Mary Jo Bowen As Pers. Representative v. Taylor-Christensen
| Decision Date | 26 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5D09-3888 |
| Parties | MARY JO BOWEN AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, ETC., Appellant, v. MARY GREGORY TAYLOR-CHRISTENSEN, ET AL., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Stephen J. Pajcic, III, and Thomas F. Slater,
of Pajcic & Pajcic, P.A., Jacksonville, S.
P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Robert L. Christensen.
In this wrongful death lawsuit, Mary Jo Bowen ["Bowen"] appeals the final judgment entered against her and in favor of appellee, Robert Christensen ["Robert"].Bowen had sought to hold Robert vicariously liable under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the death of her husband, Thomas ["Thomas"]. Christensen's ex-wife, Mary Gregory Taylor-Christensen ["Mary"], while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, struck and killed Thomas as he was changing a tire on the shoulder of I-95. The jury returned a special verdict against Bowen on her claim of liability against Robert by finding that he was not an owner of the automobile Mary was driving.1 We affirm.
In April 2005, Bowen, as the personal representative of her husband's estate, filed suit against Mary and her ex-husband, Robert. The complaint explained that in February 2005, Mary was operating a PT Cruiser that was titled in the names of Mary or her former husband, Robert, when she was involved in the fatal automobile accident with Thomas. The complaint alleged that Mary had been operating the car negligently at the time of the accident.
Of importance to this appeal, Robert filed an answer to the complaint in which he denied liability and asserted, as an affirmative defense, that he was not vicariously liable under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the damages resulting from Mary's negligence because, although his name was on the title, Robert possessed no beneficial ownership interest in the PT Cruiser driven by Mary at the time of the accident. The matter proceeded to trial before a jury in April 2009. Using a special verdict form, the jury found that, for purposes of liability under Florida's dangerousinstrumentality doctrine, Robert was not an owner of the PT Cruiser at the time of the accident. On appeal, Bowen asserts that it was error to submit the case to the jury and that, as a matter of law, Robert was an "owner" of the vehicle subject to vicarious liability based on two undisputed facts: that he knowingly took title to the vehicle as a co-owner and did not attempt to remove his name from the title.
It appears the only evidence in the record on appeal concerning the issue of Robert's liability is an excerpt of Robert's trial testimony. Robert testified that he formerly had been married to Mary, but the couple separated in April 1999, and Mary had relocated to Brevard County. In April 2003, after the conclusion of the court proceedings for the dissolution of their marriage, he wanted to reconcile with Mary, and he travelled from his home in the Florida Panhandle to visit her. Mary told him that she needed a second car because the vehicle she already had was unsuitable for driving her grandchildren around. After shopping around, "he bought her a car" -- the PT Cruiser that Mary was operating at the time of the fatal accident. Robert stated that his intention was to buy the car as a gift for Mary, and they both signed all the paperwork at the dealership when the purchase took place. Robert acknowledged that, according to the title, the owners of the vehicle were "Mary Taylor-Christensen or Robert Christenson," but stated that it was a gift for her. The following morning, he went to Mary's residence, and she took him to the basement where the car was parked. He took the PT Cruiser to a car wash and got it cleaned up for her. He was never behind the wheel again, and he had only laid eyes on it one other time, in the summer of 2003 when he saw it in her garage. In the ensuing two years, he never had access to the car,never had any authority over the car, never had a key, never insured it, and never had it registered.
Bowen contends that, as a matter of law, she was entitled to receive a directed verdict in her favor on the issue of Robert's vicarious liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine because the evidence demonstrated that: (1) Robert was listed as the co-owner on the title to the PT Cruiser; and (2) Robert did not do anything to remove his name from the title.
According to Bowen's analysis of selected cases, the only persons who can overcome the presumption of liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine are title owners who establish that they possess "mere naked title" by showing that: (1) the title is held for security purposes, as in a conditional sale; or, (2) the title is only intended to be held temporarily, as where a transfer of title is in process but not completed. Bowen reasons that, because there was no evidence indicating that there had been a conditional sale between Robert and Mary, or an incomplete transfer of title, as a matter of law, Robert could not avoid liability. In support of this argument, Bowen relies on cases wherein Florida courts have recognized exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine based on incomplete transfers of title or conditional sales. For example, in Palm Beach Auto Brokers v. DeCarlo, 620 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), a used car dealer at the time of the accident had sold the car, but held title to the vehicle as security for payment of the purchase price. The court determined, however, that there was no evidence from which the court reasonably could infer that the dealer exercised dominion and control over the automobile after its sale so as to be liable as owner for damages arising from negligent operation of the automobile by purchaser thatresulted in injuries to the third party. In Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1955), the court held that where legal title to an automobile remained in the seller under conditional sales contract, but beneficial ownership had been transferred to the buyer prior to the accident, liability for negligent operation of the automobile was not imposed on the seller under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine since seller held "mere naked title." The Palmer Court observed that the evidence was sufficient to show the intention on the part of both buyer and seller to make immediate transfer of the beneficial ownership of the automobile to buyer when buyer took possession of the automobile.
For its conclusion that "temporary" title is another exception, Bowen cites to Carrasquero v. Ethan's Auto Express, Inc., 949 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), where the auto dealership that employed the buyer of the vehicle from a third party agreed to hold title as a device to allow the employee to postpone paying sales tax for thirty days. The court undertook a classic "beneficial ownership" analysis, finding that the dealership did not possess, maintain or control the vehicle and, thus, could not be liable as the owner. The court never suggested that the temporary nature of its title was dispositive.
Our review of the case law in this area reveals no basis to support Bowen's theory that a record title owner can overcome the presumption of ownership only by proving (1) a conditional sale, or (2) an incomplete transfer of title to the vehicle. Bowen infers this limitation based primarily upon a line of cases involving the purchase of an automobile for a minor to drive, imposing vicarious liability even though the record title holder professed no beneficial ownership.
Bowen (and the dissent) principally rely on Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1958). In that case, Metzel's minor nephew, Bryant, who lived with her, was involved in an accident while operating an automobile that was titled in Metzel's name. At trial, Metzel contended that she was not the beneficial owner of the car, and she could not, therefore, be held liable under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the damages caused by Bryant's accident. To support her position, Metzel presented evidence that Metzel signed the finance papers and took title to the automobile in her name only because Bryant could not finance the purchase of the automobile due to his age. Bryant kept up the payments and Metzel had nothing to do with the car, except that she insured the car in her name. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that Metzel was the owner of the automobile for purposes of applying Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, observing:
[Metzel] was still in a position to exert some dominion and control over the vehicle. Certainly both appellant and her nephew had a species of ownership and either or both of them could have been held liable for the accident.
In Hertz Corp. v. Dixon, 193 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), the operator, Dixon, was a minor, and in order to enable him to purchase an automobile his brother-in-law, Gibbs, signed a conditional sales contract and took possession of the vehicle titled in the names of both Dixon and Gibbs. Dixon had possession of the car at all times and was later involved in a collision with an automobile owned by Hertz. Hertz sought to hold both Gibbs and Dixon liable. The trial court refused to enter judgment against Gibbs, holding that mere co-ownership did not impose tort liability. However, upon review, the First District reversed:
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