Mascari v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (AFL) Local Union No. 667
| Decision Date | 28 February 1948 |
| Citation | 215 S.W.2d 779,187 Tenn. 345 |
| Parties | MASCARI et al. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA (AFL) LOCAL UNION NO. 667 et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
On Rehearing April 15, 1948.
Writ of Certiorari Dismissed Jan. 10, 1949.
See 69 S.Ct. 410.
Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; L. D. Bejach, Chancellor.
Suit by Joe Mascari and others against International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (AFL) Local Union No. 667 and others to enjoin defendants from illegally calling a strike. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
On Petition to Rehear.
Robert A. Tillman, of Emphis, and Herbert S Thatcher, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
Newell N. Fowler and Chas. A. Johnston, both of Memphis, for appellees.
The bill in this cause was filed by complainants, Joe Mascari and others, who are engaged in the wholesale distribution of produce in the city of Memphis and adjacent territory seeking an injunction against the defendants to prevent the illegal calling of a strike.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 36 of the Public Acts of 1947, there existed a contract between complainants and defendants providing for what is generally termed a closed shop. The Act referred to is known as the Tennessee Open Shop Law and reads as follows:
A temporary injunction was granted. The defendants filed an answer, and the cause was heard on bill and answer. The answer contains the statement that the defendants 'are willing to admit, for the purposes of this suit only, that the only matter in dispute between the parties was that of the union shop.'
The determinative question between complainants and defendants in their negotiations for the execution of a new contract is: Complainants are willing to insert a clause in the new contract which shall provide that if the Act in question be held unconstitutional, the union shop and checkoff provisions of the contract between the parties be reinstated or reinserted in the provisions of the contract, but that in the meantime they shall not constitute a part of the contract; while defendants contend that the new contract shall contain provisions that the union shop and checkoff features of the contract be in full force and effect between the parties, as in the old or existing contract, and if said Act be declared constitutional, such clause shall cease to be effective as between the parties.
The answer of defendants sets out several contentions for claiming that the Act is unconstitutional. However, the real question is whether the Act violates the due process of law clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in Article 1, section 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee. These provisions are substantially the same in effect and result.
The phrase 'equal protection of the laws' is not susceptible of exact definition, and each case must be decided upon the facts involved. The guiding principle most often stated by the courts is that this constitutional guaranty requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. 12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 469.
The defendants rely on the case of Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177, where it was held that the due process of law clause contained in the State and Federal Constitutions are substantially identical. In that case the question under consideration was a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. The Court held that if there was any justifiable reason for the creation of a classification it was not an arbitrary act, and said:
'The principles on which the inquiry should be conducted are those laid down in a very recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369, Ann.Cas.1912C, 160: '(1) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore it is purely arbitrary. (2) A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. (3) When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. (4) One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.'' 125 Tenn. pages 559, 560, 145 S.W. page 188.
Can it be reasonably contended that this law discriminates against union members and in favor of nonunion members? Each group is given the same protection and the same right. The 'right to work' is guaranteed to all whether they be members or nonmembers of a union. Is not this equality? Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Unabridged Dictionary defines 'equality' as 'uniformity of state or action; equability; justice; impartiality.'
In Campbell v. McIntyre, 165 Tenn. 47, 52 S.W.2d 162, the Court held invalid a law regulating the vocation of public accountants, and quoted and reiterated the rules of construction adopted and approved in Motlow v. State, supra, but held the particular Act in question invalid because its provisions constituted an unreasonable and arbitrary restriction on the right of private contract.
The defendants contend that this is the objection to the Act in question. However, the Act now before us operates to make the field of employment open to all, while in the Campbell case the Act undertook to restrict the right of employment to a favorite group.
Defendants ignore the effect of the Act in question in taking the position that it is aimed directly at labor unions. On the contrary, the purpose of the Act in question was intended to outlaw discriminations against union men as well as nonunion men. The Act protects all employees of the State who work for a livelihood and gives all of them an opportunity to express their own wishes and desires.
The restraints which the Fourteenth Amendment has placed upon the use of its police power by a state are pointed out in Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 524, 54 S.Ct. 505, 510, 78 L.Ed. 940, 948, 949, 89 A.L.R. 1469, as follows:
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