Markel Ins. Co. v. Muzyka

• Decision Date: 06 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2-09-030-CV.,2-09-030-CV.
• Parties: MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant v. Jill MUZYKA, Individually and as Next Friend and Parent of Kennedy Muzyka, a Minor, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

293 S.W.3d 380

MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant v. Jill MUZYKA, Individually and as Next Friend and Parent of Kennedy Muzyka, a Minor, Appellee.

No. 2-09-030-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

August 6, 2009.

Camille Johnson, William A. Reece, Savrick, Schumann, Johnson, McGarr, Kaminski & Shirley, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Thomas A. Herald, Montes Herald Law Group, LLP, Irving, TX, for Appellee.

Panel: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and WALKER, JJ.

OPINION

SUE WALKER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The sole legal issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the medical expense claim of Appellee Jill Muzyka, individually and as next friend and parent of Kennedy Muzyka, a minor, was covered under an insurance policy issued by Appellant Markel Insurance Company to the ASI Gymnatic Center. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Our recitation of the pertinent facts in this case is taken from an agreed statement of facts signed by the parties.¹ On April 9, 2005, Kennedy attended a children's birthday party at the ASI Gymnastic Center. During the party, Kennedy participated in a game called "the helicopter." "The helicopter" is a game in which an ASI employee swings a large rope in a circle along the ground as children standing in a circle attempt to jump over the rope. During the game, an ASI employee swung the rope too high, causing the rope to hit Kennedy as she jumped. The force of the rope's impact knocked Kennedy to the floor and caused her to break her left arm. Kennedy required emergency and first aid medical care, x-rays, surgery, nursing and professional medical services, as well as additional follow-up medical attention. Jill incurred the medical expenses for Kennedy's injury.

At the time of Kennedy's injury, ASI held a commercial general liability policy issued by Markel. The policy contained a section entitled "Coverage C Medical Payments," which stated in pertinent part that Markel would pay medical expenses for bodily injury caused by an accident that occurred either on ASI's premises or because of ASI's operations. The policy also contained an exclusion providing that the medical payment provision under "Coverage C Medical Payments" did not apply to bodily injury incurred by "Participants, Students, and Members while participating in Athletic, Sporting or Exercise Activities."

Jill filed a claim with Markel for repayment of Kennedy's medical expenses under ASI's insurance policy. Markel declined to pay and asserted that "the helicopter" game was a "Sporting or Exercise Activit[y]" excluded from coverage under the policy.² Jill subsequently sued Markel, seeking recovery for medical expense payments, attorney's fees, and statutory violations. The parties agreed to try separately the issue of whether the policy exclusion applied to Jill's claim for Kennedy's medical expenses. The parties also agreed that the issue was a question of law and therefore submitted it to the trial court for judicial determination by means of an agreed statement of facts. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 263.

The parties' agreed statement of facts provides that Kennedy's injury occurred while she was on premises owned by ASI and covered by the insurance policy issued by Markel, during the insurance policy period, and in connection with ASI's operations. The parties further agreed that the insurance policy did not contain a definition of "Athletic, Sporting or Exercise Activities." The parties agreed that the purpose of the birthday party was to celebrate a young girl's birthday by playing games for fun, that "the helicopter" game is used by ASI during parties for fun and to entertain children, and that the game was not used during the birthday party to promote physical training, strength building, or physical endurance. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Kennedy's purpose in playing "the helicopter" game was "solely for fun and amusement, not for the purpose of athletics, sports, or exercise" and that "Markel does not contend that Kennedy was playing the game for the purpose of getting in better physical condition or to become more physically fit."

The trial court heard the arguments of counsel based on the agreed statement of facts. The trial court then ruled in favor of Jill, concluding that her medical expense claim deriving from Kennedy's injury did not fall within the exclusion and was therefore covered by the insurance policy.³ The trial court's judgment included findings of fact and conclusions of law.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal involving an agreed statement of facts pursuant to Rule 263, we review de novo the issue of whether the trial court properly applied the law to the agreed facts. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 263; Panther Creek Ventures, Ltd. v. Collin Cent. Appraisal Dist., 234 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Alma Group L.L.C. v. Palmer, 143 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied); State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler, 932 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). The agreed facts are binding on the parties, the trial court, and the reviewing court. Panther, 234 S.W.3d at 811. We conclusively presume that the parties have brought before the court all facts necessary for the presentation and adjudication of the case. Cummins & Walker Oil Co. v. Smith, 814 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).

IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND LEGAL REASONING

In its second issue, Markel argues that the trial court erred by making findings of fact in a case submitted pursuant to Rule 263 on an agreed statement of facts. In its third issue, Markel contends that the trial court's judgment, which contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, reflects that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to the issue of whether Kennedy's medical expenses were excluded from coverage under Markel's policy.

Concerning Markel's second issue, we note that Markel filed with the trial court a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nonetheless, in cases submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts, no factual issue is "tried" within the scope of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, which authorizes findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. Rule Civ. P. 296; see, e.g., Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994); Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Port Arthur Teachers Ass'n, 990 S.W.2d 955, 957-58 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. denied). Consequently, in a case submitted on an agreed statement of facts pursuant to Rule 263, we disregard any findings of fact made by the trial court. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 263; Davis v. State, 904 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in agreed cases will be disregarded on appeal); Clean Serve, Inc. v. Kroger Co., No. 01-95-01372-CV, 1996 WL 475806, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 22, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (stating that court cannot draw any inference or find any facts not contained in the agreement unless, as a matter of law, the additional inference or fact is necessarily compelled by the agreed facts); see also Palmer, 143 S.W.3d at 843 (stating that appellate courts review only whether the trial court properly applied the law to the stipulated facts). Because we disregard any findings of fact made by the trial court, the trial court's act of making findings of fact cannot be a ground for reversal on appeal. We overrule Markel's second issue.

Concerning Markel's third issue, Markel acknowledges in its brief that we apply a de novo standard of review to the issue of whether Jill's claim for Kennedy's medical expenses is excluded under Markel's policy. Because we review this legal issue de novo, the trial court's reasoning is not relevant to or controlling of our own de novo review and analysis. See Port Arthur ISD, 990 S.W.2d at 957-58 (recognizing that "[t]here is no place for ... conclusions of law in cases submitted pursuant to Rule 263"). Thus, regardless of the reasoning employed by the trial court (which we do not consider in conducting our own de novo review), if the trial court reached the correct result, we will affirm its ruling. See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 84 (1939) (recognizing the well-settled principle that an appellate court will sustain the judgment of a trial court if it is correct regardless of whether the trial court gives the correct legal reason for the judgment entered, or whether the trial court gives any reason at all); see also BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002) (recognizing principle that trial court judgment will not be reversed if trial court makes erroneous conclusion of law giving wrong reason for an otherwise correct result). Consequently, we overrule Markel's third issue.

V. INJURY COVERED UNDER POLICY

In its first issue, Markel argues that the trial court misapplied the law to the present facts because the plain language of its policy dictates that Kennedy's injury sustained during "the helicopter" game constitutes an injury incurred while participating in a "Sporting or Exercise Activit[y]" and consequently falls within the policy's exclusion. As set forth above, we review this legal issue de novo, analyzing the application of the law to the agreed statement of facts. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 263; Panther, 234 S.W.3d at 811; Palmer, 143 S.W.3d at 843; Kessler, 932 S.W.2d at 735.

A. Rules of Construction

We construe insurance policies according to the same rules of construction that apply to contracts generally. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Tex.2008); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tex.1995). Enforcing the parties' expressed intent is our primary concern. See Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins....