and residue of the property of the said Charles Shelton, undisposed of by the said Caroline M. Shelton in her lifetime under the will of her husband, said Charles Shelton, deceased.

The first and only difficult question presented is stated thus in the complaint: "Whether under said will of Charles Shelton, the rest and residue of his estate, devised and bequeathed to his wife, as therein set out, became her property and estate in fee, or whether she took therein an estate for life only; and whether or not the disposition attempted to be made of whatever property or estate of such residue and remainder as should remain undisposed of at the decease of said Caroline M. Shelton, and the settlement of her estate, is valid by way of executory devise." The more recent cases in this state which merit consideration in the present examination are Sheldon v. Rose, 41 Conn. 371; Lewis v. Palmer, 46 Conn. 454, 455; Glover v. Stillson, 56 Conn. 316, 15 Atl. 753; Peckham v. Lego, 57 Conn. 553, 19 Atl. 392; Hull v. Holloway, 58 Conn. 210, 20 Atl. 445; Methodist Church v. Harris, 62 Conn. 93, 25 Atl. 456; and Sill v. White, Id. 430, 26 Atl. 396. These decisions are in harmony, and consistent with each other, and they establish certain rules or principles as the settled law of this state, which may be stated thus: First. If the primary gift conveys and vests in the first taker an absolute interest in personal, or an absolute fee simple in real, property, it exhausts the entire estate, so that there can be no valid remainder. Second. A life estate, expressly created, will not be converted into a fee, absolute or qualified, or into any other form of estate greater than a life estate, merely by reason of there being coupled with it a power of disposition, however general or extensive. Third. An express gift in fee will not be reduced to a life estate by mere implication from a subsequent gift over, but may be by subsequent language clearly indicating intent, and equivalent to a positive provision. Fourth. Except as restrained by the foregoing limitations,—indeed, in some instances, apparently impinging upon them,—the queston as to whether the primary gift is in fee, so as to exhaust the entire estate, is in each case to be decided upon a careful examination of the entire will, aided by legitimate extrinsic evidence, to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, which intent, when so discovered and made obvious, is controlling.

In illustration of the scope, limitations, and application of the foregoing rules, a reference to language used by this court in some of the cases cited will be appropriate. In Sheldon v. Rose, supra, the testator gave his wife, in case of her remarriage, "only one-half of the property, * * * which shall go to her for her support during her natural life." The will contained no residuary clause, and there was no specific disposition of any possible remainder after the death of the wife. This court held the wife had an estate for life only, and not in fee, and so the estate became intestate when the wife's interest terminated. In reaching this conclusion the court, by Carpenter, J., said: "It is not clear that the testator intended to give her an absolute...