Marshall v. Los Angeles County
| Decision Date | 28 March 1955 |
| Citation | 131 Cal.App.2d 812,281 P.2d 544 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Albert MARSHALL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Eugene Biscailuz, Ambrose Stewart, Henry Storlie, Maurice Marshall, Theodore Davis, Meza Leobijildo, et al., Defendants, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and Eugene Biscailuz, Respondents. Civ. 20600. |
William A. Tookey, Pasadena, for appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Robert C. Lynch and Lloyd S. Davis, Deputies County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment that followed an order sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's second amended complaint.
It appears by the averments of the complaint that plaintiff was a prisoner at the sheriff's Wayside Honor Farm of the County of Los Angeles. He had been convicted of a misdemeanor, sentenced to the county jail, and transferred to the farm.
He was working with other prisoners on a dump truck owned by the county, and driven by one of the prisoners. No employee of the county was with the truck.
The men were hauling lumber from one place to another on the farm grounds. Plaintiff was assigned to ride in the truck. When it came time to unload it all of the men got into the truck. While the men were thus at work, the prisoner driver climbed into the cab of the truck, titled its bed at an acute angle, and made it go rapidly backward and forward. The idea was to shake out the lumber remaining in the bottom of the truck. Unfortunately plaintiff was still in the truck when this operation was commenced. He tried to get out, but fell between the bed of the truck and the cab, and sustained serious injuries to his ankle and leg.
He was taken to the camp infirmary, treated for bruises and sprains, kept there for a week, and then transferred to the General Hospital in Los Angeles. At the hospital it was found that he had suffered a broken leg. The bones were set and the leg put in a cast, but before the man fully recovered he was discharged from the hospital and turned out to shift for himself. If this allegation be true, that would seem to have been a needless cruelty.
Plaintiff names as defendants the county, its Board of Supervisors, the sheriff and his deputies, and the prisoner who drove the truck.
Plaintiff's brief on appeal argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be applied in his case; that the county and the sheriff are liable for aggravation of his injuries by reason of negligent care and treatment furnished him; and that in any event he is entitled to compensation under Section 400 of the Vehicle Code for his injuries, pain, and suffering.
As stated in defendants' brief, the complaint contains four causes of action. The first is based upon a claim of negligent operation of the truck by fellow prisoners. The second is based upon the failure to furnish adequate medical equipment and personnel. The third is based upon the employment of an alleged incompetent and unqualified person at the honor farm to treat sick or injured prisoners. The fourth cause of action is substantially the same as the second.
These causes of action will be discussed separately.
The first cause of action--the claim of negligent operation of the truck:
That part of Section 400 of the Vehicle Code applicable to this situation may be epitomized as follows:
'* * * every county * * * owning any motor vehicle is responsible to every person who sustains any damage by reason of * * * injury to person * * * as the result of the negligent operation of any said motor vehicle by an officer, agent, or employee * * *.'
This Court is unable to agree with the argument of the county that the truck was not in 'operation' when the accident occurred, as that word is used in the statute.
In the enactment of Section 400 of the Vihicle Code the state imposed liability for damages when the exercise of governmental functions in the operation of motor vehicles results in injury to its people. Lossman v. City of Stockton, 6 Cal.App.2d 324, 44 P.2d 397.
It was designed to end the common-law rule of governmental non-liability so far as the operation of motor vehicles by public agencies is concerned. Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal.App.2d 297, 42 P.2d 685.
To be in operation within the meaning of the law the vehicle must be in a "state of being at work" or "in the active exercise...
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