Ogdon v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd.
| Decision Date | 01 February 1973 |
| Citation | 30 Cal.App.3d 388,105 Cal.Rptr. 837 |
| Parties | Donald R. OGDON, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD et al., Respondents. Civ. 12026. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Thompson, Talbott & Lemaster and George D. Thompson, Pomona, for petitioner.
Franklin Grady, San Francisco, for respondent Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
Stanford D. Herlick, County Counsel, San Bernardino, for respondent County of San Bernardino.
Rushing, Clark & Haight and Albert G. Clark, Jr., Modesto, amicus curiae for The California Applicants Attys. Assn.
Petitioner (Applicant) seeks review of a decision after reconsideration of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (Board).
The procedural history of the case is quite complex, but because of the narrow, though significant, issue presented, many of the complexities may be eliminated for purposes of this decision. Applicant allegedly sustained three successive industrial injuries while working for the same employer. Each injury was the subject of an application for adjudication of claim. Insurance coverage was provided by several different carriers at the several times involved. Voluntarily and by order of the Board, temporary total workmen's compensation disability benefits were paid Applicant through August 12, 1970.
In May 1970, Applicant went off work and had not returned to work at the time of the latest proceedings below. On August 27, 1970, Applicant filed a fourth application for adjudication of claim, alleging cumulative injury during the period May 25, 1964 to February 10, 1970. He sought further temporary disability benefits, permanent disability benefits, medical treatment and reimbursement for medical expenses. He alleged that his earnings were maximum for industrial injury benefits. 1
At the time of the proceedings below, Applicant had four dependents, his wife and three minor children his disability and entitlement to further workmen's compensation temporary disability benefits being in dispute, payment of such benefits by the employer's insurance carrier were terminated August 12, 1970. Applicant applied to the County of San Bernardino for public assistance. Pursuant to said application, commencing in September 1970 and continuously thereafter until mid-June 1971, Applicant received public assistance under the provisions of part 3 of division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (§ 11000 et seq.), more particularly under the provisions dealing with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (§ 11200 et seq.) (hereinafter AFDC), and specifically under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 11250(a). 2 Except for the month of June 1971, during which a partial payment was made, cash benefits were paid to Applicant by warrants payable to him at the rate of $239 per month. The total amount paid was $2,313.50. Had Applicant been absent from the home, his family would have been entitled to benefits at the rate of $221 per month. Payment of AFDC benefits was terminated in June 1971 because Applicant 'received a fund of money from other sources.' 3
On or about May 5, 1971, the San Bernardino County Welfare Department filed an amended claim of lien on account of the AFDC benefits provided Applicant and his dependents in the amount of $2,031.50. 4 Following the original order approving the compromise and release in which the sum of $2,031.50 was ordered withheld pending determination of the propriety and validity of the lien claim of the San Bernardino County Welfare Department, a further hearing was had on the lien claim on July 21, 1971, which, after submission of points and authorities, resulted in an order by the referee on December 14, 1971 that the lien be allowed in the amount of $950. This order was subsequently amended by an order dated January 4, 1972 to correct a clerical error.
It was conceded that the full amount claimed had been paid to and expended by Applicant's family as living expenses (see Lab.Code, § 4903(c)), but the referee, while recognizing some pertinent differences between AFDC and unemployment compensation disability (UCD) benefits, treated the lien claim of the San Bernardino County Welfare Department similarly to a lien claim for UCD benefits and allowed only a portion of the lien claim of the San Bernardino County Welfare Department utilizing the so-called 'Baird' formula (see Lab.Code, §§ 4903(f), 4903(g), 4904; California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 59 Cal.2d 257, 260-261, 28 Cal.Rptr. 872, 379 P.2d 328). San Bernardino County petitioned for reconsideration contending that its lien claim should have been allowed in full. Applicant answered contending that the apportionment of the lien in accordance with the 'Baird' formula was proper, but also himself petitioned for reconsideration contending that the lien claim was totally invalid and should not have been allowed in any amount. The Board granted reconsideration and on February 29, 1972 rendered an opinion, decision and order allowing the lien of the San Bernardino County Welfare Department in full ($2,031.50).
Applicant's petition for review was originally denied without opinion by this court. The California Supreme Court, however, granted hearing and directed that a Writ of Review issue. Accordingly, we issued the writ.
In this opinion we shall have occasion to refer to statutory provisions contained in the Civil Code and Welfare and Institutions Code, and we are immediately thereby presented with a problem. In the 1971 session, the Legislature enacted the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 (Stats.1971, ch. 578) repealing and amending certain statutory provisions and adding others. The act was enacted as urgency legislation and, thus, became effective August 13, 1971, but the operative date of the provisions with which we might be concerned (e. g., Civ.Code, § 248; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 11004, 11008, 11020, 11155, 11157, 11267) was fixed as October 1, 1971. (Stats.1971, ch. 578, §§ 42, 43.) The question is whether those provisions of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 that became operative October 1, 1971 are applicable to the matter under review. We have concluded that they are. It is the law at the time of judgment that is controlling. (Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal.2d 558, 569, 43 Cal.Rptr. 97, 399 P.2d 897; In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 114, 104 Cal.Rptr. 472; In re Marriage of Silvers, 23 Cal.App.3d 910, 911, 100 Cal.Rptr. 731.) The order of the referee of which reconsideration was sought was made December 14, 1971 and subsequently amended on January 4, 1972 to correct a clerical error. The final decision of the Board under review was rendered February 29, 1972. Both the order of the referee and that of the Board were, thus, rendered subsequent to the operative date of those provisions of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 with which we might be concerned. As will hereinafter appear, our decision on this point does not substantially affect the decision reached, but the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 and some of its provisions do bear upon the case and, in any event, it is necessary to make clear that our reference to provisions found in the Welfare and Institutions Code and Civil Code refer to the sections as they exist following enactment of that act.
Pointing out that it was admitted that it paid at least $2,031.50 to Applicant for living expenses of himself and his dependents subsequent to his claimed injury, the County contends that the Board's allowance of its lien is authorized and, indeed, mandated by section 4903(c) of the Labor Code which provides for a lien against 'any sum to be paid as compensation' for '[t]he reasonable value of the living expenses of an injured employee or of his dependents, subsequent to the injury.' In addition, County cites several cases lending support to its position in which liens were allowed under Labor Code, section 4903 for the recoupment by the paying agency of welfare benefits paid an injured workman for the living expenses of himself or of his dependents subsequent to his injury and prior to adjudication of his workmen's compensation claim. (E. g., County of Contra Costa v. Industrial Acc. Com. [Wilkerson], 212 Cal.App.2d 585, 28 Cal.Rptr. 303; Hemming v. Industrial Acc. Com., 13 Cal. Comp.Cases 23 [writ denied February 25, 1948]; Lugo v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 31 Cal.Comp.Cases, 273 [].) 5
Applicant attacks on a broad front. Starting with the proposition that at common law, in the absence of fraud in procuring relief, a recipient of charity from the state was under no obligation to make repayment (see County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 283, 106 P.2d 11; County of L. A. v. Security First Nat. Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 578, 191 P.2d 78; see also 23 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 29 6), he contends that no recoupment of AFDC benefits properly paid is contemplated by the federal or state statutes or regulations pertaining thereto and that, therefore, the lien provisions of Labor Code, section 4903(c) do not apply.
Thus Applicant distinguishes the Hemming and Wilkerson cases, supra. Hemming involved a lien claim under Labor Code, section 4903(c) by the County of Los Angeles for indigent aid provided by it. The statutory provisions governing indigent aid, however, clearly provide for recoupment. (See Welf & Inst.Code, §§ 17109, 17401, 17403 [formerly §§ 2600-2603].) Although the Wilkerson opinion does not make clear the precise nature of the welfare benefits that had been provided, indigent aid is mentioned and the Hemming case cited as authority. (212 Cal.App.2d at p. 586, 28 Cal.Rptr. 303.) In any event, in the Wilkerson case it was not contested, but conceded, that the welfare benefits furnished provided a basis for recoupment by lien. (212 Cal.App.2d...
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