Marino v. Northern P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1937
• Docket Number: 31131.
• Parties: MARINO v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

272 N.W. 267

199 Minn. 369

MARINO v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.

No. 31131.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 5, 1937

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; E. J. Kenny, Judge.

Action by John Marino against the Northern Pacific Railway Company. From an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff, or for a new trial defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court .

1. After an oral agreement as to the terms of settlement presentation of a written release for signature is a representation that it is in effect the same as the oral agreement.

Defendant having made a representation as to the contents of a release to induce plaintiff to sign it, cannot assert that he was negligent in relying on the representation.

If, in obtaining the signature of an illiterate employee to a release, the employer undertakes to explain it to him, the employer must so do fully, and so that the employee understands it.

2. A charge stating a fact in the alternative leaves it to the jury to ascertain the fact.

3. Letter from a railroad claim department to a claim agent containing self-serving declarations held inadmissible.

Mitchell, Gillette, Nye & Harries and W. O. Bissonett, all of Duluth, and D. F. Lyons and Frederic C. McCarthy, both of St. Paul, for appellant.

M. J. McKeon and A. G. McKnight, both of Duluth, for respondent.

PETERSON, Justice.

Appeal by defendant from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, after a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $4,500 in an action for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. The questions urged on this appeal are: (1) The sufficiency of the evidence to show that two releases were obtained by defendant's agents by fraud; (2) whether the charge with respect to the release is justified by the evidence; and (3) the exclusion of a certain letter offered in evidence.

On September 15, 1935, while unloading copper bars from a hand truck, plaintiff's hand was crushed, resulting in very severe and probably permanent injuries to his fingers and hand, with partial loss of motion of three fingers and partial loss of function of the hand, so that he will be unable to perform the tasks ordinarily involved in common labor.

1. Plaintiff's evidence tends to show, with respect to the general release, that he and the defendant's claim agent orally agreed that defendant would pay plaintiff $150 for his lost wages, and that plaintiff could sue the company for the injuries to his hand. After the oral agreement had been made, the claim agent prepared a general release and a check for $150, both of which plaintiff signed. The claim agent did not make any statement to plaintiff as to the contents of the written release. Plaintiff understood that he was signing for the $150 lost wages and that he was not signing a release of his claim for personal injuries. It is plaintiff's claim that inducing him to sign a general release instead of a receipt for his wages was a fraud upon him. This issue was submitted to the jury, which found in his favor. Defendant denies that this was fraud because the oral agreement to pay lost wages, leaving plaintiff to sue to recover for personal injuries, was not a fraudulent statement or a trick that kept plaintiff in ignorance of the release which he signed.

A release for personal injuries and other damages arising out of the negligence of the releasee, procured from the releasor by a false representation that he is signing only a receipt or other voucher for money paid to him for purposes other than for the release of the entire cause of action, is fraudulent and voidable. The rule is applied in cases in which the plaintiff was induced to sign a release by being led to believe that he was signing only a receipt. Dunnell, Minn.Dig.(2d Ed.) § 8374, and note 38; Sobieski v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., 41 Minn. 169, 42 N.W. 863; Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640; Schus v. Powers-Simpson Co., 85 Minn. 447, 89 N.W. 68,69 L.R.A. 887; Sundvall v. Interstate Iron Co., 104 Minn. 499, 116 N.W. 1118; Christmann v. Great Northern R. Co., 181 Minn. 97, 231 N.W. 710.Whether plaintiff signed the general release because he was led to believe that he was signing only for lost wages, or whether plaintiff understood that he was signing a release, was for the jury to decide. Upon the evidence, it could be argued in behalf of plaintiff that he supposed he was receiving payment merely for lost wages and did not understand that he was releasing his claim for personal injuries. Cases cited supra; Bliss v. New York Central, etc., R. Co., 160 Mass. 447, 36 N.E. 65,39 Am.St.Rep. 504; Madison Trust Co., Adm'r, v. Helleckson, 216 Wis. 443, 257 N.W. 691, 96 A.L.R. 992; Farwark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 202 Iowa, 1229, 211 N.W. 875; Roberts v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 1 Fost. & F. 460 (per Cockburn, C. J.)

Defendant's contention that plaintiff's failure to ascertain the contents of the release is such gross negligence as estops him from denying it is based principally upon the proposition that there was no verbal statement made by defendant's agent to plaintiff as to the contents of the instrument at the time he signed it. Words are unnecessary. False representations may be made by acts as well as by words. Dunnell, Minn.Dig. (2d Ed.) § 3818, note 81; 12 R.C.L. 243, § 13. The presentation of the written instruments to plaintiff was a representation that they embodied the oral agreement. Dunnell, Minn.Dig. (2d Ed.) § 3832 and cases cited in note 77; Place v. Johnson, 20 Minn. 219 (Gil. 198); Providence Jewelry Co. v. Crowe, 113 Minn. 209, 129 N.W. 224; King v. International Lumber Co., 156 Minn. 494, 195 N.W. 450. In the recent case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Roth, 186 Minn. 173, 178, 242 N.W. 629, 631, Mr. Justice Olsen stated the applicable rule as follows: ‘ Where, after a verbal agreement, one of the parties undertakes to prepare the written contract, and presents it to the other for signature, the presentation of the written instrument for signature is a representation that it is the same in effect as their verbal agreement.’

Defendant urges that plaintiff was negligent in signing the release; that he should have ascertained its contents before he signed. Defendant, having made a representation as to the contents of the instrument, to induce plaintiff to sign it, cannot assert that he was negligent in relying thereon. Dunnell, Minn.Dig.(2d Ed.) § 3822; Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.; Schus v. Powers-Simpson Co., supra; Sundvall v. Interstate Iron Co., supra; Erickson v. Northwest Paper Co., 95 Minn. 356, 104 N.W. 291; Winter v. Great Northern R. Co., 118 Minn. 487, 136 N.W. 1089; Eggleston v. Advance Thresher Co., 96 Minn. 241, 104 N.W. 891; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Roth, 186 Minn. 173, 242 N.W. 629; Greear v. Paust, 192 Minn. 287, 256 N.W. 190. In McCarty v. New York Life Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 530, 77 N.W. 426, an action was brought to rescind an insurance policy because of certain fraudulent representations of the insurer's agent who took the application for the policy. It was contended that the insured was negligent in relying upon the representations of the agent without examining the application and the policy. Mr. Justice Mitchell said, 74 Minn. 530, at page 536, 77 N.W. 426, 428:‘ If there is anything well settled by the decisions of this and other courts, it is that, as between the original parties to a contract, one who has intentionally deceived the other to his prejudice is not to be heard to say, in defense of the charge of fraud, that the innocent party ought not to have trusted him. It does not lie in the mouth of the party guilty of making the false representations to say to the other party, ‘ You were a fool or negligent in believing and relying upon my statements.’ '

Lord Chancellor Chelmsford, answering a similar defense, used substantially the same language in Directors, etc., Central Ry. Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch, [1867] L.R. 2 H.L. 99, 120, Law Times Reports, 16 N.S. 500, 503.

Defendant further insists that its failure to read and explain the release to plaintiff is no excuse for his failure to ascertain its contents before signing. Defendant's testimony shows that it undertook to explain the release to plaintiff through an interpreter. It knew that he was an illiterate person and did not know the contents of the instrument he was about to sign. It therefore assumed the duty of advising him. It was its duty under the circumstances to fully and clearly inform him as to the contents of the instrument so that he might be advised in the premises. In Great Northern R. Co. v. Kasischke (C.C.A. 8th) 104 F. 440, a case like the one at bar, the court said, at pages 445, 446: ‘ It was clearly the duty of the master mechanic, when he was informed that the plaintiff could not read or write English, and that he relied upon him for an explanation of the contents of the paper, to explain its purport and the object of asking him to sign it, and to do so fully, in language which the plaintiff could comprehend. * * * We think, however, that the...