O'Mara v. Dykema, 96-1043

• Decision Date: 28 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1043,96-1043
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,932 Steven O'MARA, et al., Appellants, v. Dan DYKEMA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 854

942 S.W.2d 854

328 Ark. 310, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,932

Steven O'MARA, et al., Appellants, v. Dan DYKEMA, et al., Appellees.

No. 96-1043.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 28, 1997.

David D. Stills, Thomas A. Mars, Fayetteville, for Appellants.

Jerry B. Dossey, Bentonville, for Appellees.

THORNTON, Justice.

Appellants Steven and Cynthia O'Mara purchased a home from appellees Dan and Lisa Dykema on December 11, 1992. Appellees had been living in the house, which they built by hiring various materialmen, for approximately two years. They were approached by a realtor who asked them if they would consider an offer from appellants to buy the house. Although the house had not been on the market, they accepted the offer.

Appellants elected to inspect the house themselves prior to purchasing it, rather than hire a professional. The exterior walls of the house are made of a material called "dryvit," a plastic material similar to stucco. Upon inspection, appellants noticed a hole in an outside wall, which appellees told them was caused by a rock pitched by a lawn tractor. Appellants repaired the hole at their expense.

In 1995, after living in the house approximately three years, appellants became aware that the exterior walls were cracking and crumbling and moisture was entering the house through these cracks. They filed a complaint against appellees, alleging misrepresentation, negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranties. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on all four claims, which the trial court granted. Appellants bring this appeal from the order granting summary judgment, and we affirm.

In support of their complaint, appellants alleged that appellee Dan Dykema was a professional real estate contractor and that he built the house; that appellees had encountered problems with the application of the dryvit to the exterior walls, and had allowed the subcontractor to take shortcuts as a temporary solution; and that at the time appellants purchased the house, there was no visible evidence of any defect. Further, they asserted that appellees knew the walls were defective and would eventually crack, bubble, and crumble, and that they failed to disclose this defect to appellants in order to induce them to buy the property.

Appellants claimed that appellees represented the walls to be in good condition, and that the condition of the walls was material to their decision to buy the house. They maintained that appellees impliedly warranted that the house was habitable, had been properly constructed, and was in good condition. Appellants' complaint also stated that appellees owed a duty to them to exercise reasonable care in the construction of the home, that they failed to do this, and that this failure proximately caused them damage.

Appellees denied that they had made any misrepresentations to appellants or that they had any knowledge that the dryvit was defective. Pleading affirmatively, appellees' answer stated in pertinent part that the statute of limitations had run on the negligence claim, as more than three years had elapsed since the home was constructed. Further, they claimed that appellants had waived any reliance on warranties in their offer to buy the house.

At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the arguments centered around whether appellees could be considered a builder-vendor for purposes of the implied warranty of habitability. Appellees filed a supplemental brief in which they urged the court to find that the fact that they had hired multiple contractors to build a residence according to prepared plans and specifications and for their own occupancy, and that on a previous occasion they had built another house in which they resided for a number of years, did not make them a builder-vendor for the purposes of the implied warranty of habitability.

Standard of review. The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is familiar. Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear that there are no disputed issues of material fact. Franklin v. Osca, Inc., 308 Ark. 409, 825 S.W.2d 812 (1992). It is appropriate to sustain a grant of summary judgment if the evidence brought before the trial court by the moving party shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564, 567, 845 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1993); Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Appellees, as movants for summary judgment, bear the burden of showing that there is no issue of material fact. Gleghorn v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 293 Ark. 289, 737 S.W.2d 451 (1987). All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, as they are the parties resisting the motion; and they are also entitled to have all doubts and inferences resolved in their favor. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996). However, they may not rest upon the mere allegation of their pleadings; Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 requires their response, by affidavits or other evidence, to specifically show that there is a genuinely disputed issue of material fact. Guthrie v. Kemp, 303 Ark. 74, 793 S.W.2d 782 (1990). Once a movant makes a prima facie case for summary judgment, the respondent must then meet proof with proof by showing that there remains a genuine issue of material fact. Mt. Olive Water Ass'n v. City of Fayetteville, 313 Ark. 606, 856 S.W.2d 864 (1993).

Even if there are disputed facts, if reasonable minds would not differ as to the conclusion to be reached, then a grant of summary judgment is proper. Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, 326 Ark. 895, 935 S.W.2d 258 (1996). Further, if a respondent to a motion for summary judgment cannot present proof on an essential element of the claim, the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988).

We examine each of appellant's allegations based upon this standard of review and affirm the trial court's judgment for the reasons set forth below.

Misrepresentation. Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the claim of misrepresentation because appellants failed to present proof on essential elements of the claim. Id. The elements of a cause of action for misrepresentation are:

(1) a false representation of a material fact;

(2) knowledge or belief on the part of the person making the representation that the representation is false;

(3) an intent to induce the other party to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the misrepresentation;

(4) a justifiable reliance by the other party; and

(5) resulting damages.

Interstate Freeway Serv., Inc. v. Houser, 310 Ark. 302, 306, 835 S.W.2d 872, 873-74 (1992). Appellants failed to produce a genuine issue of material fact that appellees knew the dryvit was defective or that they falsely represented to them that it was not defective. They asserted in affidavits that Lisa Dykema told them she had problems with the dryvit contractor that were never resolved. Mrs. Dykema stated in her affidavit that the dryvit contractor who did the original work on the home did not show up on time and did not finish his work on time. Appellants failed to meet proof with proof because they brought forth no specific facts indicating that appellees experienced problems with the dryvit itself or knew it was defective, much less that they falsely represented these facts. Ark. R. Civ. P. 56; Guthrie v. Kemp, supra. Representations are considered fraudulent when the one making them either knows them to be false or, not knowing, asserts them to be true. Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 456 S.W.2d 673 (1970). A grant of summary judgment on a claim of misrepresentation is appropriate when a plaintiff does not produce specific facts that the defendant knew his representations were false. E.g., Rosser v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Ark.App. 77, 928 S.W.2d 813 (1996).

Negligence. Appellants' complaint alleged that appellees breached a duty of care when they failed to exercise reasonable care in the construction of the home. Their claim is barred by the statute of limitations, as the complaint was filed more than four and one half years after the house was built. It has long been the law in this state that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not otherwise limited by law. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Ark.Code Ann. § § 16-56-104--105 (1987 & Supp.1995). The statute begins to run when the acts occur. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989). However, affirmative actions of concealment of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations. Wilson v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992). When there have been affirmative acts of concealment, the statute begins to run again at the time the cause is discovered or should have been discovered by reasonable diligence. Id. We have stated that "no mere ignorance of the plaintiff of his rights nor the mere silence of one who is under an obligation to speak, will prevent the statutory bar." Id. at 87, 841 S.W.2d at 620-21 (quoting McKneely v. Terry, 61 Ark. 527, 545, 33 S.W. 953, 957 (1896)). There must be some "positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff's cause of action concealed, or perpetrated in a way that conceals itself." Id. Further, "if the plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, might have detected the fraud, he is...