Martin v. Brady

• Decision Date: 24 July 2001
• Docket Number: (AC 20808)
• Citation: 64 Conn. App. 433,780 A.2d 961
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: ANTHONY R. MARTIN v. JAMES BRADY ET AL.

64 Conn. App. 433

780 A.2d 961

ANTHONY R. MARTIN v. JAMES BRADY ET AL.

(AC 20808)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 5, 2001.

Officially released July 24, 2001.

Lavery, C. J., and Mihalakos and Peters, JS. Norman A. Pattis, with whom were Dawne Westbrook and, on the brief, John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert F. Vacchelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

PETERS, J.

The principal issue in this case is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff, Anthony R. Martin, from pursuing state constitutional claims of misconduct by the defendant police officers, who searched his property and person and then seized him personally. Although sovereign immunity may be bypassed by filing, with the claims commissioner, a claim for permission to bring suit,¹ the plaintiff has not pursued that alternative. The trial court held that, because of sovereign immunity and the plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed. Relying on Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998), the plaintiff argues to the contrary. He maintains that a claim for relief that invokes a provision of our state constitution falls within one of the exemptions from filing suit with the claims commissioner. The plaintiff relies on General Statutes § 4-142 (2),² which provides, in relevant part, that the claims commissioner has no authority to hear "claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts...." The plaintiff contends that § 4-142 (2) is applicable because, in his view, a suit for relief under article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut is a suit that "otherwise is authorized." We are not persuaded and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record establishes the relevant procedural history. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendants individually,³ alleging that they had deprived him of his due process rights and his rights to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion relied both on sovereign immunity and on the plaintiffs failure to exhaust an alternate administrative remedy. General Statutes § 4-141 et seq. Distinguishing Binette, the case upon which the plaintiff relies, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment dismissing his complaint.⁴ Because the judgment was based entirely on the legal inferences to be drawn from the complaint, our review is plenary. SLI International Corp. v. Crystal, 236 Conn. 156, 163-64, 671 A.2d 813 (1996). Because the judgment was rendered pretrial, we consider the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint in the light most favorable to sustaining the viability of the complaint. Reynolds v. Soffer, 183 Conn. 67, 68, 438 A.2d 1163 (1981).

The plaintiffs argument for reversal has two major parts. As a matter of pleading, he contends that the defendants were not entitled to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity because he had sued them in their individual capacities for egregious misconduct. As a matter of substantive law, he maintains that his complaint did not fall within the purview of the claims commissioner because, under Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 23, he was pursing an independent constitutional claim that § 4-142 (2) did not purport to preclude. We disagree with both parts of the plaintiffs argument.

I PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS

The first issue that we must resolve is whether, procedurally, the defendants in this case are barred from access to a defense of sovereign immunity as a result of the pleadings filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has divided his argument on this issue into two subparts. He maintains that the defense is inapplicable because he sued each of the defendants (1) in their individual capacity and (2) for misconduct that was "wanton, reckless or malicious."⁵ General Statutes § 4-165. We disagree.

A

The fact that the plaintiff has framed his complaint so as to seek relief from the defendants in their individual capacities does not preclude their rights to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff does not challenge the applicable legal principles. Obviously, the state can act only through its officers and agents. Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 342, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981). Such officers and agents are protected from legal proceedings by sovereign immunity, unless they are alleged to have acted in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 169, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000); Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 487-88, 642 A.2d 699 (1994). As did the court, we have examined the plaintiffs complaint to determine whether it contains allegations that might preclude the defendants from invoking sovereign immunity as a defense.

The complaint charges the defendants with actionable misconduct in that one or another (1) forced his way into the plaintiffs Middletown home without a "search warrant" and, after he submitted to an arrest, struck him and threw him to the floor,⁶ (2) searched his home on the basis of a search warrant that was issued in response to an affidavit containing false claims and (3) in the process of that search, smashed windows and broke down doors.

Significantly, the complaint contains no allegations that the defendants were acting in any capacity other than as state officers enforcing an extradition arrest warrant. There is no allegation that the defendants' alleged misconduct exceeded their statutory authority or that an applicable statute was unconstitutional. As the court properly noted, in the absence of such an allegation, the form in which the plaintiff cited the defendants does not matter. Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 174-75.

B

The plaintiff argues, alternatively, that the defendants cannot rely on the defense of sovereign immunity because § 4-165 disallows statutory immunity for actions alleged to have been "wanton, reckless or malicious." This argument confuses sovereign immunity with statutory immunity. If the defendants have established their defense of sovereign immunity, they need not demonstrate their compliance with § 4-165. Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 164.

II SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS UNDER BINETTE v. SABO

Whatever might be the applicability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in other circumstances, the plaintiff argues that Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 23, governs this case so as to supersede sovereign immunity. First, he claims that, as a matter of law, Binette supports his position doctrinally. Second, if that claim is upheld, he argues that Binette supports his position factually. We disagree with both of the plaintiffs claims.

A

In Binette, our Supreme Court recognized a private constitutional tort cause of action for money damages under article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut. The plaintiff claims that, pursuant to § 4-142 (2),⁷Binette authorizes a suit "by law" against these individual defendants. If that claim is accepted, the plaintiff maintains that he rightfully bypassed the claims commissioner in bringing this action to the Superior Court. We disagree.

The defendants argue, and we agree, that Binette is distinguishable from the present case doctrinally. In Binette, our Supreme Court had no occasion to address the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as that case addressed the misconduct of municipal, not state, police officers.

Binette did not purport to announce an overarching universal principle. Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 47. It cautioned that the availability of access to a separate tort action under Binette should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis only. Id., 48; see also ATC Partnership v. Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 613, 741 A.2d 305 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1214, 120 S. Ct. 2217, 147 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2000). Bearing these cautionary words in mind, we are persuaded that Binette does not permit a tort action in this case. Our Supreme Court, in Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 172, has reminded us that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be overcome too easily. It is not our law that every tort action premised on alleged misconduct by a state officer automatically deprives the officer of access to the defense of sovereign immunity. Id. Under Shay, the appropriate test in this case is whether the defendants' activities fall outside of the normal scope of the defendants' authority to enforce an arrest warrant. Although we recognize the force of constitutional mandates, we are disinclined to enforce such mandates at the expense of sovereign immunity unless the plaintiff clearly has alleged facts that, if proven, would distinguish his claim for relief from standard claims of police misconduct.⁸

B

Whatever the precise doctrinal impact of Binette may be, case-by-case adjudication is inherently fact bound. We turn, therefore, to the plaintiffs argument that, if Binette applies doctrinally, the facts alleged in his complaint are sufficiently egregious to allow him to pursue a separate tort action against the defendants.⁹ We disagree with his argument.

In Binette, the complaint was sustained because of its specific allegations of an unreasonable, egregious search and seizure. The plaintiffs therein alleged that the defendants, Mahlon C. Sabo and Anthony A. Languell,¹⁰ had entered the home of the plaintiffs, Joseph A. Binette and Janet Binette, without permission or a warrant. "According to the complaint, Sabo threatened Janet Binette with arrest and imprisonment and pushed her, causing her...