Mato v. State

• Decision Date: 13 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 481S95,481S95
• Citation: 429 N.E.2d 945
• Parties: Michael MATO, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 945

429 N.E.2d 945

Michael MATO, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 481S95.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 13, 1982.

Howard S. Grimm, Jr., Fort Wayne, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Defendant (Appellant), following a trial by jury, was convicted of Rape, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1(1) (Burns 1979), Criminal Deviate Conduct, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-2(a)(2) (Burns 1979), Theft, Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2 (Burns 1979), and Criminal Confinement, Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979). He was sentenced to a total of forty (40) years imprisonment. This direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in finding, after a belated hearing, that the defendant was competent to stand trial?

(2) Whether the trial court erred in not granting the defendant a new trial so that he might raise the defense of insanity?

Following rendition of the jury's verdict, on February 15, 1980, the trial judge on his own motion, ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. One appointed psychiatrist reported that in his opinion the defendant was not sane and was in need of psychiatric treatment. The other appointed psychiatrist reported that, in his opinion, the defendant was not competent to stand trial and had been insane at the time that he committed the criminal acts. One of the psychiatrists also recommended that the defendant receive psychiatric treatment, as did the pre-sentence report.

At a sentencing hearing held on April 1, 1980, Judge Bontrager found probable cause to believe that Defendant was not competent to proceed and committed him to a state hospital for evaluation. The judge then disqualified himself from further proceedings, and a special judge was appointed by this Court on April 11, 1980. On May 27, 1980, the state hospital superintendent reported that the defendant could understand the nature of the charges against him and could participate in his defense. A competency hearing was then held by the newly appointed judge who found, on October 6, 1980, that the defendant had been competent during his trial and was then competent to be sentenced.

ISSUE I

Defendant contends that based upon events, particularly the defendant's behavior prior to and during the trial, the trial judge should have held a competency hearing, sua sponte, under Ind.Code § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1979).

The measure of competency to stand trial is whether or not the defendant has a present ability to consult rationally with his defense counsel and a factual comprehension of the proceedings against him. Evans v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 148, 157, 300 N.E.2d 882, Dragon v. State, (Ind.1979) 383 N.E.2d 1046, Dusky v. United States, (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824. Under Defense counsel has detailed three indicators which he claims should have alerted the court to the need for an earlier hearing to determine whether or not the defendant had the ability to understand the proceedings against him. The first alleged indicator was the defendant's confusion at a number of pretrial appearances before the judge at which the defendant had displayed difficulty in comprehending the substance of the charges against him and the purpose of his previous appearances. The second alleged indicator was the defendant's confused response, during a polygraph examination. The third alleged indicator was an incident which had occurred at trial and in which Defendant had given responsive and logical testimony on direct examination and most of the cross-examination. At one point during the cross-examination, however, he had become confused and unresponsive and had interrupted the prosecutor to discuss a song which he claimed to have heard on the radio. The song, according to his bizarre ramblings, had some connection with his criminal conduct.

Ind.Code § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1979), the trial court may raise the issue of defendant's competency at any stage of the proceedings, or at the suggestion of any person. The trial court is vested with discretion to determine if "reasonable grounds" exist to hold a competency hearing.

It is important to note that, as were the circumstances in Evans v. State, supra, at no time, either before or during the trial, did any of the participants raise any question as to Defendant's competency. Neither are we of the opinion that any of the circumstances now cited by Defendant as indicators of his incompetency were of such force as to compel an earlier invocation of the statute.

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find him incompetent to stand trial when it became aware that "his mental competency was not such as to allow him to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him and participate in a rational manner." This argument presumes a matter not in the record, i.e. that the court had become aware of Defendant's incompetency. It confuses a recognition of the possibility of incompetency with an ultimate conclusion of incompetency. All that can be said of the record in this connection is that the court became aware of certain clues which he recognized as indicators of incompetency. In view of this recognition, it did what it was required to do under the statute-instituted proceedings to determine the question. Those proceedings resulted in a determination that the defendant was then competent to proceed with sentencing and had been competent throughout the proceedings.

Defendant's position appears to be, first that the court erred in not making an earlier determination of competency, and secondly that when it did make the determination, it erred therein.

With regard to the first contention, it cannot be questioned that the trial court is required to proceed under the statute as soon as reasonable grounds for believing a defendant to be incompetent become apparent. However, the statute recognizes that the grounds for such belief may appear, for the first time, at any stage of the proceedings. It must also be considered that every occurrence outside the norm is not necessarily a compelling indicator and that such occurrence may have a cumulative effect. If no petition for a competency hearing is filed, as was the case here, the matter of necessity is one that may depend, almost exclusively, upon the perceptive powers of the trial judge.

Defendant contends that a competency hearing held six months after trial does not comport to due process requirements, but he offers no persuasive argument or authority in support of the claim. Unquestionably, there are difficulties with retrospective determinations of competency such as fading memories, and changing conditions, to identify but two. Nevertheless, depending upon the data that is available, trustworthy determinations can be made retrospectively. United States v. Makris We next turn to a consideration of defendant's contention that the trial court erred in its belated determination that the defendant was then competent and had been throughout the proceedings.

(5th Cir. 1979) 535 F.2d 899; and we have, in at least two previous instances,...