Martin v. Martin
| Decision Date | 18 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-0101.,05-0101. |
| Citation | 720 N.W.2d 732 |
| Parties | Bobby D. MARTIN, Sr., Appellee, v. Bobby D. MARTIN II, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht & Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Greg A. Life of Life Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellee.
This is a partition action in which the plaintiff claims an interest in land as a tenant in common by virtue of a deed from the grantor not joined in by his spouse. The district court concluded the deed was valid and ordered the land to be partitioned by sale. The court of appeals reversed. On our review, we agree with the court of appeals. We reverse the decision of the district court.
Robert Martin Jr. ("Bobby") purchased a forty-acre tract of land in Appanoose County on contract for $12,000 on November 1, 1993. The real estate contract named Bobby as the buyer, and the sellers gave Bobby a warranty deed in 1999 after Bobby completed the payments required under the contract. Bobby lived in a mobile home located on the land.
Bobby's father, Robert Martin Sr. ("Bob"), provided funds to Bobby to assist in the purchase of the land. After the purchase in 1993, Bob moved his personal property, equipment, and numerous items described as "junk" onto the land, with Bobby's assistance. In addition, Bob made several improvements to the land. He built a pond and a driveway, cleared trees, graded the land, and installed water pipes. Bob claimed that Bobby acknowledged on numerous occasions that they both owned the land.
Bobby married on June 13, 1999. His wife, Sheryl, lived in the home located on the land until Bobby filed for divorce in November 1999. At that time, Bobby and Sheryl separated, and Sheryl moved out of the home. Bobby and Sheryl had two children together.
During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Bob and Bobby entered into an agreement, entitled "Agreement Regarding Real Property." Under the agreement, Bob and Bobby acknowledged they both owned the forty-acre tract of land. They signed the agreement on February 21, 2000. That same day, Bobby executed a quitclaim deed that conveyed the land from himself (as the sole owner) to himself and Bob as tenants in common. Although Bobby and Sheryl were still married at the time, Sheryl did not sign the deed. Bobby apparently placed the deed in a safe, because he "thought it wasn't good" at the time, and neither Bob nor Bobby recorded the deed.
Bobby and Sheryl were divorced a year later on February 21, 2001. The court awarded the homestead property to Bobby. On July 18, 2003, after a dispute arose with Bobby, Bob recorded the quitclaim deed. There was no explanation as to how or when Bob acquired possession of the deed. Bob then filed a petition for partition on August 18, 2003. Bob claimed that he and Bobby owned the land as tenants in common by virtue of the quitclaim deed: He asked the court to have it partitioned by sale. Bobby responded to the petition by claiming Bob had no ownership interest in the land because the quitclaim deed by which Bob claimed to have acquired his interest was not executed by Sheryl as required by Iowa Code section 561.13 and was invalid. See Iowa Code § 651.2 (2003) (); accord Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1203(2). The district court held the quitclaim deed was valid, and Bob had a one-half undivided interest in the land as a tenant in common. The court ordered the land to be partitioned by sale. The district court also awarded Bob attorney fees of $2,728.52.
The district court found that the facts of this case were unique, and did not fall within the purpose of the statutory requirement under section 561.13 for the spouse to join in a conveyance of the homestead. Accordingly, it held that section 561.13 should not be applied to invalidate the deed because to do so would result in manifest injustice. The specific facts identified by the district court to support its conclusion that the statute was inapplicable were that the homestead was premarital property of Bobby, Sheryl moved from the homestead prior to the time the quitclaim deed was executed, Bobby was granted the homestead in the dissolution of marriage based on a stipulated agreement between Bobby and Sheryl, and Sheryl was not asserting any rights to invalidate the deed. Instead, the district court found Bobby was using the statute to assert a "technical defect" and that he was not seeking to use the statute to benefit Sheryl or the children. The district court also found that if the statute did apply, then the stipulation entered into by Bobby and Sheryl that included an agreement that Bobby would be awarded the homestead constituted a ratification of the quitclaim deed and validated the deed under section 561.13.
Bobby appealed. He claimed the quitclaim deed was invalid because the land constituted his homestead, he was married at the time of the conveyance, and his former wife never joined in the conveyance to Bob. The court of appeals reversed. It held the quitclaim deed was invalid because Bobby was married at the time the deed was executed and his wife did not sign the deed. It rejected any notion that the statute could be applied to support a contrary result based upon the particular equities of the case. Bob applied for, and we granted, further review.
An action to partition property is an equitable proceeding. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1201(1). Therefore, our review is de novo. Thiele v. Whittenbaugh, 291 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1980) (citing Huse v. Noffke, 271 N.W.2d 682, 683 (Iowa 1978)). Nevertheless, "we are justified in giving weight to the trial court's findings, especially so far as they relate to credibility of witnesses, in view of his better position to determine the real truth." Watts v. Archer, 252 Iowa 592, 596, 107 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1961) (citing Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 252 Iowa 414, 419, 107 N.W.2d 114, 117 (1961); Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1395, 72 N.W.2d 494, 498 (1955)).
There are many statutory and legal requirements that must be met for a deed to result in a valid conveyance. See generally Iowa Code ch. 558. One requirement is that a spouse must join in a conveyance of the homestead. Iowa Code section 561.13 provides, in relevant part:
A conveyance or encumbrance of ... the homestead, if the owner is married, is not valid, unless and until the spouse of the owner executes the same or a like instrument, or a power of attorney for the execution of the same or a like instrument, and the instrument or power of attorney sets out the legal description of the homestead.
Id. § 561.13.
A conveyance by deed does not take place until the deed is delivered. See McNertney v. Kahler, 710 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 2006) () (citing 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 102, at 141 (2002)); accord Orud v. Groth, 652 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2002) . Bob claims the deed was not delivered until after Bobby and Sheryl were divorced. Therefore, he argues, the "conveyance" under section 561.13 did not occur during the time Bobby was married, and Sheryl's signature was not needed to pass title. See Iowa Code § 561.13 .
There is a longstanding presumption that delivery occurs on the date the deed is signed. Orud v. Groth, 708 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2006) (citing Conway v. Rock, 139 Iowa 162, 164, 117 N.W. 273, 274 (1908)); accord Klosterboer v. Engelkes, 255 Iowa 1076, 1083, 125 N.W.2d 115, 119 (1963) (); Richardson v. Estle, 214 Iowa 1007, 1009, 243 N.W. 611, 613 (1932) (); Hall v. Cardell, 111 Iowa 206, 209, 82 N.W. 503, 504 (1900) . In this case, the deed was signed on February 21, 2000 — when Bobby was married to Sheryl. Bob bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that the deed was delivered on that date "by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to the contrary." Orud, 708 N.W.2d at 76 (citing Jones v. Betz, 203 Iowa 767, 768, 210 N.W. 609, 609 (1926)).
The evidence in this case fails to rebut the presumption of delivery on the date the deed was executed. Although Bob claims in his brief "Bobby delivered the quit claim deed later, after his marriage had been terminated," there is nothing in the record to support this claim. There is no evidence of how and when Bob acquired possession of the deed. The only evidence on the issue was Bob's testimony that he "got it back later." This evidence is vague and insufficient to rebut the presumption that the deed was delivered when signed. It certainly does not establish that the deed was delivered after Bobby and Sheryl divorced. Therefore, we conclude the conveyance was attempted when Bobby...
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