Marriage of Walton, In re

• Decision Date: 13 October 1972
• Citation: 28 Cal.App.3d 108,104 Cal.Rptr. 472
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE of Robert Lynn and Norma Janet WALTON. Robert Lynn WALTON, Respondent, v. Norma Janet WALTON, Appellant. Civ. 11952.

Page 472

104 Cal.Rptr. 472

28 Cal.App.3d 108

In re the MARRIAGE of Robert Lynn and Norma Janet WALTON Robert Lynn WALTON, Respondent, v. Norma Janet WALTON, Appellant.

Civ. 11952.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 13, 1972.

Hearing Denied Dec. 7, 1972.

[28 Cal.App.3d 110] Gillette, Seifert & Pagter and George C. Gillette, Anaheim, for appellant.

Kurlander, Solomon & Hart and Charles R. Hart, Jr., and Ronald L. Gould, Santa Monica, for respondent.

OPINION

KAUFMAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

Wife appeals from an interlocutory judgment granting Husband's petition for dissolution of marriage and denying Wife's request for legal separation.

Facts

The parties were married on or about August 7, 1948 and separated approximately 21 years later on August 7, 1969. On October 6, 1970, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage (Civ.Code, § 4506(1)). On October 12, 1970, Wife filed her response seeking legal separation on the same ground, irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage (Civ.Code, § 4506(1)). Prior to trial Wife moved the court to dismiss Husband's petition on grounds that certain provisions of The Family Law Act enacted in 1969 (Stats.1969, ch. 1608), particularly Civ.Code, sections 4506(1) and 4507, are violative of the California and federal constitutions on several bases. The motion was denied, the matter proceeded to trial, and the court rendered an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of the marriage placing custody of the minor children of the parties with Wife, providing for spousal and child support and dividing the marital property.

Contentions on Appeal

No error is urged with respect to those portions of the judgment dealing with child custody, spousal and child support and division of the marital property. Wife contends:

(1) Granting Husband's petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences as specified in Civil Code, section 4506(1) is violative of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution prohibiting the enactment of any law impairing the obligations of contract;

(2) Granting Husband's petition for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences as specified in Civil Code, section 4506(1) constitutes a retroactive application of law to Wife depriving her of a vested interest in her married status in violation of the due process of law guarantees contained in article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

(3) Granting Husband's petition for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences is violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process of law in that Civil Code, sections 4506(1) and 4507 are too vague and ambiguous to assure uniform application;

(4) 'The impact of The Family Law Act as to the Wife is unfair and unjust.'

Impairment of Contract

Wife's contention that dissolution of her marriage on the ground of irreconciable differences as prescribed in The Family Law Act constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of her contract rights is untenable. In the first place, marital rights and obligations are not contractual rights and obligations within the meaning of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. (Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210--214, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654, 659--660; cf. Ikuta v. Ikuta, 97 Cal.App.2d 787, 790, 218 P.2d 854; Langdon v. Sayre, 74 Cal.App.2d 41, 44--45, 168 P.2d 57; see 3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (7th ed.) p. 2054.) Marriage is much more than a civil contract; it is a relationship that may be created and terminated only with consent of the state and in which the state has a vital interest. (Civ.Code, § 4100 (formerly Civ.Code, § 55); Maynard v. Hill, Supra; De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 863--864, 250 P.2d 598.)

Secondly, even if marital obligations were treated as contractual obligations protected by the constitutional prohibitions, a statutory change in the grounds for divorce would not constitute an unconstitutional impairment thereof. 'Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.' (Maynard v. Hill, Supra, 125 U.S. at p. 205, 8 S.Ct. at p. 726, 31 L.Ed. at p. 657; accord: McClure on Behalf of Caruthers v. Donovan, 33 Cal.2d 717, 728, 205 P.2d 17; Estate of Gregorson, 160 Cal. 21, 24, 116 P. 60; Morganti v. Morganti, 99 Cal.App.2d 512, 515, 222 P.2d 78.) When persons enter into a contract or transaction creating a relationship infused with a substantial public interest, subject to plenary control by the state, such contract or transaction is deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy, and such legislative amendments or enactments do not constitute an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. (Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434--438, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 426--429; Castleman v. Scudder,81 Cal.App.2d 737, 740, 185 P.2d 35; Phelps v. Prussia, 60 Cal.App.2d 732, 741, 141 P.2d 440; State, etc., Bur. v. Pomona, etc., Assn., 37 Cal.App.2d Supp. 765, 768--770, 98 P.2d 829.)

Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law

Similarly, Wife's contention that the dissolution of her marriage on the ground of irreconcilable differences under The Family Law Act unconstitutionally deprives her of a vested interest in her married status cannot be sustained. Certainly a wife has a legitimate interest in her status as a married woman, but, separate and apart from marital property and support rights as to which Wife makes no contention, we entertain some doubt whether her interest in her status as a married woman constitutes property within the purview of the due process clauses of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In any event, in view of the state's vital interest in the institution of marriage (Maynard v. Hill, Supra, 125 U.S. at p. 205, 8 S.Ct. at p. 726, 31 L.Ed. at p. 657; De Burgh v. De Burgh, Supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 863--864, 250 P.2d 598) and the state's plenary power to fix the conditions under which the marital status may be created or terminated (Maynard v. Hill, Supra; McClure on Behalf of Caruthers v. Donovan, Supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 728, 205 P.2d 17; Estate of Gregorson, Supra, 160 Cal. at p. 24, 116 P. 60; Morganti v. Morganti, Supra, 99 Cal.App.2d at p. 515, 222 P.2d 78), it is clear that Wife could have no vested interest in the state's maintaining in force the grounds for divorce that existed at the tim of her marriage. Her interest, however it be classified, was subject to the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. (Phelps v. Prussia, Supra, 60 Cal.App.2d at p. 742, 141 P.2d 440; cf. Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, Supra, 290 U.S. at pp. 434--438, 54 S.Ct. at pp. 238--240, 78 L.Ed. at pp. 426--429; Castleman v. Scudder, Supra, 81 Cal.App.2d at p. 740, 185 P.2d 35; State, etc., Bur. v. Pomona, etc., Assn., Supra, 37 Cal.App.2d Supp. at pp. 768--770, 98 P.2d 829.)

Even if Wife is said to have some constitutionally protected vested right, she has not been deprived thereof without due process of law. "Vested rights, of course, may be impaired 'with due process of law' under many circumstances. The state's inherent sovereign power includes the so called 'police power' right to interfere with vested property rights whenever reasonably necessary to the protection of the health, safety, morals, and general well being of the people. . . . * * * The constitutional question, on principle, therefore, would seem to be, not whether a vested right is impaired by a marital . . . law change, but whether such a change reasonably could be believed to be sufficiently necessary to the public welfare as to justify the impairment." (Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal.2d 558, 566, 43 Cal.Rptr. 97, 102, 399 P.2d 897, 902 (quoting from Armstrong, 'Prospective' Application of Changes in Community Property Control--Rule of Property or constitutional Necessity? (1945) 33 Cal.L.Rev. 476, 495--496).) The public policy considerations felt by the Legislature to be compelling reasons for the enactment of The Family Law Act and the change in grounds for divorce from a fault standard to a marital breakdown standard are described in the Report of 1969 Divorce Reform Legislation of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary (4 Assem.J. (1969) 8054 at p. 8057.) (See also Comment, 'The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law,' 17 UCLA L.Rev. 1306, 1307--1312.)

Moreover, strictly speaking, the application of the standards prescribed in The Family Law Act for dissolution of marriage in the case at bench does not constitute a retroactive application of the legislation. The Family Law Act became effective January 1, 1970 (Stats.1969, ch. 1608, § 37) and was in effect when the petition for dissolution was filed, when the matter was tried and at the time of judgment. (Cf. Addison v. Addison, Supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 569, 43 Cal.Rptr. 97, 399 P.2d 897; In Re...