Matter of Woodson v. Continental Airlines, W. C. No. 4-500-568 (Colo. 12/29/2003), W. C. No. 4-500-568.

• Citation: W. C. No. 4-500-568.
• Case Date: December 29, 2003
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 1

In the Matter of the Claim of Caroline Woodson, Claimant,
v.
Continental Airlines d/b/a Chlsea Catering, Employer, and Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, Insurer, Respondents. W. C. No. 4-500-568. Supreme Court of Colorado. December 29, 2003.

The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Martinez (ALJ) which denied additional medical and disability benefits. We affirm.

Paul D. Feld, Esq. and T. Paul Krueger, II, Esq., Denver, CO, for Respondents.

Kathy E. Dean and Robert S. Socolofsky, Industrial Claim Appeals Panel.

FINAL ORDER

On September 7, 2000 the claimant suffered a compensable injury to her right foot, which was diagnosed as a contusion. The claimant subsequently reported symptoms in other areas of her body which she attributed to the industrial injury. These symptoms included pain in her right hip, right thoracic area, right shoulder, neck and face. The claimant also reported vision loss in the right eye. At hearing, the claimant requested workers' compensation benefits for treatment of incontinence and cataract surgery.

The ALJ found Dr. Dahahey examined the claimant on April 19, 2001, and diagnosed subjective right foot pain of unknown etiology. Dr. Dahahey also opined the claimant's vision loss and other symptoms were unrelated to the industrial injury. Crediting the opinions of Dr. Dahahey, the ALJ determined the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between the industrial injury and her other symptoms. Therefore, the ALJ denied the requests for additional medical and disability benefits.

Neither the claimant's petition to review nor her brief in support of the petition to review contain any specific allegations of error. Instead, the claimant attached documents to the petition for review and requested the ALJ reconsider her requests for additional benefits based on the evidence contained in the documents. We perceive no basis to disturb the ALJ's order.

Our authority to review the ALJ's order is defined in § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2003. That statute precludes us from disturbing the ALJ's order unless the ALJ's findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review, the ALJ has not resolved conflicts in the evidence, the record does not support the ALJ's findings, the findings do not support the order, or the order is not supported by the applicable law.

Our review is also limited to the evidence in the record before the ALJ. City of Boulder v. Dinsmore, 902 P.2d...