Martin v. Hopkins Cnty.
| Decision Date | 16 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 06-22-00022-CV |
| Citation | 658 S.W.3d 342 |
| Parties | Cynthia MARTIN, Appellant v. HOPKINS COUNTY, Hopkins County Judge Robert Newsom, Hopkins County Commissioner Mickey Barker, Hopkins County Commissioner Greg Anglin, Hopkins County Commissioner Wade Bartley, and Hopkins County Commissioner Joe Price, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Benjamin A. Geslison, for Civil - Amicus Curiae.
Lee I. Correa, Robert S. Davis, Flowers Davis, PLLC, Tyler, for Appellee.
W. Lance Cawthon, Jason W. Snell, The Snell Law Firm, PLLC, Austin, AnneMarie McComb, for Appellant.
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
raised ultra vires claims against Hopkins County officials in connection with the county's agreement with a private company to build a solar power plant. The trial court found that the county's contract complied with requirements of the Texas Local Government Code and granted a summary judgment against Martin on her ultra vires claims. On appeal, Martin challenges the trial court's summary judgment. We find that the county and its officials established that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment against Martin as a matter of law. As a result, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The heart of this case involves Chapter 381 of the Texas Local Government Code, which provides an avenue for counties to "promot[e] the prosperous development of business, industry, and commerce in the county." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 381.001(f). Section 381.004(b) authorizes "the commissioners court of the county [to] develop and administer a program ... for state or local economic development" "to stimulate business and commercial activity in a county." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 381.004(b)(1) (Supp.). To effectuate this purpose, Section 381.004 provides several means that counties may employ to attract business, industry, and commerce.
Under subsection G, "[t]he commissioners court may develop and administer a program ... for entering into a tax abatement agreement with an owner or lessee of a property interest subject to ad valorem taxation." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 381.004(g) (Supp.). Should the county seek to attract a business by using a tax abatement agreement, "[t]he execution, duration, and other terms of the agreement are governed, to the extent practicable, by the provisions of Sections 312.204, 312.205, and 312.211, [of the Texas] Tax Code, as if the commissioners court were a governing body of a municipality." Id. Should the county forego a tax abatement incentive under subsection G, subsection H allows "[t]he commissioners court [to] develop and administer a program ... for making loans and grants of public money." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 381.004(h) (Supp.). The central issue here is whether Hopkins County (the County) employed subsection G or subsection H to attract Hopkins Energy, LLC (the Developer), which sought to build a solar power plant while providing advertised community benefits, including local tax revenue, permanent jobs, and community support via substantial charitable contributions.
Discussions between Hopkins County and the Developer spanned several years. On November 4, 2021, the public received notice of a Monday, November 8 regular meeting scheduled for 9:00 a.m. in the County Commissioners’ Courtroom, which showed that the purpose of the meeting included, among other things, consideration and approval of an agreement between the County and the Developer. On November 8, 2021, the County entered into an Amended and Restated Chapter 381 Economic Development Program and Agreement with the Developer (the Agreement).1
Martin sued Hopkins County and the following officials in their official capacities: County Judge Robert Newsom; and County Commissioners Mickey Barker, Greg Anglin, Wade Bartley, and Joe Price (collectively the Officials).2 In her live pleading, Martin alleged that the Agreement offered tax abatement incentives under subsection G of Section 381.004, not loans or grants under subsection H. As a result, Martin asserted ultra vires claims against the Officials because the Agreement did not comply with provisions of the Texas Tax Code, a subsection G requirement.3 Martin prayed for injunctive relief and declarations that the Officials "lack[ed] legal authority to take any prospective action in accordance with or pursuant to the ... Agreement," or "to reimburse any ad valorem taxes collected from [the Developer]."
In response, the County and the Officials filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment arguing that the Agreement with the Developer was made pursuant to subsection H, which did "not require that the agreement be governed by any other statute, including the Texas Tax Code Sections." As a result, the Officials argued that they could not be held liable for alleged ultra vires acts in Martin's petition, which were all based on Texas Tax Code violations. After a hearing, the trial court granted the traditional motion for summary judgment.
Based on her interpretation of the Texas Local Government Code and the Agreement, Martin argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against her. "We review summary judgments de novo, taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Energen Res. Corp. v. Wallace , 642 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds , 589 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex. 2019) ). "A party that moves for traditional summary judgment must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ).
"Once the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact." Polecat Hill, LLC v. City of Longview , 648 S.W.3d 315, 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (citing Walker v. Harris , 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996) ). Because the trial court did not specify the basis for its ruling here, "we must affirm a summary judgment if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious." Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc. , No. 06-14-00105-CV, 2015 WL 2437519, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc. , 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) ).
The trial court's summary judgment involved resolution of the parties’ contract construction and statutory construction arguments, and we review the trial court's legal determinations on these matters de novo. See Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. , 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019) ; Energen Res. Corp. , 642 S.W.3d at 509 (citing Youngkin v. Hines , 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018) ).
Because "Texas has a strong public policy favoring freedom of contract," James Constr. Grp., LLC v. Westlake Chem. Corp. , 650 S.W.3d 392, 403 (Tex. 2022), we first "look to the language of the parties’ agreement" to construe it, Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. , 590 S.W.3d at 479 (citing Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.-USA v. Adams , 560 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2018) ). "When a contract's meaning is disputed, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the instrument." James Constr. Grp., LLC , 650 S.W.3d at 403 (quoting URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty. , 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018) ). We "attempt[ ] to give effect to all provisions." Id.
Also, the language of a contract must be given "its plain, grammatical meaning unless it ‘would clearly defeat the parties’ intentions.’ " Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. , 590 S.W.3d at 479 (quoting Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson , 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002) ). "If we determine that the contract's language can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then the contract is not ambiguous[,] and we will construe it as a matter of law." Id. (quoting El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc. , 389 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex. 2012) ). "But if the contract contains two or more reasonable interpretations, the contract is ambiguous, creating a fact issue as to the parties’ intent." Id. (citing El Paso Field Servs. , 389 S.W.3d at 806 ).
"In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Energen Res. Corp. , 642 S.W.3d at 509 (quoting City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003) ). "We begin by examining the plain meaning of the statute's language." Id. (citing Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc. , 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014) ). "If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must read the language according to its common meaning ‘without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.’ " Id. (quoting Crosstex Energy Servs. , 430 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting State v. Shumake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) ).
"This Court may not impose its own judicial meaning on a statute by adding words not contained in the statute's language." Miles v. Tex. Cent. R.R. & Infrastructure, Inc. , 647 S.W.3d 613, 619 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc. , 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) ). We also "presum[e] that the Legislature intended for each of the statute's words to have a purpose and that the Legislature purposefully omitted words it did not include." Id. (quoting Silguero , 579 S.W.3d at 59 ). "The statutory words must be determined considering the context in which they are used, not in isolation." Id. (quoting Silguero , 579 S.W.3d at 59 ).
Martin's briefing characterizes this case as one of statutory construction. Martin also urges that we should broadly interpret the term "tax abatement" while narrowly interpreting the...
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