Mattatall v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2005-318-Appeal.,2005-318-Appeal.
• Citation: 947 A.2d 896
• Parties: Stephen MATTATALL v. STATE of Rhode Island.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

947 A.2d 896

Stephen MATTATALL v. STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2005-318-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 29, 2008.

Paula Rosin, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Virginia M. McGinn, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON for the Court.

The applicant, Stephen Mattatall, appeals to this Court from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. On appeal, the applicant contends: (1) that the hearing justice erred in declining to recuse himself with respect to Mr. Mattatall's application for postconviction relief; and (2) that the Alford¹ plea made by applicant in 1979 when faced with a reckless driving charge was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore should not have been used as a predicate for sentencing the applicant under the habitual offender statute when, several years later, he was convicted of second-degree murder.

This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on April 8, 2008, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the record, the memoranda submitted by the parties, and the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the case should be decided at this time.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

In 1983, applicant was charged with the murder of one John Scanlon, whose body had been found in applicant's home on the morning of September 24, 1982. Following a jury trial, applicant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he was sentenced to a term of forty years imprisonment, with thirty years to serve and the balance suspended with probation. The trial justice also imposed an additional ten-year sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute.² The applicant appealed his conviction to this Court, which reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Mattatall, 510 A.2d 947 (R.I.1986).³

A second jury trial, which began in September of 1987, ended in a mistrial due to applicant's behavior in the courtroom, for which he was held in contempt of court.

Finally, following a third jury trial in 1988, applicant was found guilty of second-degree murder and was sentenced to a term of sixty years imprisonment, with fifty years to serve and the balance suspended with probation. The trial justice also sentenced applicant to an additional twenty-year term pursuant to his status as an habitual offender. This Court affirmed his conviction in State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I.1992); that opinion contains a thorough recitation of the facts and procedural history with respect to applicant's trial and eventual conviction of second-degree murder.

After this Court's affirmance of his conviction, applicant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1, alleging over thirty separate grounds for relief, including prosecutorial misconduct and "[c]onspiracy and [i]neffectiveness." A hearing was held on September 28, 2004, at the conclusion of which the hearing justice found that the application was "wholly meritless, groundless, and must be denied." An order reflecting that determination was entered on October 7, 2004.

Before his first application was denied by the Superior Court, applicant filed a second pro se application for postconviction relief on November 29, 2001. In that second application, he contended that the enhancement of his second-degree murder sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute was improperly predicated in part on his prior felony conviction for reckless driving, death resulting. That conviction resulted from applicant's Alford plea,⁴ but his second application contended that that plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The applicant also argued that, because he "didn't commit" the offense of reckless driving, death resulting, "he should not and cannot be deemed a repeat offender" for purposes of sentencing pursuant to the habitual offender statute.

Although applicant filed his second application for postconviction relief in Kent County, the matter was subsequently transferred to Providence County to the justice of the Superior Court who had presided over the third murder trial. The applicant then moved to recuse that justice and to have his application assigned for hearing by another judicial officer, whom he specifically identified. In support of that two-pronged motion, applicant alleged: (1) that the justice to whom the case was assigned was biased against him and (2) that the trial justice who accepted applicant's Alford plea in the 1979 reckless driving case should rule on any challenge to that plea. On May 9, 2002, the hearing justice entered an order denying applicant's motion to recuse and to reassign.⁵

Thereafter, on October 26, 2005, the hearing justice denied Mr. Mattatall's second application for postconviction relief. The hearing justice noted that applicant had previously challenged the use of his 1979 conviction as a predicate for the imposition of an additional sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute, which argument had been rejected by both the Superior Court and subsequently by this Court in State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I.1992). Accordingly, the hearing justice concluded that consideration of the second application was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. The hearing justice also stated that he had heard and denied applicant's previous application for postconviction relief and that he could "conceive of no grounds nor any compelling interests of justice that entitle [applicant] to another post-conviction entreaty."⁶ It is from this denial of his second application for postconviction relief that applicant timely appealed.

On appeal, applicant contends that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion to recuse and his motion to have his application for postconviction relief reassigned. The applicant's specific contentions are: (1) that "it is neither appropriate nor the normal procedure for someone other than the judge who took the plea that is being challenged on post-conviction relief to consider a defendant's application, unless the original judge is unavailable for reasons such as death or retirement;" (2) that assignment of an application for postconviction relief to the original trial justice is mandatory; and (3) that the justice who denied his second application for postconviction relief should have recused himself because, in applicant's estimation, he was biased against applicant.

The applicant also contends that his 1979 Alford plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that his claim at to this issue is not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.

Standard of Review

Section 10-9.1-1 provides that the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.⁷ Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I.2007). In reviewing a hearing justice's determination with respect to an application for postconviction relief, this Court will not disturb the findings of the hearing justice "absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence." State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 993 (R.I.2002); see also Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d 82, 84-85 (R.I.2007); Doctor v. State, 865 A.2d 1064, 1067 (R.I.2005); Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I. 2001).

At the same time, however, "questions of fact concerning whether a defendant's constitutional rights have been infringed, and mixed question of law and fact with constitutional implications, are reviewed de novo." Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gonder, 935 A.2d at 85. Nevertheless, as we have emphasized on numerous occasions, in conducting our review, we still accord great deference to a hearing justice's findings of historical fact and to inferences drawn from those facts, even when the de novo standard is applied with respect to issues of constitutional dimension. See Gonder, 935 A.2d at 85; Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993; Ouimette, 785 A.2d at 1135.

Analysis

I The Motion to Recuse and Reassign

Before we address applicant's contentions, we pause to note that he has not provided a transcript of the hearing on his motion to recuse and reassign.⁸ This Court has declared on numerous occasions that it is "`risky business' for a party to appeal without providing the Court with a transcript of the Superior Court proceedings." West v. Town of Narragansett, 926 A.2d 1021, 1023 (R.I.2007) (mem.); see also Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I.2007); Sentas v. Sentas, 911 A.2d 266, 270 (R.I.2006); 731 Airport Associates, LP v. H & M Realty Associates, LLC, ex rel. Leef, 799 A.2d 279, 282 (R.I.2002). Nevertheless, in this instance, the Superior Court's order denying applicant's motion to recuse and reassign sufficiently sets forth the hearing justice's reasoning to permit us to review same.

A Recusal

The applicant contends that the hearing justice should have recused himself because his impartiality was uncertain given the fact that, when sentencing him in the underlying murder case, the hearing justice had made a number of unfavorable comments with respect to applicant's character and credibility. In support of his claim, applicant points to Article VI, Canon 3E of the Supreme Court Rules of Judicial Conduct, which states that a judicial officer is required to "disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the [judicial officer's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,...