Marsh v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. S12A1568.,S12A1568.
• Citation: 732 S.E.2d 443,292 Ga. 28
• Parties: MARSH v. CLARKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

292 Ga. 28

732 S.E.2d 443

12 FCDR 3154

12 FCDR 3603

MARSH

v.CLARKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

No. S12A1568.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 15, 2012.

Reconsideration Denied Nov. 19, 2012.

James J. Thomas, II, IchterThomas, LLC, Atlanta, for appellant.

Jay D. Bennett, Nowell Donald Berreth, Alston & Bird, LLP, Atlanta, Terrell W. Benton, Jr., Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Athens, for appellees.

THOMPSON, Presiding Justice.

This is a mandamus action in which a taxpayer seeks a writ requiring a school district to return “excess proceeds” collected pursuant to an educational sales and use tax approved by referendum. The superior court denied the writ, the taxpayer appealed, and we affirm.

In 2001, voters in the Clarke County School District approved a one percent educational sales and use tax (ELOST) for a period of five years beginning immediately upon the expiration of an ELOST that had been approved in 1997. The purpose of the referendum was to provide funds to pay the cost of specified, authorized projects totaling $87,849,000. The total amount of taxes collected pursuant to the 2001 ELOST was $93,413,789, which was $5,564,789 more than the amount of taxes the school district intended to collect, but less than the amount the school district actually spent on the authorized projects ($95,362,296). In 2006, voters again approved a one percent ELOST for an additional five years. In spite of these referendums and taxes, as of September 1, 2012, the school district has debt totaling at least $10,855,000.

Relying upon Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV(h) of the Georgia Constitution,¹ appellant sought a writ of mandamus requiring the school district to return “excess proceeds” of the 2001 ELOST to the taxpayers of the county by reducing the millage rate in an amount equal to the amount of the excess proceeds. The superior court denied the writ, finding, inter alia, appellant did not show a clear legal right to relief because the school district did not violate the “excess proceeds” provision. We agree with the superior court.

Looking to the plain language of the “excess proceeds” provision, it is clear that any monies remaining following expenditures for projects specified in the referendum are to be used to reduce the millage rate, but only if the amount collected exceeds (a) the actual cost of the authorized projects or educational expenditures or (b) the debt of the school district. The school district actually spent more (i.e., $95,362,296) than the amount of taxes collected (i.e., $93,413,789) pursuant to the 2001 referendum on school projects authorized by the referendum. Moreover, as of September 1, 2012, the school district had at least $10,855,000 in debt, an amount greater than the amount of “excess proceeds.” Thus, appellant did not establish a clear legal right to mandamus: he did not prove that “excess proceeds” remain for the purpose of reducing the millage rate. See James v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 283 Ga. 517, 661 S.E.2d 535 (2008) (writ of mandamus may be granted only when petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought).

We now turn our attention to petitioner's assertion that the superior court also erred in finding that his mandamus claim (an extraordinary legal remedy ² ), was barred by laches (an equitable defense ³). Although not necessary to resolve this case, we address this matter to offer guidance to bench and bar because it appears that our case law is contradictory and engenders confusion.

There are two lines of authority covering this topic. One line, holding that a mandamus action can be barred by gross laches, stems from Justice Lumpkin's opinion in Mayor & Alderman of Savannah v. Green, 4 Ga. 26(3) (1848): “To justify the Court in refusing the writ of Mandamus, on the ground that the party applying had slept on his rights—the laches must be gross—the delay unreasonable.” This approach was reiterated in Talmadge v. Cordell, 167 Ga. 594, 595, 146 S.E. 467 (1928), Southern Airways Co. v. Williams, 213 Ga. 38, 96 S.E.2d 889 (1957), and, most recently, West v. Fulton County, 267 Ga. 456, 458, n. 3, 479 S.E.2d 722 (1997).

The other, much newer, line of cases, starts with Crow v. McCallum, 215 Ga. 692, 696, 113 S.E.2d 203 (1960), and states that a mandamus action cannot be barred by laches: “With reference to the plea of laches, it is necessary to say only that the doctrine of laches is an equitable one, and that the instant [mandamus] case is a legal proceeding to which this doctrine does not apply.” See also Addis v. Smith, 226 Ga. 894, 895, 178 S.E.2d 191 (1970) (quoting Crow ); HCA Health Svcs. v. Roach, 263 Ga. 798, 801(3)(c), 439 S.E.2d 494 (1994) (citing Addis ). This newer line of cases appears to be based on the well established notion that inasmuch as laches is an equitable defense, it cannot be applied to actions at law. See, e.g., VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, 281 Ga. 50, 635 S.E.2d 758 (2006) (laches cannot bar declaratory judgment action); Stuckey v. Storms, 265 Ga. 491(1), 458 S.E.2d 344 (1995) (“laches is a purely equitable defense and is not applicable to a complaint for the enforcement of a legal right”).

Here, petitioner alleges the trial court erred by applying the defense of laches to his legal claim for mandamus. However, although mandamus is characterized as a legal remedy, it is more accurate to say that mandamus is a special kind of legal remedy, to wit, an extraordinary legal remedy like prohibition, OCGA § 9–6–40, or quo warranto, OCGA § 9–6–60. In fact, the writ of mandamus is much like a mandatory injunction. Thus, it has been said that mandamus is quasi-equitable in its nature. See generally Martin v. Hatfield, 251 Ga. 638, 639–640(3), 308 S.E.2d 833 (1983) (our...