Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1983
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: MARY R., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B. & R. CORPORATION, et al., Defendants and Respondents; Division of Medical Quality of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance, Movant and Appellant. Civ. 28138.

Page 871

196 Cal.Rptr. 871

149 Cal.App.3d 308

MARY R., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B. & R. CORPORATION, et al., Defendants and Respondents Division of Medical Quality of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance, Movant and Appellant.

Civ. 28138.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 29, 1983.

As Modified Dec. 8, 1983.

John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., Barry D. Ladendorf, Deputy Atty. Gen., for movant and appellant.

No appearance by defendants and respondents.

WORK, Associate Justice.

The Division of Medical Quality of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance (Division) appeals from an order denying its application to intervene and its request to modify the court's order of confidentiality and sealing of court records issued December 5, 1980, in the dismissed case of Mary R., etc., et al. v. B. & R. Corporation, et al. For the reasons which follow, although we conclude Division was not entitled to intervene in the underlying action, we strike the court's permanent gag order on the original parties and their agents as contrary to public policy and remand the case for further proceedings to determine whether the court records should continue to be sealed from the public.

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 8, 1980, Division received a complaint from a marriage and family counselor alleging Mary R., while age 14 and a patient of a licensed physician had been repeatedly sexually molested by him between August 1975 and April 1976. Mary R. told a Division field investigator there had been a civil lawsuit which was dismissed and the court records sealed. She stated she would furnish information to Division if not prohibited from doing so by court order. In fact, the trial court, when dismissing the action by stipulation, had issued an order sealing the court records and ordered the parties, their agents or representatives never to discuss the case with anyone.

On January 27, 1981, Division told the trial judge of its need to review the court records. However, the trial judge stated the parties had stipulated to the restrictions and it would not rescind the order unless the parties agreed. The physician did not consent.

On March 4, 1982, upon advice of a deputy attorney general who believed the court's order was contrary to public policy, Division directed the Attorney General's Office to seek modification of the court's order sealing the court records and documents and to relieve the parties of the order of confidentiality so Division could investigate this serious charge of misconduct by one of its licensees.

On April 21, 1982, Division moved to intervene in the already dismissed lawsuit, alleging the court's order prevented Division from fulfilling its statutory responsibility to investigate and prosecute violations of the Medical Practices Act. ¹

After hearing, the court denied intervention and refused to modify its orders, reasoning the application was untimely since Division knew of the contested order one month after its issuance and did not attempt to formally challenge the order until late April 1982. The court found the delay made it impossible for the trial court to place the parties in their original positions and set aside the settlement without substantial prejudice to one or more of the parties in the underlying case. ²

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DIVISION'S APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION

Division contends the trial court erred in denying its application to intervene, because the integrity of its investigatory powers requires intervention; laches cannot be employed to bar intervention; the court's underlying order enforces an illegal contract contrary to public policy and void as a matter of law; and the court's underlying order prevents it from properly exercising its police powers.

The source of a party's right in California to intervene in an action is statutory, as CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 387³, subdivision (a) provides for permissive intervention within the trial court's discretion. Consequently, the right to permissive intervention is not absolute, as it may be "permitted only if the petitioner shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute." (Socialist Workers, etc. Committee v. Brown, 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 891, 125 Cal.Rptr. 915.) The statute is designed to promote fairness and to insure maximum involvement by all responsible interested and affected persons (see Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.App.3d 66, 73, 137 Cal.Rptr. 793), as it "protects the interests of others affected by the judgment, obviating delay and multiplicity." (People v. Superior Court (Good), 17 Cal.3d 732, 736, 131 Cal.Rptr. 800, 552 P.2d 760.) However, "[c]ounterbalancing this purpose is the interest of the original parties in pursuing their litigation unburdened by others." (Ibid.)

A governmental entity has no greater authority to intervene in the litigation of others than has any other private party. The entity must meet the statutory conditions for intervention and may intervene only where its interests are such as would entitle a private party similarly situated to intervene, or where the public interest warrants it. (59 Am.Jur.2d, Parties, § 156, pp. 588-589.) To avail oneself of the right to intervene,

" '[one] must have either an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of one of the parties to the action, or an interest against both of them. The interest here referred to must be direct and not consequencial, and it must be an interest which is proper to be determined in the action in which the intervention is sought.' ... 'The interest mentioned in the code which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other persons must be in the manner in litigation and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.' " (Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 661, 663 ; Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 881 ; Socialist Workers, etc. Committee v. Brown, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 891 .)

Although section 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention (Stillwell Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 16 Cal.App.2d 636, 639, 61 P.2d 71), the trial court here properly denied Division's request to intervene because it had only a consequential interest determinable in the dismissed underlying action between the original parties. Division's interest here arises solely from the overbroad effect of the ancillary order of confidentiality and the sealing of the court records.

THE COURT'S STIPULATED GAG ORDER IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY

Division may collaterally attack the validity of the sealing and gag orders where it can establish a right, claim or interest, accruing before the issuance of the order is prejudiced or injuriously affected by its enforcement. Such relief may be predicated on fraud, collusion, mistake, or lack of jurisdiction. (See Villarruel v. Arreola, 66 Cal.App.3d 309, 317-318, 136 Cal.Rptr. 19; Babbitt v. Babbitt, 44 Cal.2d 289, 293, 282 P.2d 1; Bennett v. Wilson, 133 Cal. 379, 382, 65 P. 880; People ex rel. Public Util. Com. v. Ryerson, 241 Cal.App.2d 115, 119, 50 Cal.Rptr. 246; Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Higgins, 54 Cal.App.2d 779, 781, 129 P.2d 929; Harada v. Fitzpatrick, 33 Cal.App.2d 453, 459, 91 P.2d 941; see also, Ryerson v. Riverside Cement Co., 266 Cal.App.2d 789, 795, 72 Cal.Rptr. 595.)

Division's standing is based on its interest in fulfilling its statutory obligations to supervise and regulate the practice of medicine in this state and to investigate allegations of physician misconduct. The court's order prevents it from fulfilling its statutory investigatory duties to benefit public health and safety. The stipulation of the parties, solemnized by the court's order, prohibits the parties or their agents from discussing the underlying facts of the case with Division's investigators and gags, under penalty of contempt, the victim and all witnesses to what, if factual, is a serious breach of professional conduct of grave consequence to future patients and, at worst, shows serious criminal acts. Further, it prevents Division from examining the court's records and documents including depositions and interrogatories which may contain useful information to assist its investigation. Accordingly, this infringement upon the integrity of the investigatory powers of Division establishes its standing to challenge the sealing and confidentiality orders.

Laches does not bar relief because it "will not be raised against [governmental entities] when to do so would nullify 'a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public ....' " (County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal.3d 201, 222, 161 Cal.Rptr. 742, 605 P.2d 381, quoting County of San Diego v. Cal. Water, etc. Co., 30 Cal.2d 817, 829-830, 186 P.2d 174; Bib'le v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 26 Cal.3d 548, 553, 162 Cal.Rptr. 426, 606 P.2d 733.) Although equitable defenses have been applied against the government where justice and right require it (City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423), "the doctrine is inapplicable if it would result in the nullification of a strong rule of policy adopted for the benefit of the public." (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal.3d 720, 725, 125 Cal.Rptr. 896, 543 P.2d 264; Page v. City of Montebello, 112 Cal.App.3d 658, 668, 169 Cal.Rptr. 447.) Here, there is no showing of any manifest injustice suffered by either original party requiring the application of the doctrine of laches, and applying the doctrine would nullify a policy adopted for the public protection.

Division's statutory obligation to the medical profession and the public to investigate all complaints of physician misconduct in this state has been effectively blocked by the gag order, by interjecting the court's contempt powers, thus giving a judicial stamp of approval to a ploy obviously...