Martinez v. LHM Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA0298 |
| Citation | 490 P.3d 708 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Canuto John MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LHM CORPORATION, TCD, d/b/a Larry H. Miller Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram 104, Defendant-Appellant. |
The Wynkoop Law Office, PLLC, Richard B. Wynkoop, Susan G. Thomas, Wheat Ridge, Colorado; Law Firm of Brian DeBauche, LLC, Brian DeBauche, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Fairfield and Woods, P.C., Michael J. Dommermuth, Lee Katherine Goldstein, Adrian P. Castro, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
¶1 Plaintiff Canuto John Martinez alleges that a car dealership violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). The dealership, LHM Corporation, TCD, d/b/a Larry H. Miller Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram 104th (LHM), appeals the district court's determinations that (1) attorney fees awarded under the CCPA are costs — not damages — for the purposes of determining the finality of a judgment being appealed; and (2) Martinez satisfied the public impact element of his CCPA claim. We dismiss LHM's appeal of the second issue as untimely and affirm the award of attorney fees. We also award Martinez reasonable appellate attorney fees under section 6-1- 113(2)(b), C.R.S. 2019, and remand this case to the trial court to determine the amount of such fees.
¶2 This case involves a rescinded car sale. On November 12, 2016, Martinez paid $700 down and traded in his 2012 Dodge Journey (the 2012 Journey) to acquire a 2016 Dodge Durango (the 2016 Durango) from LHM. Martinez purchased the Journey in 2012 with financing from Ally Financial (Ally).
¶3 With LHM's help, Martinez applied for financing with Ally for the 2016 Durango. Ally conditionally approved Martinez for a loan, and Martinez signed multiple agreements with LHM, including a Spot Delivery Agreement that allowed Martinez to take the 2016 Durango without confirmed financing. When Martinez asked about the status of his financing, LHM assured him that Ally had approved his application. Martinez left the dealership with the 2016 Durango believing that he had purchased the vehicle.
¶4 Later that day, LHM received a notice of adverse credit action that stated Ally had not approved Martinez's financing. Ally did not send this notice to Martinez. From November 12 to 29, LHM negotiated with Ally to obtain financing for Martinez. Despite repeatedly discussing the loan with Ally and submitting a "funding package," LHM was unable to secure the financing. LHM did not inform Martinez of Ally's decision during this period.1 Despite Martinez's lack of financing for the 2016 Durango, LHM sold the 2012 Journey on November 22 and did not apply any funds from that sale toward Martinez's existing car loan with Ally for the 2012 Journey.
¶5 After Martinez was unable to make payments for the 2016 Durango on Ally's website, he returned to the dealership on December 26. Bill Spratte, LHM's financial manager, explained that holiday turnover had resulted in delays. LHM renewed Martinez's application with Ally that day, but Ally again denied the application because payments on Martinez's loan for the 2012 Journey were three months past due. LHM attempted again — without success — to get Ally to approve the loan on January 7, 2017.
¶6 On January 9, Martinez demanded that LHM cancel the sale of the 2016 Durango and return the 2012 Journey to him. Spratte told Martinez that LHM still had the 2012 Journey even though LHM had sold the vehicle in November. LHM's General Manager, Brent Wood, met with Martinez and his wife to assure them that LHM would resolve the issue and asked them to return the next day. Instead of returning, Martinez filed this lawsuit the following day, alleging, among other things, that LHM violated CCPA section 6-1-708(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019, by misrepresenting that Ally had agreed to finance Martinez's purchase of the 2016 Durango and by selling the 2012 Journey without approved financing for Martinez's purchase.2
¶7 LHM later received a loan offer for Martinez from a third-party lender, and LHM sought to negotiate a new contract for the 2016 Durango with new financing terms. Martinez rejected the offer. On February 2, LHM paid Ally the delinquent balance on the loan for the 2012 Journey and asked Ally to notify credit agencies to remove the late payments from Martinez's credit report. LHM also wrote its own letters to Equifax, Experion, and TransUnion asking them to do the same. On February 27, LHM refunded Martinez's $700 down payment, and Martinez returned the 2016 Durango in exchange for the 2012 Journey, which LHM had reacquired.
¶8 The parties proceeded to a bench trial, and the district court ruled, on March 20, 2018, that LHM violated the CCPA and awarded Martinez $9900 in damages.3 The district court also ordered LHM to pay Martinez's attorney fees arising from the CCPA claim pursuant to section 6-1-113(2)(b), C.R.S. 2019, though it did not then determine the amount of attorney fees owed. The court's order clearly states that "as the prevailing party on the [CCPA claim,] Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant his costs and the reasonable attorney fees that he incurred in prosecuting" that claim. Martinez filed a motion for attorney fees on April 10, and on June 1, LHM asked the district court to stay collection of damages until after the court determined the amount of attorney fees. Specifically, LHM asserted that the district court's order was not final until the court determined the fees and costs owed. The district court denied the stay in large part because it concluded that its March 20, 2018, judgment was a final, appealable order.
¶9 On December 28, 2018, the district court awarded Martinez $51,232.50 in attorney fees. LHM now appeals.
¶10 Martinez argues that LHM's appeal is untimely and should be dismissed. Specifically, Martinez argues that attorney fees under the CCPA are costs, not damages, and thus the district court's March 20, 2018, order was final for the purpose of appeal. Further, Martinez argues that, because LHM did not file this appeal until after the district court determined the amount of attorney fees due on December 28, 2018, its appeal is untimely. We agree.
¶11 Martinez argues that LHM failed to preserve its argument regarding CCPA attorney fees for appeal. We need not address preservation because, assuming LHM's arguments are preserved, it's appeal from the March 20, 2018, order is untimely.
¶12 Generally, this court has jurisdiction to review only final judgments from the district court. § 13-4-102, C.R.S. 2019; C.A.R. 1(a). "[A] decision on the merits is a final judgment for appeal purposes despite any outstanding issue of attorney fees ...." Baldwin v. Bright Mortg. Co. , 757 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Colo. 1988). In Baldwin , the Colorado Supreme Court held that an order dismissing the defendants’ third-party claim and awarding attorney fees against them for bringing a frivolous action was final and appealable, even though the district court had not yet determined the amount of the attorney fees award. Id .
¶13 However, when attorney fees are "damages" awarded "as part of the substance of a lawsuit" — as opposed to "costs" awarded to a prevailing party under a fee shifting provision — a trial court's order is not final until the court has determined the amount of the attorney fees award. Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd. , 848 P.2d 936, 941-42 (Colo. 1993) ; see also Guarantee Tr. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Casper , 2018 CO 43, ¶¶ 22-25, 28, 418 P.3d 1163 (); Hall v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. , 2012 COA 201, ¶¶ 2-4, 12-21, 292 P.3d 1196 (same).
¶14 In contrast, "when a statute provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party, an appeal on the merits proceeds separately from an appeal of an award of attorney fees." Hall , ¶ 13. Thus, an order under a "prevailing party" statute that resolves the merits of the claim is final and appealable despite an outstanding issue involving attorney fees. See Baldwin , 757 P.2d at 1072-74 ; see also Madison Capital Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII , 214 P.3d 557, 560 (Colo. App. 2009) ().
¶15 Failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction and precludes any review of the merits. Matter of Estate of Anderson , 727 P.2d 867, 869 (Colo. App. 1986). An appellant must file a notice of appeal "within 49 days of the date of the entry of judgment, decree, or order from which the party appeals." C.A.R. 4(a). We may extend the deadline by thirty-five days if the appellant can demonstrate excusable neglect. Id.
¶16 We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Hall , ¶ 19. "[W]hen the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond its plain terms and must apply the statute as written." Id. (citing Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2012 COA 160M, ¶ 10, 305 P.3d 409 ).
¶17 Section 6-1-113(2), under which the district court awarded attorney fees, provides as follows:
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..."[a] decision on the merits is a final judgment for appeal purposes despite any outstanding issue of attorney fees." Martinez, ¶ 12, 490 P.3d at 711 (quoting Baldwin, 757 P.2d at 1074). However, the division noted, this court's decision in Ferrell indicates that, "when attorney fees are 'da......