Stocking v. Austin

Decision Date02 June 2016
Docket NumberCV1550170376S
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
PartiesGary Stocking v. Brian Austin, Jr. et al

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS, NO 102

PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE.

I FACTS

On November 25, 2015, the plaintiff, Gary Stocking, submitted his complaint, alleging violation of state law and federal law by the defendants, Brian Austin, Jr., and Kevin T. Kane. The plaintiff's action seems to be primarily based on a state claim for " Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution." The plaintiff alleges that, on February 9 2015, he submitted a complaint to the Executive Assistant Attorney, Austin, against Senior Assistant State's Attorney Russell C. Zentner, for perjury and conspiracy to fabricate evidence in violation of clearly established law.

The plaintiff asserts that he did not receive a response from Austin until April 15, 2015, when Austin replied that he would take no further action to investigate Zentner.

The plaintiff further alleges that, on March 27, 2015, he also submitted a criminal complaint against the probation officer Michael Sullivan, to the Chief State's Attorney, Kane, at the Division of Criminal Justice. The plaintiff asserts that he did not receive a response from Kane.

The plaintiff claims that the Division of Criminal Justice is an agency within the executive branch which is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of criminal matters, and that the Division must not " Conspire to Hinder Prosecution." The plaintiff also asserts that " [w]hen a person is under the custody of the State, a special relationship is established, and a duty is owed to a particular person rather than the general public."

As to relief, the plaintiff requests punitive damages against the defendants for " Conspiracy to Hinder Prosecution and for the willful deprivation of [his] Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional Civil Rights to due process of law." [1] The plaintiff states that he has brought the present action against both defendants, in their official and individual capacities, for $10 million each. Finally, the plaintiff asks the court to issue a writ of attachment on everything of monetary value owned by the defendants.

On December 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss.[2] On December 17, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion.[3] On December 21, 2015, the defendants filed a reply brief.[4] The matter was heard at short calendar on March 18, 2016.

II DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss

" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " [B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). Moreover, " [c]laims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). Thus, " a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity [or statutory immunity] bars the action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

In addition, the doctrine of federal qualified immunity also implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and is a proper ground for the motion to dismiss. Chapman v. Chapdelaine, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-12-5005693-S (October 17, 2013, Graham, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 932, 933, ), citing Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011), and Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 747, 763, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). " Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case . . . [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651.

" In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations . .., or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.

" Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). Nevertheless, it is well established that, " in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013).

In the present case, the defendants argue that the court should dismiss the plaintiff's action on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff lacks standing, (2) the state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity or statutory immunity, and (3) the federal claims are barred by qualified immunity. As to standing, the defendants contend that a private citizen lacks standing to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to investigate or prosecute a criminal complaint because a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.

The plaintiff counters that although private citizens lack standing to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to investigate, the plaintiff filed the criminal complaint while he was an inmate in state custody, and a special relationship was established which required the state to investigate the plaintiff's criminal complaints. As to federal eleventh amendment immunity, the plaintiff contends that the protection has been largely terminated for liability purposes in state courts, and that states may generally be sued under state tort law for improper conduct by officers. The plaintiff further argues that when employees of the state act outside the scope of their official duties and violates clearly established statutory or constitutional law, they can be sued in their individual capacity.

B. Standing

" Standing . . . is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002).

" Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the...

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