Martin, In re, Cr. 23195

• Decision Date: 23 November 1981
• Docket Number: Cr. 23195
• Citation: 178 Cal.Rptr. 445,125 Cal.App.3d 896
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re Charles MARTIN, Jr. on Habeas Corpus.

Page 445

178 Cal.Rptr. 445

125 Cal.App.3d 896

In re Charles MARTIN, Jr. on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 23195.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 23, 1981.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 23, 1981.

Benjamin R. Winslow, Winslow & Schmidt, San Francisco, Appointed by the Court of Appeal, for petitioner.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, William D. Stein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ann K. Jensen, Nathan D. Mihara, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

This petition, filed in pro per by an inmate, seeks good time/work time for a period of some eight months during which he was committed to California Rehabilitation Center under civil addict proceedings (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3051). We have concluded that he is entitled to the credit he seeks.

The parties agree to the following statement of facts:

On July 21, 1980, petitioner pleaded guilty in Contra Costa County Superior Court to four counts of forgery (Pen.Code § 470) (Sup.Ct.No. 24059) and one count of burglary (Pen.Code, § 459) and possession of a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, § 12020) (Sup.Ct.No. 24335). On the same day the trial court instituted civil addict proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051.

On July 25, 1980, petitioner was received by the California Department of Corrections, Northern Reception Center (hereafter "NRC-CMF") and was then transferred to the California Rehabilitation Center (hereafter "CRC") on August 1, 1980. Petitioner was ultimately found unsuitable for the civil addict program at CRC and was returned to Contra Costa County Superior Court on April 1, 1981 where he was sentenced to state prison for two years. He was received at NRC-CMF on April 9, 1981.

Petitioner prepared and filed an in pro per motion in the trial court on or about June 5, 1981 to obtain good time/work time credits for the period of time he spent at CRC. The trial court denied that motion on June 22, 1981. On August 6, 1981, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner contends that under equal protection principles he is entitled to the same good time/work time credits for time spent in CRC as he and other inmates are awarded for time in state prison or county facilities.

Penal Code sections 2931 and 4019 are the primary statutory authorities for credits for work performed and good conduct in penal institutions. Section 2931 ¹ covers conduct after sentence to state prison, whereas section 4019 ² covers conduct by certain prisoners confined in county jails or similar institutions. In People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874, the California Supreme Court concluded that although neither section 4019 nor section 2931 provided conduct credit for presentence county jail time served by a felon sentenced to state prison, principles of equal protection required that such person also receive conduct credits.

In the same opinion, the Sage court disposed quickly of a contention that a felon should receive conduct credits for time during which he was committed to a state hospital for treatment as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316. The court noted that section 4019 authorizes credit for certain prisoners confined in city or county jails, industrial farms or road camps but that it does not authorize conduct credit for time in "non-penal institutions such as state hospitals or the California Rehabilitation Center." (26 Cal.3d at pp. 502-503, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874.)

The Attorney General argues in this case that Sage forecloses the credit petitioner seeks. But that portion of the Sage opinion reveals only what is obvious from the face of Penal Code section 4019: that it does not apply to time spent in CRC. The more troublesome issues are whether under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c) or equal protection principles, conduct credits should be given for CRC time.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c), effective July 29, 1980 (Stats.1980, ch. 822, § 8) ³ provides, in essence, that a person committed as a civil addict under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 cannot be required to spend longer in confinement than he or she could have served on the underlying felony with full credit for behavior and participation. Thus it provides the civilly committed addict with the functional equivalent of a right to good time/work time credit (and, incidentally, appears to give him credit even when he does not "participate" or when his conduct might not have warranted it in another institution).

The amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201 was made prospective only by the Legislature (Stats.1980, ch. 822, § 9). However, in In re Morales (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 456, 171 Cal.Rptr. 425, Division One of the Fourth District (Brown, P. J.) held that prospective application denied equal protection to those who committed their crimes before July 29, 1980. Hearing was denied by the Supreme Court.

The Attorney General argues, correctly, that Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c) applies only to the maximum period of time a person can serve in a civil addict program and does not provide for conduct credits for one who has been excluded from the program as unsuitable (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3053). However, application of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c) to persons who complete the addict treatment program and failure to provide conduct credits for those who spend only a portion of their sentence time in the addict program creates two classes of prisoners. Members of the first class, by remaining in CRC for two-thirds of the maximum term they would have served in state prison, are effectively given full good time/work time credits for CRC confinement. Members of the second class, who may spend anywhere from one day to one day less than the members of the first class, receive no conduct credits for the time spent in CRC.

The Attorney General contends that the disparate treatment of the two classes is justified because: (1) time spent under a commitment to CRC is "treatment time," not "punishment" for the underlying offense; and (2) the CRC program is not set up to monitor an inmate's "good behavior" or "work participation" and there is no system whereby conduct credits could be subject to loss, as there is in a penal setting. He notes that the Sage court concluded that equal protection did not require conduct credits for MDSO time.

Shortly before its Sage decision, the Supreme Court decided People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92. In Saffell, the defendant attacked both failure to give conduct credits to mentally disordered sex offenders and the automatic adoption of the "upper term" as the treatment period for an MDSO. The Saffell court found compelling reasons for the disparate treatment of MDSOs, those reasons centering around the distinctions between treatment and punishment, the availability of other methods to reward or penalize patients, and the administrative difficulties of setting up and operating a good time/work time system. In Sage, the court summarily rejected the equal protection argument by referring to its decision in Saffell. In other contexts the Supreme Court has noted the "essential parallelism" of the MDSO statutes and those covering commitment to CRC and has applied the same interpretations to the two laws. (See People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 641, 139 Cal.Rptr. 594, 566 P.2d 228.)

What was said in Sage and Saffell has little impact upon the decision in this case, however, because of adoption of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c). The Sage and Saffell decisions were rendered in reliance upon a legislative scheme in which MDSO patients were provided no species of good time/work time credits, and in which the courts were specifically advised to ignore conduct credits when setting the MDSO treatment term. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6316.1, subd. (a).)

The Attorney General argues that neither the distinction between rehabilitation and punishment nor the administrative difficulties are altered by adoption of section 3201, subdivision (c). He asserts that the new statute does not provide conduct credits, but merely sets the maximum treatment time for an addict by reference to the term he would serve in prison. It is true that section 3201, subdivision (c) does not change the nature of the CRC program or provide an administratively convenient way to apply the prison conduct credit system to CRC inmates. It is also true that on its face the section does not provide conduct credits but merely prescribes a method for setting the maximum treatment time for a CRC inmate. However, by concentrating on the literal meaning of the new legislation, the Attorney General ignores its impact upon the situation of one committed to CRC.

In Saffell, the court permitted longer treatment of MDSOs because treatment was not equivalent to punishment. It rejected the notion of good time/work time incentives because it found other incentives and disincentives, administrative difficulties in applying credits, and the absence of the kind of work programs available in state prisons. In adopting Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c), the Legislature has determined that the treatment period should be equivalent to the potential punishment and has established an administratively convenient method of providing credit. Thus, the justifications found persuasive in Saffell cannot be asserted in relation to CRC credits. The Legislature does not intend an addict to be treated for longer than he could be imprisoned and it intends the "credit" to...