Bib'le v. Committee of Bar Examiners

• Decision Date: 26 February 1980
• Citation: 606 P.2d 733,162 Cal.Rptr. 426,26 Cal.3d 548
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 606 P.2d 733 Joe T. BIB'LE, Petitioner, v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF the STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. L.A. 31127.

Page 426

162 Cal.Rptr. 426

26 Cal.3d 548, 606 P.2d 733

Joe T. BIB'LE, Petitioner, v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF the STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

L.A. 31127.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 26, 1980.

Paz, Rodriguez & Sanora, Nieto, Paz, Rodriguez & Sanora and Jose Angel Rodriguez, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Herbert M. Rosenthal, Gael T. Infande, San Francisco, and Robert M. Sweet, Los Angeles, for respondent.

BY THE COURT.

Petitioner seeks review of respondent State Bar order denying petitioner's request he be exempted from taking and passing the First Year Law Student Examination (FYLSX) as a precondition of eligibility to take the general bar examination.

The general bar examination is administered by respondent Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar (committee) semi-annually. With exceptions not here pertinent, only persons who take and pass such an examination are eligible to become members of the bar and thus to engage in the practice of law. (See Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6060, 6062.)

The Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in California establish the eligibility of persons wishing to take the general bar examination. ¹ The rules require, inter alia, that such persons demonstrate they have satisfactorily completed a first-year course of prescribed study, e.g., contracts, torts and criminal law. Persons who take and pass the FYLSX satisfy the requirement. Also, persons who have satisfactorily completed prescribed courses of study at an accredited law school are deemed to have satisfied the requirement and are exempt from taking the FYLSX. Petitioner claims he has satisfactorily completed such a first-year course of study covering the prescribed subjects and thus is exempt from taking the FYLSX. We conclude petitioner has not fulfilled requirements for exemption and, even if deemed to be exempt, has not completed other educational requirements as a further precondition to taking the general bar examination. ²

Petitioner's record of law study is set out in the margin. ³ As pertinent to issues herein it shows, first, that petitioner did not complete a first year of study in a manner entitling him to the claimed exemption from the FYLSX. Rule VI, section 64 provides that to be exempt an applicant have "satisfactorily completed the first-year course of instruction in a law school accredited by the committee . . . . A general applicant shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the first-year course of instruction in an accredited law school when he is advanced to the second year course of instruction at the same accredited law school, whether or not on probation." Petitioner did not satisfactorily complete his first year course of study at Northrop. He was academically disqualified at the end of his first year, having received passing grades but no grade judged by Northrop to be satisfactory, and having failed criminal procedure. He was not advanced to the "second year course of instruction at the same accredited law school," and thus is not exempt pursuant to the established rule.

Petitioner further contends certain events work an estoppel against the committee, precluding a requirement that he take and pass the FYLSX before completing his studies and taking the general bar examination. To successfully invoke such a doctrine against a quasi-governmental agency petitioner must establish that the committee's conduct was intended or that petitioner had the right to believe it was intended to be acted upon by petitioner to his injury. (Crumpler v. Board of Administration of Public Employees Retirement System (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 567, 581, 108 Cal.Rptr. 293; see also Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305, 61 Cal.Rptr. 661, 431 P.2d 245.) Additionally, petitioner must establish that he was ignorant of the true state of facts that he was unaware he was required to take and pass the FYLSX before proceeding to complete his law school studies in preparation for the general bar examination. (Id.)

Petitioner particularly claims the estoppel arises from a letter written in 1976 by an employee of the committee, apparently at petitioner's request, to the California Department of Rehabilitation advising that petitioner was currently enrolled in a summer school program and should he receive passing grades that "he will have successfully completed one year of law study, complying with Rule IX, sec. 2(a)." ⁴ The purpose of the letter was to establish petitioner's eligibility to receive continuing financial assistance from the department. It states only that petitioner would complete a first year study in accordance with the rule setting forth educational requirements for the completion of each of four years of study as a precondition for taking the general bar examination. Neither the letter nor the rule referred to deal with the FYLSX; that examination and exemptions thereto are dealt with in rule VI, section 64, not rule IX. However, petitioner claims the content of the letter is evidence of committee conduct intended to induce action by petitioner in reliance on his claimed exemption from the FYLSX.

Even assuming a factual basis for the claimed estoppel, there are strong policy reasons for not invoking the doctrine in the circumstances of this case. ⁵ Estoppel will not ordinarily lie against a governmental agency if the result will be the frustration of a strong public policy. (See City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 493, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423; County of San Diego v. Cal. Water etc. Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 817, 829-830, 186 P.2d 124; Pettitt v. City of Fresno (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 813, 819, 110 Cal.Rptr. 262.) In none of the cases relied on by petitioner for the proposition that estoppel will lie against a public agency was the frustration of a strong public policy placed in issue. (See Canfield v. Prod (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 722, 137 Cal.Rptr. 27; Hartway v. State Board of Control (1976) 69 Cal.App.3d 502, 137 Cal.Rptr. 199; Advance Medical Diagnosti Laboratories v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 263, 129 Cal.Rptr. 723.)

There is a strong public policy in the requirement of the FYLSX. It serves a dual purpose of protecting persons who are ill-suited for a legal career from continuing to spend time, money and effort following completion of a one-year study in an effort that has little chance of success, and it affords persons who are better qualified for a legal career an opportunity to measure the quality of their training and education after the first year study to better prepare themselves for the general bar examination. ⁶ Such policy will surely be frustrated if the committee can be estopped from requiring an applicant to take and pass the FYLSX when that applicant is not exempt therefrom. (See Packer v. Board of Behavioral Science Examiners (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 190, 125 Cal.Rptr. 96. Petitioner's record of law school studies (see fn. 3, Ante ) also establishes that aside from any question of the requirement that petitioner take and pass the FYLSX, petitioner is not now eligible to take the general bar examination. Petitioner has not completed his fourth year of study, as required of applicants for the general bar examination completing their studies at unaccredited law schools. (Rule IX, section 91(2)(a).) At best, petitioner can be credited with but three and a half years of study even allowing him credit for the second year of study during which he did not receive passing grades for all the classroom hours so credited. He thus fails to satisfy requirements of rule IX, section 91(2)(a).

Petitioner also claims the FYLSX constitutes an impermissible discrimination against persons required to study law in unaccredited schools. He asserts his right to practice law is a fundamental interest and that any state discrimination designed to deny or interfere with such right must be subject to strict scrutiny and supported by a compelling state interest.

This court has articulated the appropriate test in examining claims of discrimination in occupational and professional licensing. "The conventional 'rational relationship' test is traditionally applied in cases involving occupational licensing . . . ." (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 17, 112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 798, 520 P.2d 10, 22.) We rejected in D'Amico a contention that the right to be licensed in a profession there osteopathy was a fundamental interest: "Nor can it be said that the instant case touches upon 'fundamental interests' as that term has lately been defined by the United States Supreme Court, for the right to be admitted to a certain profession is not a right 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' (San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16. . . .)" (Id., at pp. 17-18, 112 Cal.Rptr. at p. 798, 520 P.2d at p. 22.) Accordingly, the rules here under attack have a presumption of constitutionality and require only that the distinctions drawn bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. (See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners (1957) 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; Hackin v. Lockwood (9th Cir. 1966) 361 F.2d 499, cert. den. 385 U.S. 960, 87 S.Ct. 396, 17 L.Ed.2d 305.)

Recent court decisions have uniformly rejected the claim there is no rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose in rules requiring different treatment in her admissions depending on the nature or quality of legal education and training received by applicants to the bar. (See Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court (D.Mont.1974) 372 F.Supp. 1175, affd. (1974) 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172; Goldsmith v. Pringle (D.Colo.1975) 399 F.Supp. 620.)

There is no question the FYLSX serves a legitimate state interest. It both protects persons from continuing to pursue a profession for which they are not qualified, and aids qualified persons in judging the...