Schus v. Powers-Simpson Co.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1902
• Citation: 85 Minn. 447,89 N.W. 68
• Parties: SCHUS v. POWERS-SIMPSON CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

85 Minn. 447

89 N.W. 68

SCHUS

v.POWERS-SIMPSON CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 21, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; C. B. Elliott, Judge.

Action by Jacob Schus against the Powers-Simpson Company. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Defendant is a corporation organized for the purpose of manufacturing and dealing in lumber; buying, improving, selling, and dealing in real and personal property connected with its lumbering business; and, in addition thereto and in connection therewith, it owns and operates what is called a ‘logging railroad,’ which is equipped with four locomotives and a number of logging and box cars, used in carrying logs from the pineries to the sawmills owned and operated by it. It does not follow the business of a common carrier of passengers and freight, the operation of the road being limited exclusively to its own private business; but its servants and employés engaged in the operation of its trains are exposed to the same dangers and risks as are employés and servants of railroad corporations engaged as common carriers. Held, that Gen. St. 1894, § 2701, known as the ‘Fellow Servant Act,’ applies to defendant, and it is liable to an employé engaged in the operation of such railroad for injuries caused by the negligence of a co-employé or fellow servant.

2. In this action (one to recover damages for personal injuries received by a brakeman in coupling cars on defendant's said railroad) the evidence received on the trial tended to show that there was a general custom in respect to the operation of the road for the engineer, when cars being coupled came together, to immediately stop his engine and hold it stationary until signaled to again move it by the brakeman making the coupling. It further tended to show that, on the occasion complained of, this custom was not observed by defendant of, this gineer, in consequence of which plaintiff was injured. It is held that the evidence was sufficient to require the submission of the case to the jury, and to sustain their verdict to the effect that such custom existed, and that the engineer's failure to follow and observe it at the time complained of was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.

3. Evidence examined and considered, and held to sustain the verdict of the jury to the effect that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, and did not assume the risks incident to making the coupling in question; also to sustain the verdict that plaintiff's cause of action was not settled and adjusted by an agreement between the parties made and entered into prior to the commencement of the action. Woods, Kingman & Wallace, for appellant.

F. D. Larrabee, for respondent.

BROWN, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff had a verdict in the court below, and defendant appeals from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The facts are as follows: Defendant is a corporation organized for the purpose of buying and selling timber land; cutting, hauling, and driving logs and timber; buying, improving, selling, and dealing in real and personal property; and the carrying on of such other business as is conveniently and necessarily connected therewith. In addition to its lumbering business, and in connection therewith, it owns and operates what is called a ‘logging railroad.’ Its line extends into the pine woods from Hibbing, in St. Louis county, the distance of about 29 miles, including spur tracks and branches. It is equipped with four locomotives and a number of logging and freight cars, which are used in carrying logs from the pineries to the sawmills owned and operated by it. It does not follow the business of a common carrier of passengers or freight, the operation of its road being limited exclusively to its own business. At the time complained of, plaintiff was in the employ of defendant upon this railroad as a brakeman, and was injured while coupling cars. The facts with respect to his injury, the manner in which it was received, and the evidence tending to snow negligence on the part of defendant, will be stated further on in this opinion. Four principal questions are presented for our consideration: (1) Whether defendant is a railroad corporation, within the meaning, or comes within the operation, of chapter 13, Laws 1887 (Gen. St. 1894, § 2701) known as the ‘Fellow Servant Act’; (2) whether the evidence establishes negligence on the part of defendant, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; (3) whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence; and (4) whether his cause of action for damages was settled and adjusted, and defendant released and discharged therefrom, by an agreement made and entered into between the parties prior to the commencement of the action.

1. It is contended that defendant is not a railroad corporation, within the intent and meaning of chapter 13, supra, and that in consequence it is not liable to one of its servants for injuries caused by the negligence and carelessness of a fellow servant. It is urged that the statute does not apply to defendant, for the reason that it was not organized as a railroad corporation, and for the further reason that it is not engaged as a common carrier of passengers and freight; its railroad business being confined exclusively to its own private affairs. The statute provides, generally, that every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in this state shall be liable for all damages sustained by an agent or servant thereof by reason of the negligence of another agent or servant; but railroads under construction and not open to public use are excepted from the operation of the act. The statute has been before the court repeatedly with respect ot its validity and its application to particular servants and employés, and has been sustained, not as a law applying exclusively to railroad corporations as a class,-for, if that were its purpose, it would, as intimated by Judge Mitchell in Johnson v. Railroad Co., 43 Minn. 222, 45 N. W. 156,8 L. R. A. 419, be unconstitutional and void as class legislation,-but as applying to employers whose servants and employés are exposed to the peculiar hazards and dangers incident to the operation of railroads. In that case the court said: ‘If a distinction is to be made as to the liability of employers to their employés, it must be based upon a difference in the nature of the employment, and not of the employers. One rule of liability cannot be established for railway companies, merely as such, and another rule for other employers, under like circumstances and conditions.’ Within the reasoning of that decision, and other cases in this court (Smith v. Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 17, 46 N. W. 149;Lavallee v. Railway Co., 40 Minn. 249, 41 N. W. 974;Mikkelson v. Truesdale, 63 Minn. 137, 65 N. W. 260), the test in interpreting and construing this statute is not whether the corporation engaged in operating the railroad was organized as a railroad corporation, but whether the road being operated is a railroad, within the ordinary meaning of the term, in and about the operation of which employés are exposed to those dangers and risks from the consequences of which the legislature intended to provide against. In Suth. St. Const. 218, it is said to be indispensable to a correct understanding of a statute to inquire what is the subject of it,-what object is intended to be accomplished by it. When the subject-matter is once clearly ascertained, and its general intent, a key is found to all its intricacies. General words may be restrained to it, and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate that intent. When the intention can be collected from the statute, words may be modified, altered, or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with such intention. The subject-matter of the statute under consideration, and its intent and purpose, were to protect employés engaged in a dangerous and hazardous employment; and, within the decisions cited, the character of the employer is not of controlling importance. The statute is to be given, if not a liberal, at least a reasonable, interpretation, and one that will carry into effect the intent of the legislature. If the character of the employer, within the meaning of the statute, is not important, and the nature of the employment is the test to be applied in construing the statute, the expression ‘any railroad corporation engaged in the operation of a railroad’ should, within the rule laid down by Sutherland, be enlarged and expanded so as to include any person, company, or corporation engaged in operating a railroad, incident to which operation are the dangers and hazards from which the legislature intended to protect the employés. Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N. W. 788. Defendant was not organized as a railroad corporation, it is true; but it is conceded that it is operating a line of railroad equipped with engines and cars, the operation of which, so far as concerns the running of its trains, is identical with ordinary railroads, except that...