Hertz Corp. v. Dixon
Decision Date | 29 December 1966 |
Docket Number | No. H--287,H--287 |
Citation | 193 So.2d 176 |
Parties | The HERTZ CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant, v. Donald A. DIXON and Jimmy Gibbs, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
John Paul Howard, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Shave, Jr., Fernandina Beach, for appellee Jimmy Gibbs.
This case presents the question of the liability of a co-owner of an automobile for damages inflicted on another automobile, under the circumstances outlined herein.
The appellee Dixon is a minor, and a default and final judgment was entered against him. To enable Dixon to purchase the automobile, which was being driven by him at the time of the collision, Gibbs, who was sui juris and was Dixon's brother-in-law, signed a conditional sales contract, in which he was designated 'Co-Buyer'. The title to the car was registered in the names of both defendants, the legal title remaining in the conditional seller, Riverside Chevrolet Company. Possession of the car at all times was in Dixon, Gibbs had never ridden in it at the time of the collision, and said it was the sole property of Dixon and that he signed the conditional sales contract only as a guarantor for Dixon. On the night of the collision, Gibbs was not present at the scene, being asleep at home at the time and thus had no knowledge of the operation of the vehicle at the time the accident occurred. Dixon's negligence caused the car to collide with an automobile owned by Hertz. The lower court refused to enter judgment against Gibbs, holding that mere co-ownership did not impose tort liability. Upon the facts of this case, we disagree.
The current law on the subject was extensively analyzed in Engleman v. Traeger, 1931, 102 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527, in which our Supreme Court said:
(Emphasis theirs.)
This case does not fall within the principle of Palmer v. R. S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 635, relating to the liability of the conditional sale vendor, which was clearly recognized as an exception in Engleman v. Traeger, supra.
Here, not only was Gibbs one of the record title holders, but in fact had put in motion and made possible the operation of the automobile by Dixon, who, as a minor, could not have bought the automobile. Not only did Dixon operate the car as a co-owner, but with the knowledge, consent and direct participation by Gibbs in the acquisition of title.
The mere statement by Gibbs that he signed the conditional sales contract only as guarantor for Dixon was a clear violation of the parol evidence rule, in the light of the express terms of the conditional sales contract which designated Dixon as 'Buyer' and Gibbs as 'Co-Buyer'. Bolton v. Schimming, 1961, 226 Or. 330, 360 P.2d 540, does not comport with the rationale of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in this state, stemming from Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L.R.A.1917E, 715. On the contrary, the doctrine developed in this state is more closely allied with that of the Code provisions in the District of Columbia, under which it is flatly held that a co-owner becomes vicariously liable for the operation of an automobile by the other co-owner. Joyner v. Holland, District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 212 A.2d 541.
We need not go as far as the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, nor suggest any possible exceptions to the rule. Suffice it to say, that under the facts of this case the activities of Gibbs, his execution of the conditional sales contract, and his position as a record holder of the title, made him liable for any damages resulting from Dixon's operation of the automobile.
Accordingly, the judgment below must be reversed.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. In the beginning of the majority opinion it is stated that the question involved the liability of a co-owner of an automobile for damages inflicted on another automobile by one of the co-owners while operating the automobile. This assumption is a misleading and I believe an erroneous assumption of a fact which is not borne out by the evidence. The trial court did not find the parties to be co-owners, in fact, but one of the parties being only a guarantor for payment of the purchase price of the automobile. One of the alleged 'co-owners' was a minor, 19 years of age. He was a brother-in-law of the appellee Gibbs. In...
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...had a species of ownership and either or both of them could have been held liable for the accident.Id. at 386. In Hertz Corp. v. Dixon, 193 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), the operator, Dixon, was a minor, and in order to enable him to purchase an automobile his brother-in-law, Gibbs, signed......
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