Martinez v. People
Decision Date | 13 January 2020 |
Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 18SC482 |
Citation | 455 P.3d 752 |
Parties | Quinten MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, C. May Nickel, Deputy Public Defender, Fort Collins, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Clifford E. Riedel, District Attorney, Eighth Judicial District, Joshua D. Ritter, Deputy District Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 After pleading guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired, Quinten Martinez was sentenced to jail and probation under section 42-4-1307, C.R.S. (2019). The county court twice revoked his probation and resentenced him. Martinez has served 608 days in jail related to this offense, of which 458 stem from probation violations.
¶2 We conclude that the sentence imposed for Martinez's second probation violation was illegal. We hold that under section 42-4-1307(7), the maximum cumulative amount of jail time a court may impose for probation violations stemming from a second or subsequent alcohol- or drug-related misdemeanor driving offense is 365 days. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment and remand the case with instructions to vacate Martinez's sentence, resentence him under section 42-4-1307(6) and (7), and correct the mittimus.
¶3 Three procedural events drive the legal analysis in this case:
¶4 Martinez appealed this last sentencing order to the district court, arguing that section 42-4-1307(7)(c)(1) limits to 365 days the cumulative period of incarceration for probation violations for misdemeanor traffic offenses involving alcohol or drugs ("DUI").2 Because he had already served 355 days in jail for probation violations, he asserts that the maximum jail sentence the court could impose was ten days. Martinez also moved for a stay of execution, which the trial court granted. By the time the stay entered, Martinez had already served 103 days of his 365-day sentence on the second revocation.
¶5 The district court affirmed the sentence. It concluded that when a defendant violates probation, "[t]he trial court has the discretion to either impose suspended jail time and continue the defendant on probation or to revoke probation and resentence the defendant."
¶6 We granted Martinez's petition for certiorari review.3
¶7 After discussing the standard of review, we interpret section 42-4-1307. Because the statute's silence regarding sentencing after revocation creates ambiguity, we apply several canons of statutory construction that help us discern the legislature's intent. We conclude that when a defendant is sentenced to probation as part of his sentence for a second or subsequent DUI offense and then violates the terms of that probation, the court may impose all or part of the suspended 365-day jail sentence but can impose no more than 365 days cumulative jail time for all probation violations.
¶8 Although sentencing is generally a matter within the discretion of the trial court, a court may exercise that discretion "only to the extent permitted by statute." Allman v. People , 2019 CO 78, ¶ 30, 451 P.3d 826, 833 (quoting Vensor v. People , 151 P.3d 1274, 1275 (Colo. 2007) ). We therefore turn to the relevant sentencing statutes to determine the legality of the sentence imposed here, reviewing de novo the county court's interpretation of those statutes. See id. at ¶ 29, 451 P.3d at 833 ().
¶9 "When construing a statute, we give effect to the intent of the General Assembly by first looking to the plain language of the statute." In re Marriage of Boettcher & Boettcher , 2019 CO 81, ¶ 12, 449 P.3d 382, 385. We must construe the statute as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Id. If the plain language is clear, we apply it as written. Hunsaker v. People , 2015 CO 46, ¶ 11, 351 P.3d 388, 391. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or conflicts with other statutory provisions, we may employ aids of statutory construction to discern the legislature's intent. See id. ; People v. Coleman , 2018 COA 67, ¶ 41, 422 P.3d 629, 637. For example, we may rely on the legislative history, the consequences of a particular construction, and the end to be achieved by the statute. See People v. Cooper , 27 P.3d 348, 354 (Colo. 2001).
¶10 "[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and prescribe punishments." Vensor , 151 P.3d at 1275.
¶11 Section 42-4-1307(6)(a)(I)–(IV) provides that, for a third or subsequent DUI conviction, the court must sentence the defendant to: (1) 60–365 days in jail; (2) a fine of $600–$1500, which may be suspended; (3) 48–120 hours of useful public service; and (4) a period of probation for at least two years (unless the defendant is simultaneously sentenced to the department of corrections for another offense), with a separate 365-day suspended sentence to the county jail.4
¶12 Subsection (7) of that statute, entitled "Probation-related penalties," outlines sanctions for violating the mandatory probation component of the initial sentence. It allows the court to impose up to two additional years of probation for the purpose of continued monitoring or treatment. § 42-4-1307(7)(b)(II). It also provides that the initial period of incarceration imposed under subsection (6)(a)(I) shall not be credited against the suspended 365-day sentence imposed in conjunction with probation. § 42-4-1307(7)(a). If, during the period of probation, the defendant violates a condition of his probation, the court "may impose all or part of the suspended sentence." § 42-4-1307(7)(c)(I). "During the period of imprisonment [imposed for violating probation], the person shall continue serving the probation sentence with no reduction in time for the sentence to probation." Id. "Any imprisonment imposed upon a person by the court pursuant to [this subsection] must be imposed in a manner that promotes the person's compliance with the conditions of his or her probation and not merely as a punitive measure." § 42-4-1307(7)(c)(II). Finally, subsection (7) provides that "[a] cumulative period of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this [subsection] shall not exceed one year." § 42-4-1307(7)(c)(I).
¶13 In short, the statute's plain language creates two reservoirs of jail time: (1) a "one-and-done" initial sentence to jail under subsection (6)(a)(I) for 60–365 days that may not be tapped a second time; and (2) the 365-day suspended incarceration imposed under subsection (6)(a)(IV) that may be tapped multiple times. Thus, drawing from both reservoirs, the maximum term of incarceration a defendant may receive under this statute is two years. See Coleman , ¶ 65, 422 P.3d at 641 ( ). Read as a whole, this sentencing scheme encourages rehabilitation and compliance with the terms of probation, while also seeming to limit the maximum time an individual may spend in jail related to a non-felony DUI offense.
¶14 Still, the prosecution contends that section 16-11-206(5), C.R.S. (2019), gives a sentencing court two options when a DUI probationer has violated a condition of probation: (1) it may continue probation under section 42-4-1307(7) and impose incremental jail time from the suspended 365-day reservoir; or (2) it may, under section 16-11-206(5), revoke probation and resentence a defendant to any sentence that might originally have been imposed under section 42-4-1307.
¶15 According to the prosecution, if the court continues probation, then the maximum cumulative period of incarceration for probation violations is one year. If the court revokes probation, however, there is no limit on the cumulative amount of time a defendant might spend in jail because the court may impose any sentence originally authorized upon each revocation. The prosecution concedes that, taken to its logical extreme, this could yield the absurd result of an indeterminate sentence for a misdemeanor traffic offense. But the prosecution counters that no court would allow that absurdity to occur, based on "judicial restraint" and the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Regardless, the prosecution argues that the plain language of the two statutes dictates this result, and we must apply the relevant statutes as the legislature drafted them.
¶16 Irrespective of whether the court continues or revokes probation, Martinez maintains that under the plain language of section 42-4-1307, and its associated legislative history, the maximum time a defendant can spend in jail for probation violations stemming from a DUI conviction is one year.
¶17 Section 42-4-1307 is silent regarding the court's sentencing options following probation revocation. Indeed, it makes no reference to revocation at all. Instead, the "penalties" provision simply mandates that "the person shall continue serving the probation sentence with no reduction in time for...
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