People ex rel. G.S.S.
| Decision Date | 04 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 19SC118 |
| Citation | 462 P.3d 592 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner In the INTEREST OF G.S.S., Respondent |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado,, Christian Champagne, District Attorney, Sixth Judicial District, Sean Murray, Deputy District Attorney, Durango, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 Section 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S. (2019), provides that juveniles who are denied bail "must be tried on the charges on which the bail is denied" within sixty days "after the entry of such order or within sixty days after the juvenile’s entry of a plea." Noticeably absent from section 19-2-509(4)(b) is the remedy for a violation of that direction, rendering ambiguous what should happen when a juvenile is held without bail for more than sixty days and has not been tried on the charges against him. This case requires us to resolve that ambiguity.
¶2 After being charged, fourteen-year-old G.S.S. was detained for more than three months without bail, even though he had not entered a plea and had not been tried on the charges against him. At that point, G.S.S.’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that G.S.S.’s "right to a speedy trial" had been violated under section 19-2-509(4)(b). The trial court agreed and dismissed the case against G.S.S. with prejudice, and the court of appeals affirmed in People in Interest of G.S.S. , 2019 COA 4M, ––– P.3d ––––. We then granted certiorari to determine the proper remedy for a violation of the sixty-day limit in section 19-2-509(4)(b).
¶3 We first conclude that section 19-2-509(4)(b) is ambiguous because its plain language does not make clear what type of right—bail or speedy trial—it confers, nor does it provide a remedy for its violation. We next interpret section 19-2-509(4)(b) and conclude that the legislature intended it to be a bail statute and not a speedy trial statute; thus, the remedy for a violation of section 19-2-509(4)(b) should correspond to a bail right and not a speedy trial right. We therefore hold that the remedy for a violation of section 19-2-509(4)(b) is for the court to immediately hold a bail hearing and order the juvenile’s release. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for reinstatement of the delinquency petition and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶4 In April 2017, the police arrested G.S.S. after investigating him for threatening to shoot fellow students at his middle school. Upon his arrest, G.S.S. was taken into custody and placed in detention. His arrest warrant stated that bail was fixed at $50,000. The People then charged him with two delinquent acts: (1) interference with staff, faculty, or students of educational institutions; and (2) attempted possession of an explosive or incendiary device.
¶5 At G.S.S.’s initial detention hearing, the People recommended that he remain detained pending psychological testing and a risk assessment evaluation. G.S.S.’s counsel, however, requested that G.S.S. be released from custody, arguing that an initial psychological report was not necessary to formulate a release plan. The trial court expressed that its "primary concern" was community safety, and it continued the detention hearing so that the parties could arrange psychological testing and a risk assessment evaluation. Accordingly, G.S.S. was held without bail, and he remained in custody.
¶6 Over the next three months, the trial court held numerous detention hearings. However, G.S.S. was not psychologically tested at any point throughout those three months, so a risk assessment evaluation was not created. As a result, both the defense and prosecution requested several continuances. The trial court granted the requests and continued to order that G.S.S. be detained pending evaluation and assessment. Thus, G.S.S. continued to be detained without bail.
¶7 More than three months after the initial detention hearing, the People requested a hearing "to determine and comply with" G.S.S.’s "speedy trial rights" under section 19-2-509(4)(b). Soon thereafter, G.S.S.’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss "for violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial" under section 19-2-509(4)(b), which directs that after the initial detention hearing, a juvenile who is denied bail or whose bail is revoked or increased "and who remains in custody or detention, must be tried on the charges [for which bail is denied, revoked, or increased] within sixty days after the entry of such order or within sixty days after the juvenile’s entry of a plea, whichever date is earlier." Because G.S.S. had been detained for longer than sixty days, his counsel argued that his right to a speedy trial had been violated and thus that the case must be dismissed.
¶8 Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that G.S.S. had a right to a speedy trial under section 19-2-509(4)(b) and that this right had been violated. Further, it agreed that the remedy under section 19-2-509(4)(b) was dismissal with prejudice under the adult speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2019), which explicitly instructs that the remedy for violation of speedy trial rights is dismissal with prejudice. § 18-1-405(1). Thus, the trial court dismissed the case against G.S.S. with prejudice, and G.S.S. was released from detention.
¶9 The People appealed. A division of the court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that a failure to bring a juvenile to trial within sixty days after a no-bail order amounts to a violation of the juvenile’s speedy trial rights and that no speedy trial exceptions applied. G.S.S. , ¶ 1. Judge Jones dissented, arguing both that the delays were attributable to G.S.S. and that he was unconvinced that the adult speedy trial remedy applied to section 19-2-509(4)(b). 2019 COA 4M, ––– P.3d ––––, ¶ 37 (Jones, J., dissenting). We granted certiorari and now reverse.
¶10 We first identify the appropriate standard of review. Next, we discuss the statutory framework for juvenile speedy trial and bail rights, and we conclude that section 19-2-509(4)(b) is ambiguous with regard to the type of right it confers and, consequently, to the remedy for its violation. Last, we interpret section 19-2-509(4)(b) and conclude that it is a bail statute and not a speedy trial statute; thus, the remedy for a violation of section 19-2-509(4)(b) should correspond to a bail right and not a speedy trial right. We therefore hold that the remedy for a violation of section 19-2-509(4)(b) is to immediately hold a bail hearing and order the juvenile’s release.
¶11 Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo. People v. Iannicelli , 2019 CO 80, ¶ 19, 449 P.3d 387, 391. In interpreting a statute, our principal goal is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. We begin this inquiry by looking to the statute’s plain language, giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. In so doing, we read the legislative scheme as a whole and give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. at ¶ 20, 449 P.3d at 391.
¶12 If the statute is unambiguous, we need not utilize any other tools of statutory construction. Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725, 729. If it is ambiguous, however, we may consider other interpretive tools to determine the legislature’s intent. Id. A statute is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations. Id. "Perhaps the best guide to intent is the declaration of policy which frequently forms the initial part of an enactment." City & Cty. of Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Denver Classroom Teachers Ass'n , 2017 CO 30, ¶ 11, 407 P.3d 1220, 1223 (quoting St. Luke's Hosp. v. Indus. Comm'n , 142 Colo. 28, 349 P.2d 995, 997 (1960) ). We may also consider the object sought to be attained by the statute, laws on the same or similar subjects, and the consequences of a particular construction. See, e.g. , § 2-4-203, C.R.S. (2019). In utilizing these tools, "[w]e avoid interpreting a statute in a way that would lead to an absurd result." Martinez v. People , 2020 CO 3, ¶ 20, 455 P.3d 752, 757.
¶13 In article 2 of the Children’s Code, the General Assembly laid out the processes and procedures for juvenile proceedings, including with respect to bail and a speedy trial.
¶14 A juvenile’s statutory right to bail is dictated by section 19-2-509, which is titled "Bail." Subsection (4)(b) concerns the conditions of bail and the procedure for any modification to bail. Its last sentence provides that a detained juvenile must be brought to trial within sixty days of a denial, revocation, or increase of bail. In full, subsection (4)(b) reads as follows:
In setting, modifying, or continuing any bail bond, it must be a condition that the released juvenile appear at any place and upon any date to which the proceeding is transferred or continued. Further conditions of every bail bond must be that the released juvenile not commit any delinquent acts or harass, intimidate, or threaten any potential witnesses. The judge or magistrate may set any other conditions or limitations on the release of the juvenile as are reasonably necessary for the protection of the community. Any juvenile who is held without bail or whose bail or bail bond is revoked or increased under an order entered at any time after the initial detention hearing pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and who remains in custody or detention,...
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