Martin v. Pga Tour, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 97-6309-TC.,CIV. 97-6309-TC.
• Citation: 984 F.Supp. 1320
• Parties: Casey MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. PGA TOUR, INC., a Maryland corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

984 F.Supp. 1320

Casey MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. PGA TOUR, INC., a Maryland corporation, Defendant.

No. CIV. 97-6309-TC.

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

January 30, 1998.

William Wiswall, Wiswall & Walsh, Eugene, OR, Martha Walters, Walters Romm Chanti & Dickens, Eugene, OR, for Plaintiff.

William Maledon, Scott Rogers, Osborn & Maledon, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant.

ORDER

COFFIN, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. On January 26, 1998, the court heard oral arguments on defendant PGA TOUR's motion (# 20) for summary judgment and plaintiff Casey Martin's cross-motion (# 44) for partial summary judgment. After argument, the court made oral findings and rulings, denying the Tour's motion in part and granting Martin's motion in part. This written order supplements and elaborates on the oral findings.

BACKGROUND

The PGA Tour is a non-profit association of professional golfers. The PGA sponsors and cosponsors professional golf events on three tours: the regular PGA Tour, with approximately 200 players at any given time; the Senior PGA Tour, with approximately 100 players; and the Nike Tour, with approximately 170 players.

There are various ways to gain playing privileges on the tours conducted by the PGA. Chief among them is a three-stage qualifying school tournament. The first stage consists of 72 holes. Those who score well enough in this stage advance to the second stage consisting of 72 holes. The top qualifiers, approximately 168 players, advance to the third and final stage consisting of 108 holes. The lowest 35 finishers plus ties are awarded playing privileges on the regular PGA Tour. The next 70 lowest scoring players obtain privileges to play on the Nike Tour. A player failing to qualify for the regular PGA Tour, but qualifying for the Nike Tour may obtain the privilege to play on the PGA Tour by winning three Nike Tour tournaments during a single season or by finishing in the top fifteen places on the Nike Tour money list.

To enter the qualifying school tournament, a prospective player must pay a $3,000 fee and submit two letters of reference. Plaintiff in this case entered the qualifying school tournament and made it through the first and second stages.

In the first two stages of the qualifying tournament, players are permitted to use golf carts. In the third stage, as well as on the regular PGA Tour and the Nike Tour, players are required to walk and are required to use caddies.¹ Plaintiff contends he suffers from a debilitating disease known as Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, and for purposes of this motion the Tour does not contest this assertion. Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome is a venous malformation which curtails blood circulation in plaintiff's right leg. This condition has resulted in significant atrophy in the lower leg and bone deterioration of the tibia. Plaintiff further contends that his physical impairment substantially limits his ability to walk. Plaintiff filed this action, pursuant to the ADA, seeking to enjoin defendant's "no cart" rule during the third stage of the qualifying school tournament, and on the PGA and Nike Tours. Plaintiff asserts that by failing to provide him with a cart, defendant fails to make its tournaments accessible to individuals with disabilities in violation of the ADA.

This court granted a preliminary injunction directing defendant to allow plaintiff to use a cart during the third stage of the qualifying school tournament. Defendant then lifted the no cart rule for all players during the third stage of the qualifying school tournament. Plaintiff scored well enough in the tournament to attain playing privileges on the Nike Tour. This court extended the injunction by stipulation of both parties to include the first two tournaments on the Nike Tour. Defendant now moves for summary judgment contending that the ADA does not apply to it or its tournaments.

STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The initial burden is on the moving party to point out the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Once the initial burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the opponent to demonstrate through the production of probative evidence that there remains an issue of fact to be tried. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. There is also no genuine issue of fact if, on the record taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir.1989).

On a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir.1976). The inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Life Insurance Co of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir.1981).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges in his first claim for relief that defendant is a private entity which is or operates a place of public accommodation. As a result, plaintiff contends that defendant is subject to the ADA's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182. Plaintiff alleges in his second claim that defendant is a private entity that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certifications, or credentialing for professional or trade purposes. Plaintiff thus contends that defendant is subject to the ADA's requirement that any person offering examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for professional or trade purposes shall do so in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12189. Plaintiff alleges in his third claim that defendant is an employer as defined in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). Thus, plaintiff contends that defendant is prohibited from discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

Defendant PGA Tour contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on all three of plaintiff's claims because it is private non-profit establishment exempt from the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187.² Defendant argues, in the alternative, that even if it is not a private club it is entitled to summary judgment on counts one and two of plaintiff's complaint because the PGA and Nike Tour competitions do not constitute "places of public accommodation," and that the Nike Tour is not an examination or course. In addition, defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in count three of plaintiff's complaint because plaintiff is not an "employee" of the PGA Tour.

A. Defendant is not Exempt from the ADA

As noted, a private club or establishment is exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA (as well as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color religion, or national origin). Because of the importance of these laws, exemptions are narrowly construed and the burden of proof rests on the party claiming the exemption. See Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir.1968); Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1980).

Before one can answer the question of whether the PGA Tour is entitled to the private club exemption, one must first define the nature of the entity:

Succinctly put, the Tour is an organization formed to promote and operate tournaments for the economic benefit of its members, a highly skilled group of professional golfers. As with all professional sports organizations, the Tour is part of the entertainment industry, offering competitive athletic events to the public, which in turn generate sponsorship of the events, network fees, advertising revenue, and, ultimately, the tournament prize money awarded the competitors.

The Tour, in short, is a commercial enterprise. The success of the Tour in generating revenue for its members is in direct proportion to public participation as spectators and viewers of the Tour's tournaments. Without this public participation, the primary objective of the Tour could not be achieved.

One of the principal cases relied upon by the PGA for its exemption claim actually cuts against its position:

In Welsh v....