Martin v. Martin, No. COA09-1215 (N.C. App. 6/15/2010), COA09-1215.
| Decision Date | 15 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. COA09-1215.,COA09-1215. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | MARTHA L. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. JAMES ANDY MARTIN, Defendant. |
Narron & Holdford, P.A., by I. Joe Ivey, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Morrison Law Firm, PLLC, by Janice A. Walston, for Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
James Andy Martin (Defendant) appeals from the trial court's order granting Martha L. Martin (Plaintiff) specific performance of certain terms contained in the Separation Agreement between the parties, directing Defendant to pay Plaintiff $9,874.47 in education expenses for which he was responsible, and awarding the costs of the action to Plaintiff to be paid by Defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm as to the order of specific performance but reverse as to the award of costs.
Plaintiff and Defendant were previously married and subsequently divorced. Three children were born of the marriage before the parties separated on 24 July 1999. On 20 August 1999, the parties entered into an agreement (Separation Agreement) providing for, inter alia, shared joint custody of the minor children, with Plaintiff providing the primary residence, and detailing Defendant's visitation schedule. Among the settlement terms negotiated, Plaintiff and Defendant included a paragraph titled "EDUCATION," wherein they agreed that they "shall each pay for one-half of the cost of each child's college education including, but not limited to, tuition, room and board, books, and miscellaneous fees." The Separation Agreement was not incorporated into the parties' divorce judgment.
The eldest child of the parties' marriage, Andrew, was accepted by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) and matriculated as a freshman in the fall of 2007. As soon as UNC made the financial information available as to the cost of tuition, room, board, and related expenses, Plaintiff provided Defendant with those figures and continued to update him as to the costs of their son's college education. Defendant, however, had made no contribution to Andrew's post-secondary education as of the date of trial in this action. Plaintiff also paid all expenses incurred for their son through the first semester of his sophomore year, and Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiff for her payment thereof. It is anticipated that the other two children of the marriage based on positive academic performance, will be eligible for, apply to, and attend college.
In December of 2007, Plaintiff filed a complaint for recovery of the amount owed by Defendant and for specific performance of the education provisions contained in the Separation Agreement. The matter was heard at the 30-31 October 2008 term of Wilson County Civil Non-Jury District Court. After conducting a bench trial on the merits and reviewing all the evidence before it, the district court entered an order on 28 April 2009, nunc pro tunc 31 October 2008, finding Defendant in breach of the Separation Agreement's education provisions and granting Plaintiff's request that she recover from Defendant one-half of the amount she had expended in costs associated with their eldest son's freshman academic year. The order further decreed that Defendant specifically perform his obligations as they appear in the education section of the Separation Agreement by paying one-half of each child's college education expenses, including all amounts already owed for Andrew's sophomore year. From this order, Defendant appeals.
Our review of a bench trial order is clearly defined:
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts." While findings of fact by the trial court in a non-jury case are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support those findings, conclusions of law are reviewable de novo.
Lee v. Lee, 167 N.C. App. 250, 253, 605 S.E.2d 222, 224 (2004) (quoting Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C. App. 154, 160, 418 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1992)); see also Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 291, 442 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1994) (). In reviewing the equitable remedy of specific performance, however, we are limited to an abuse of discretion standard. See Harborgate Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Mountain Lake Shores Dev. Corp., 145 N.C. App. 290, 295, 551 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2001).
Defendant first argues that an unincorporated separation agreement is a contract, governed by contract law, and must be interpreted and enforced as such. We agree with Defendant's assertion. See, e.g., Condellone v. Condellone, 129 N.C. App. 675, 681, 501 S.E.2d 690, 695 (1998) ("A marital separation agreement which has not been incorporated into a court order is `generally subject to the same rules of law with respect to its enforcement as any other contract.'" (quoting Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 16, 252 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1979)); see also 3 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee's North Carolina Family Law § 14.33a, at 14-93 (5th ed., rev. vol. 2002) ().
Contrary to Defendant's argument, however, the trial court did find as a fact that "[t]he Separation Agreement was not incorporated into the parties' divorce judgment" and concluded as a matter of law that "[t]he Separation Agreement is a valid contract entered into by the parties." Moreover, the trial court concluded not only that Defendant was "in breach of the provisions of the Separation Agreement" but also that "Plaintiff is entitled to an order of [s]pecific performance in order to obtain the benefit promised to her by the Defendant in the Separation Agreement." Thus, the language used and the remedies implemented by the trial court clearly demonstrate that the judge interpreted and enforced the Separation Agreement pursuant to contract law. Accordingly, the trial court did exactly what Defendant contends it should have done, and therefore, this argument is meritless.
Defendant argues that the education section of the Separation Agreement is ambiguous and cannot reasonably be enforced and that the trial court failed to so find. We disagree.
As set out above, "[q]uestions relating to the construction and effect of separation agreements . . . are ordinarily determined by the same rules which govern the interpretation of contracts generally." Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 409, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1973). Because a court's primary purpose when interpreting a contract "is to ascertain the intention of the parties at the moment of its execution," the terms of a separation agreement between a husband and wife, like any contract, are construed to achieve their intent at the time they entered into the agreement. Id. at 409-10, 200 S.E.2d at 624. "If the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract." Walton v. City of Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 881, 467 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1996).
The determination as to "`whether contract language is ambiguous is a question for the court.'" Piedmont Bank and Trust Co. v. Stevenson, 79 N.C. App. 236, 241, 339 S.E.2d 49, 52, aff'd per curiam, 317 N.C. 330, 344 S.E.2d 788 (1986). In making this conclusion, "words are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning and all the terms of the agreement are to be reconciled if possible[.]" Id. Moreover, we must "presume[] the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the contract must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean." Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 294, 354 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where the plain language is clear such that a contract in writing is "`free from any ambiguity which would require resort to extrinsic evidence, or the consideration of disputed fact, the intention of the parties is a question of law.'" Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., 179 N.C. App. 120, 123, 633 S.E.2d 113, 115 (2006) (quoting Lane, 284 N.C. at 410, 200 S.E.2d at 624). Thus, "[w]here the terms of a separation agreement are plain and unambiguous, the court will determine the legal effect and enforce it as written by the parties." Blount v. Blount, 72 N.C. App. 193, 195, 323 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984).
Defendant argues that he intended the education provision of the Separation Agreement to mean "a modest education with student loans and scholarships for a child or children with whom he enjoyed an ongoing, active relationship based upon the regular visitation set forth in the Separation Agreement." He claims he did not intend that his obligation to pay for his children's education expenses would extend to the current situation, which he describes as "a four (4) year education at a well-respected state school with a private dormitory and new laptop through the school program — independent of all other provisions of the Separation Agreement, thereby excusing [Plaintiff] from any obligations to support the visitation schedule." Essentially, Defendant's argument is that his intent, at the time he entered into the Separation Agreement, was that his responsibility for one-half of his children's college expenses would arise only if he maintained an active role in his children's lives through sustained visitation and contributed to the college application and decision-making process. We must first determine, however, whether the...
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