Matlack v. Kline
| Decision Date | 04 December 1919 |
| Citation | 216 S.W. 323,280 Mo. 139 |
| Parties | SARAH B. MATLACK v. ROWENA KLINE, Appellant, and MARY E. SMITH |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court. -- Hon. Guy D. Kirby, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
George Hubbert, W. Cloud and Thos. Carlin for appellant.
(1) The will of David Caldwell must control the estate and resulting rights in question; and by its terms the same are vested in appellant Kline, dating from the deaths of her associate devisees without living issue, including Frederick D. Smith. (2) Courts are enjoined generally to have a care for the provisions of the wills of testators and truly execute the same; and there is no discretion to evade the force thereof nor liberty to rove in the fields of suggestion of better ways than the testator has pointed out. R. S. 1909, secs 583, 2569; Sparks v. Clay, 185 Mo. 408; Barnard v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 225; Stewart v. Jones, 219 Mo. 637; Stockwell v. Stockwell, 262 Mo. 685. (3) Whether appellant be regarded as vested of the Smith portion of the Caldwell estate by direct primary devise, or by force of the provision for it to be passed on to her at Smith's death, she stands seized of the whole estate for herself and her heirs, under the fundamental rule as to the unity of the particular estate and the remainder. Although they may be different parts of the entirety, the one in possession and the other in expectancy, they are, nevertheless and in fact one estate, and the particular life tenant stands for the entirety. 16 Cyc. 648; 2 Blacks. Com. 164; 4 Kent Com. 198. (4) Appellant was entitled to possession immediately upon the death of Smith as the preceding tenant, and to all rents and profits accruing subsequent to his death. 16 Cyc. 652. (5) At the death of Smith as life tenant, the estate for twenty years, as created by his lease for a term not expired by more than eleven years, was of necessity terminated, but subject at the option of the remainderman, to adoption of the leasehold term as to rents and royalties and the right to exact compliance therewith on the part of the remainderman. Hinton v. Bogart, 137 N.Y.S. 697; Guthmann v. Vallery, 71 N.W. 734, 66 Am. St. 475; Hoagland v. Crum, 113 Ill. 365; Mulligan v. Cox, 56 N.Y.S. 797; Edghill v. Mankey, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 688 and note; Ray v. Young, 142 N.W. 393. (6) A contract for a lease and a lease itself are far from identical. They are not to be confounded. They are different. 1 Tif. Landl. & Ten., p. 371, sec. 62. The written lease in this case does not purport to be the grant or deed of the appellant Kline. If so, the rents and royalties reserved would be to her, for they could not have been reserved on her lease arbitrarily to another, but must have been reserved to the lessor as such, at least unless it were otherwise by her agreement for good consideration thereto moving her. Tif. Landl. & Ten., pp. 1026-8.
White, Hackney & Lyons for respondent Sara B. Matlack.
(1) Fred D. Smith having but a life estate in the land in question, upon which no mining had previously been done, had not, by virtue of his life estate, any interest in the undeveloped minerals in the land, and was, therefore, incapable, by his own lease, of vesting, in the lessee the right to mine on the premises; and the defendant, Rowena Kline, as owner of the reversion or remainder, had no right, during the lifetime of Fred D. Smith, to lease the land for mining purposes. But, Fred D. Smith and Rowena Kline did have the power and authority to lease the property for mining purposes on such terms as they saw fit. Hill v. Ground, 114 Mo.App. 80. (2) By her instrument in writing, ratifying in full the mining lease made by Fred D. Smith, the defendant, Rowena Kline, ratified, confirmed and became bound by all the terms and conditions of the Smith lease, including the provision by which all the royalty was payable to Smith or his heirs. Town of Ansonia v. Cooper, 64 Conn. 536; Same Case, 66 Conn. 184. (3) Even though the written instrument executed by the defendant Kline, ratifying Smith's lease be deemed ineffectual as a lease from her by reason of the lack of operative words of lease, yet it operated, as against the defendant Kline, as a written license to enter and perform all the terms and conditions of the lease. 25 Cyc. 642; Boone v. Stover, 66 Mo. 430. And the plaintiff, as such licensee, having entered and expended large sums of money in mining and developing the land, by virtue of the license, has become a purchaser for a valuable consideration and the license, being thus an agreement on a valuable consideration, is irrevocable by the licensor. Railroad v. Railroad, 222 Mo. 484; Baker v. Railroad, 57 Mo. 273. Likewise the plaintiff on the faith of the validity of the lease, and the binding force of the license, having entered into the contract with Smith for the liquidation of the 10 per-cent royalty, and having paid him the $ 1000 cash and the monthly payments of $ 130 per month thereafter, should, on the same principle, be protected in her property rights thus acquired. (4) By virtue of her ratification in writing of the Smith lease the defendant Kline separated the accruing royalty from the reversion and made the same, by the express terms of the contract, payable to Smith or his heirs for the unexpired term of the lease, and while she could have withheld her consent to the execution of the lease and thereby thwarted the mining operations entirely, the defendant, Rowena Kline, had perfect power and authority to make all the royalty, or any part thereof, for the full term of the lease or any part thereof, payable to some person other than herself, and thereby estop herself from afterwards claiming any part of the royalty. Vantage Mining Co. v. Baker, 170 Mo.App. 457; Higgins v. California P. & A. Co., 109 Cal. 304; 1 Underhill L. & T. p. 532. (5) The defendant, Kline, having conferred full and complete dominion over, and ownership in, the accruing royalties on Fred D. Smith, by her ratification in writing of his lease, and having thus separated the accruing royalties from the reversion, the contract between Smith and the plaintiff liquidating the accruing royalties was valid and binding and conferred upon the plaintiff a property right in, and ownership of, the 10 per cent. royalty thereafter to accrue, so long as the plaintiff made the monthly payments therein provided for.
Jas. T. Neville, Norman A. Cox and Hugh Dabbs for respondent Mary E. Smith.
(1) Smith, as life tenant, with a contingent interest in the remainder, could not make a lease on the land for mining purposes without the consent of the life tenant. All the parties desiring that the land should be prospected and developed for mining purposes, in order to increase its value and consequently their interest therein, entered into the contract for lease described in the record, for the mutual benefit of all the parties thereto. This contract and lease were legal under all the authorities. In re Agnews Estate, 17 Pa. S.Ct. 201; Tarr v. City Council, 46 S.C. 15, 23 S.C. 984; Defferbaugh v. Hess, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1106; Lenfers v. Henkle, 73 Ill. 405. (2) Appellants not only ratified, signed and agreed to the execution of the lease, but the lessees and their assigns have gone into possession under this ratification, in accordance with the provisions of the lease, and the intentions of the parties appellant and respondent and those under whom they claim, have developed the land for mining purposes, spent large sums of money thereon, made improvements exceeding $ 75,000 in the way or mining plants and increased the value of the land from $ 40 an acre to about $ 300 an acre. Under this state of facts they will not be heard to say that the lease is invalid and that Mrs. Smith is not entitled to the royalty under the terms thereof. (3) The court will take judicial notice of the fact that in this district the ore supply will last for more than fifty years after development is started. This fact bears largely on the question of consideration, which is the principal point urged by appellant, and shows that after the expiration of the present lease the remainderman will have the opportunity to produce ore therefrom for many years, taking for that purpose a fully developed and proven property, whereas, before the execution of these contracts, the land had simply an agricultural value which was nothing like the present and future value for mining purposes. Rowena Kline has ratified not only the contract for lease between Smith and Bowen, but has ratified and acknowledged the lease as well. There is nothing in the argument of appellant that the act of Rowena Kline and those under whom she claims is not of sufficient solemnity to take effect as a lease. It is a well known principle of law, that a ratification of the contract for lease and of the lease itself by Rowena Kline, when based on a consideration, is an adoption by her of these instruments as her own, and having induced the expenditure of large sums of money in improving and developing this property by such ratification, appellant is now, under the law, denied the privilege of backing up on her bargain. As to the consideration paid to appellant and those under whom she claims for the execution of these contracts of adoption, or for this lease, as the law now makes it, when appellant, who was of legal age and capacity to make a contract, named the consideration therein for foregoing certain of her rights, the benefit accruing to the land by reason of the opening up and developing of mines thereon, and this consideration was paid by the other contracting party by the investment of thousands of dollars in the opening up and developing of mines thereon, appellant's right to question the adequacy of the consideration named by...
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