Marriage of McCadam, In re, 94CA1192

Decision Date07 December 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94CA1192,94CA1192
PartiesIn re the MARRIAGE OF Marie E. McCADAM, n/k/a Marie Evelyn Macozek, Appellant, and Douglas S. McCadam, Appellee. . IV
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

Bader & Villanueva, P.C., Jeffrey M. Villanueva, Kelly L. Shafer, Denver, for Appellant.

Fahrenholtz & Riva, P.C., Grant W. Riva, Avon, for Appellee.

Opinion by Chief Judge STERNBERG.

Marie Evelyn Macozek (wife) appeals the property distribution portion of a judgment dissolving her marriage to Douglas Stanley McCadam (husband). We reverse and remand the cause with directions.

Husband and wife were married on August 23, 1984. At that time, wife owned certain real property. Shortly after the marriage, she sold the property and loaned husband $25,000 of the sales proceeds for use in his restaurant business. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note dated June 11, 1985, which husband signed both as president of his restaurant business and as personal guarantor.

The promissory note provided for interest at the rate of sixteen percent per annum with monthly payments of $333.33. The principal and any unpaid interest were due on April 15, 1987. The note provided for default interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum. Husband defaulted on the note after making one payment.

The dissolution action was filed in late 1993, and approximately seven months later, wife filed a separate lawsuit seeking to collect principal and interest due under the note. The trial court consolidated that suit with the dissolution action.

At a permanent orders hearing on May 3, 1994, the parties presented evidence concerning the proposed division of property. The court concluded that the $25,000 principal amount due under the note was neither a marital asset nor a marital debt. Initially, the trial court indicated it was accepting a figure of $7,000 for interest due under the note, but then, without any findings or further discussion, stated that it was "not going to pay any interest on the note." The permanent orders made no reference to interest due under the note, instead indicating only that husband owed wife the $25,000 principal amount.

Husband asserts that the trial court considered the interest on the note to be marital property and, in its discretion, simply chose not to assess the interest against husband. In the alternative, husband argues that the trial court concluded implicitly that wife had abandoned any right she had to collect interest under the note. There is no support in the record for either of husband's contentions.

Wife contends that any interest due under the promissory note was her separate property and should not have been disregarded by the trial court. We agree that the interest should not have been ignored and hold that it should have been classified as marital property. We also hold that the interest due should be classified as a marital debt.

Section 14-10-113(2), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B) defines marital property as all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage except:

(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;

(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;

(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; or

(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.

Section 14-10-113(3), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B) provides that property acquired by either spouse after marriage is presumed to be marital. Such presumption may be overcome, however, by establishing that the property in question was acquired by a method listed above in § 14-10-113(2). Assets not falling within the specific definition of separate property are deemed to be marital in nature subject to equitable division by the court. See In re Marriage of Fields, 779 P.2d 1371 (Colo.1989).

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4 cases
  • Cardona v. Castro, 09CA1996.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • December 9, 2010
    ... 321 P.3d 518 In re the MARRIAGE OF Marta Doris CARDONA, Appellee, and Jaime Felipe CASTRO, Appellant. No. 09CA1996. Colorado Court ... See In re Marriage of McCadam, 910 P.2d 98, 100 (Colo.App.1995). The court should reconsider the property division based on the ... ...
  • In re Krejci
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • January 17, 2013
    ...297 P.3d 1035In re the MARRIAGE OF Emily A. KREJCI, Appellee and CrossAppellant,andJohn R. Krejci, Appellant and CrossAppellee.No ... See In re Marriage of McCadam, 910 P.2d 98, 100 (Colo.App.1995).3 19 Wife's argument that reversal and remand are not necessary ... ...
  • In re Marriage of Lewis, 01CA0013.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • February 13, 2003
    ... ... Any marital property is divisible between the parties. Under the rationale of In re Marriage of McCadam, 910 P.2d 98 (Colo.App.1995), unless the promissory notes evidence an intent that the interest be treated as separate property, the interest accruing ... ...
  • Marriage of Casias, In re, 97CA0606
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • August 6, 1998
    ... ... See In re Marriage of McCadam, 910 P.2d 98 (Colo.App.1995) ... B. The 401(k) Account ...         Among issues that may arise on remand is husband's contention that the ... ...

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